845.00/1274
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs ( Murray ) to the Under Secretary of State ( Welles )
Mr. Welles: Reference is made to telegrams nos. 1, 6, and 13 from New Delhi11 concerning recent political developments in India and attitudes adopted by nationalist groups. Before discussing the information reported in these telegrams, however, it may prove helpful to consider briefly the political background of these recent political developments.
It may be recalled that Gandhi12 broke with the Congress shortly after the fall of France, when the Congress offered to cooperate with the Government in the defense of India, provided its demands were met for a responsible government at New Delhi. Gandhi’s attitude [Page 602] was that such cooperation would involve being a party to violence in the conduct of the war. The Government rejected these demands for a responsible government. Then, in a meeting at Bombay in September 1940, the Congress Working Committee passed the “Bombay Resolution” withdrawing the Poona Offer. As a result, Congress found itself in the dilemma of not being able to go forward or backward and turned to Gandhi for help. Gandhi then organized the individual non-violence movement, whereby individuals selected by him made anti-war speeches and were promptly jailed by the Government. Shortly before Christmas, 1941, these prisoners were released by the Government of India.
On December 30, 1941, the Congress Working Committee, in the Bardoli resolution referred to in New Delhi’s telegram no. 1 of January 2, 4 p.m., signified its willingness to cooperate in the prosecution of the war, provided the British Government makes some concessions in return. Early in January 1942, the All-India Congress Committee ratified the Bardoli resolution.
Gandhi endorsed the Bardoli resolution but at the same time asked to be relieved of Congress leadership. For quite some time prior to the adoption of the resolution there had been considerable dissatisfaction within the party regarding satyagraha (the individual nonviolence movement). Many party members considered the movement unrealistic and ineffective, and opposition to it was growing. Furthermore, Gandhi found that he was receiving only half-hearted cooperation from some of those he had selected to participate in the movement. Apparently, he realized that he could not prevent the adoption of the resolution but felt that his non-violent principles would not permit him to participate in a policy of cooperation with the war effort. He therefore renounced his active leadership in the party but, in endorsing it, Gandhi retains a nominal leadership and was able to nominate Nehru as his “legal heir”.
Mr. Wilson13 points out that it is difficult, at this early date, to interpret the full meaning of the Bardoli resolution or to gauge its significance accurately.