845.00/1351
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Calvin H. Oakes of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
| Participants: | Colonel Johnson |
| Colonel Herrington | |
| Mr. Murray | |
| Mr. Alling | |
| Mr. Oakes | |
| Mr. Parker |
This memorandum may be prefaced by Colonel Johnson’s remark that in his opinion the situation in India has deteriorated in the last two months to such an extent that unless the United States Government is prepared to send in the near future to India several divisions and 500 airplanes the Government would be wise to withdraw entirely from that theater of operations and to consider the country lost.
According to both Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington, distrust and dislike of the British has increased to such an extent that many Indians there view the Japanese in a friendly light. In this connection Colonel Johnson stated that the Inspector General of Police at Calcutta had informed him that in his opinion should the Japanese attempt to enter Calcutta they would be received with garlands by the civilian population, and that in fact many of the native policemen would assist in the welcome. The Inspector General was further of the opinion that at such time a massacre of the Europeans might easily take place, and it was that official’s opinion that all Americans would be well advised to leave while an opportunity existed.
Colonel Herrington stated that 800,000 Indians had already left Calcutta and that the remainder of the population is ready to flee. It was said that the British have a considerable concentration of troops some miles up the only road leading to or from Calcutta with a view to rushing them into the city should an attack take place. That this road would at such a time become blocked with refugees appears certain, but Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington stated that the British military authorities were apparently untroubled by this problem.
Nehru, Rajagopalachari and others could at one time have formed a coalition which would have been able to act as a bulwark to the British in the present crisis had the necessary concessions been made. Jinnah and the industrialists were then prepared to cooperate with such a nationalist government as the British might have been able to create. In so far as Jinnah and the Moslem League are concerned, Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington think that their support for the British or for any scheme propounded by the British is pretty well assured under almost any circumstances. The industrialists, however, are becoming less amenable to British persuasion, and Birla—who is politically the most influential of the industrialists—had, in a conversation with Colonel Johnson, shortly before the latter’s departure, definitely indicated that he was in growing agreement with Gandhi’s contention that the British must go. On every side the feeling is increasing that the British must be gotten out of the country at all costs. Whether any solution is now possible is therefore problematical.
[Page 659]The Viceroy and others in authority were determined at the time of the Cripps Mission that necessary concessions should not be made and are still of the same opinion. In this connection Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington both expressed the firm conviction that the British are prepared to lose India, as they lost Burma, rather than make any concessions to the Indians in the belief that India will be returned to them after the war with the status quo ante prevailing. Colonel Johnson stated further that he had been reliably informed that the authorities did not propose to attempt any serious defense of India in the event of Japanese attack, and that he had so stated to Cripps. Cripps naturally refused to believe this, but was prevailed upon by Colonel Johnson to confront General Wavell with the allegation. Cripps is reported to have told Colonel Johnson later that Wavell had admitted that this was the case. It is Colonel Johnson’s opinion that with the exception of such components of the Indian Army as may have been able to withdraw from Burma, there are only about 50,000 properly equipped soldiers of the Indian Army in India at the present time, and these badly trained. The size of the British garrison is said to be very small.
Lack of troops is aggravated by the poor quality of the British officer in India, and Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington stated that it was obvious that India had been used as a dumping ground for the least capable of the officer personnel. Wavell himself, however excellent a general he may once have been, is viewed as exhausted physically and nervously, and is considered to be not only incompetent himself but to possess an incompetent staff. In this connection it was stated that Wavell and the latter’s G–2 had insisted that Lashio was still being held several days after it had fallen. Their knowledge even of the terrain in Assam is said to be faulty. Further incompetence is indicated by the wasteful manner in which American Lend-Lease material is being handled, sufficient storage space never having been provided, and inefficient disposal being made of the material upon its arrival. Complete indifference appears to prevail regarding the resultant deterioration of the material.
The seriousness of the political situation in India is further aggravated by the lack of means of defense in Ceylon. While the English were successful in beating off the first Japanese attack, they lost all but about 50 of their planes. The planes lost have never been replaced; the naval base at Trincomalee has been abandoned; and the ground forces are inadequate. It is Colonel Johnson’s and Colonel Herrington’s opinion that should the Japanese make another attack on Ceylon there is at the present time nothing to prevent them from occupying the island.