845.00/12882/8

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

Mr. Welles: It seems to me that the State Department must immediately get to work on the changed situation in the Far East arising [Page 603] out of the fall of Singapore. The first item on the list ought to be to tackle the Indian problem in a large way.

Pursuant to the President’s directive there is now being organized an economic and war supply mission to India. Tentatively, it is contemplated that this will be composed of Henry Grady, Louis Johnson and two other men to be selected by the War Production Board. It is contemplated this mission will get under way at once and will endeavor to step up the very considerable production which now exists, looking towards completion of the Indian program to put a million men into the field by the end of 1942.

But, under existing conditions, any such program is not likely to get very far unless the political situation is handled with extreme vigor.

Secretary Hull has twice taken up with the British Government the possibility of a prompt recognition of India’s aspiration to a freer existence and a full membership in the British family of nations.14 The President has indicated his sympathy with this general line. Winant has indicated there is wide division in the British Cabinet and has urged that we lend assistance. The Near Eastern Division is in full accord, and so am I.

I suggest, accordingly, that we once more take up with the British, preferably through Winant in London, the necessity of making a statement of policy with respect to India; and I suggest that the United States associate herself with Great Britain in stating that policy. It would seem that the logical thing to do was to have Churchill15 announce in London that the British plans contemplated the introduction of India as a full partner in the United Nations, and that by prearrangement, the United States—perhaps through the President—promptly and vigorously welcome the step.

As an immediate implementation of this policy, India should grant to the United States full recognition of our Diplomatic Agent there in a raised diplomatic status, preferably that of ambassador, though I suppose we could compromise on minister, if need be. Equally, the Indian Agent General here should be similarly raised to equivalent rank.

At the same time, the Viceroy16 could be directed to hold a constitutional conference of some kind in New Delhi looking towards the evolution of ways and means of recognizing the growing political importance of Indian sentiment as such.

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I do not have any confidence as to the immediate ability of the Indian Congress group to do much except talk at this stage of the game, but I believe the nature of their talk probably will determine whether there is a general acquiescence and cooperation in war organization in India, or whether there is a more or less passive resistance, which will be exploited by the Japanese to the limit. We should have to put up the methods, for the time being, to the British—our own role at this stage would have to be as observers and potential suppliers.

A[dolf] A. B[erle], Jr.
  1. For one of these approaches to the British Government, see memorandum of conversation by the Secretary of State, May 7, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iii, p. 178. There is no indication in the Department’s files of a second approach to the British Government on this subject.
  2. Winston Churchill, British Prime Minister.
  3. Marquess of Linlithgow.