740.0011 Pacific War/2647

Memorandum, by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton)38

China’s War Potential: Estimate

I

Basic Facts

1.
Land Area. The total area of Chinese territory, including Manchuria, Mongolia, Chinese Turkestan and Tibet, is estimated to be 4,282,000 square miles. This exceeds by over 600,000 square miles the continental area of the United States. It represents a land mass which would stretch east and west from the middle of the Caucasus Mountains to Lisbon, north and south from the northernmost tip of Norway to the bottom of the heel of Italy, northwest and southeast from the north tip of Scotland to Cairo, and southwest and northeast from Lisbon to the White Sea.
2.
Population. The population of China is estimated to be between four and five hundred million. This is almost equal to the population of the entire British Empire, including India, and is between 4 and 5 times the population of the entire Japanese Empire. It is roughly 3½ times the population of the United States.
3.
Economic Resources. With the exception of petroleum, China has extensive potential and developed natural and industrial resources, including some excellent facilities for manufacture of heavy chemicals, iron and steel. Important heavy industries have been developed in Manchuria, and some in North China and in the Yangtze Valley.
4.
Communications. Transportation in China is served by a skeleton of both east-west and north-south railways connecting large centers of population and industry. In addition, there are the important facilities offered by the great Yangtze River and other transportation facilities available on smaller rivers, lakes, and canals. To a lesser extent, highways and airdromes have been developed for land and air transportation. Radio and telegraph communications are adequate.
5.
Present Situation.
(a)
The present Chinese governmental structure is of relatively recent origin. The spirit of nationalism in China which was in the process of development and organization under Chiang Kai-shek has received great impetus by the impact of Japan’s aggression and barbarities against the Chinese people. Nationalism in China is a growing force which is contributing steadily toward the development of a strong, unified nation. By Western standards there is at present too extensive provincial autonomy and more than usual inefficiency in the administration of the central government.
(b)
The military situation in China for the past five years has been in a constant state of flux with intermittent sallies and attacks by both sides; but in general it is characterized by Japanese advances and Chinese defensive retreats.
(c)
It is authoritatively estimated that China has slightly less than 3,000,000 regular soldiers in the field (not including organized and unorganized guerrillas). The Chinese armies lack air power. They have no effective air units with the exception of American volunteer forces. Chinese armies lack motorized and mechanized war equipment. Chinese armies lack heavy artillery. Faced by an enemy having such equipment, China is obviously unable and cannot be expected to open an offensive. Even defensive operations are in considerable measure impaired and imperiled by the lack of these arms.
(d)
The over-all strategy of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek represents defensive warfare on a scale probably more vast than ever before employed. (The operations of Soviet Russia would seem to be a combination of offensive and defensive tactics.) Chinese armies faced by superior military power put up stubborn resistance and eventually withdrew practically intact to the point where Japanese strategists considered it not worthwhile to press their attack. This withdrawal has been aided and Japanese occupation seriously hindered by the adoption of the tactics of “scorched earth” and of guerrilla warfare behind the lines. Such tactics were feasible and were achieving an appreciable amount of success in the war of attrition so long as China was able to obtain vital materials from abroad and to maintain its armies in the face of stringent economic and psychological conditions. Success of the Chinese military operations has depended in large part upon the maintenance among the Chinese in both occupied and unoccupied China of a high spirit of resistance.
(e)
World-wide hostilities and the isolation of China have resulted in an exacerbation of psychological and economic disabilities in China. Financial and economic power is weakened. Morale is threatened by a growing feeling of war-weariness and discouragement and was seriously dampened by the disillusionment which many Chinese felt [Page 73] when they witnessed the speed and success with which Japanese armed forces overcame British, Dutch and American arms in the Far East. The Chinese had felt reasonably certain that China’s position would become much stronger when Western powers became involved in war with Japan. Instead, the Chinese have found the position of China considerably worsened in an immediate sense following Japan’s attack on the United States.
(f)
China has withstood this blow to its morale largely through the great influence and leadership which Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek—a man who has demonstrated amazing tenacity of purpose—exercises in China.
(g)
Japan controls in addition to the large territory of Manchuria and parts of Mongolia approximately 800,000 square miles of China. (This is a rough estimate based upon the location of front lines. Within this area there are large sections relatively free from Japanese control. There exist widespread and intermittent Chinese organized guerrilla activity and sabotage.) Japan’s invasion of China has resulted in Japanese control of all important coastal points of ingress and egress, of industrial and commercial centers, and of large sections of main Chinese railways. Japan has now cut substantially all organized land and water transportation between China and the outside world.
(h)
Japan has achieved a measure of political and economic success in China. There has emerged some Chinese leadership in occupied China acting in cooperation with Japan. The Japanese have been able to make valuable use of the local Chinese population in their efforts at reconstruction and reorganization of occupied areas of China. Japan has made considerable progress in the restoration of transportation and communication facilities, in rebuilding and expanding industrial facilities, and in the reopening and development of natural resources.
(i)
A Chinese spokesman in London is reported recently to have asserted that Japan now has in China (exclusive of troops in Manchuria and adjoining Japanese territory) 1,000,000 soldiers. A more accurate estimate would probably be appoximately 600,000. Japanese armies in China are currently employing advances in force in a number of widely-scattered territories in an apparent attempt further to extend their holdings in China.
(j)
In conclusion: From the foregoing there plainly emerge two fundamental characteristics—first, the immensity of China’s physical size and manpower resources and second, the vagueness and instability of numerous elements in the situation. These two characteristics make impossible precision in analysis of China’s war potential and of the situation in China, occupied or unoccupied. Accurate detailed [Page 74] estimates are prevented by increased confusion due to protracted and widespread military activities, by the lack of reliable statistics and by the very immensity of the area and population involved. General conclusions, both accurate and important, can, however, be reached. In considering this problem, it is proposed first to present an estimate of the effects which would follow the collapse of organized Chinese resistance to Japan.

II

Possible Effects of a Collapse of Organized Chinese Resistance

A. The Effects on Japan.

1.
Every Japanese cabinet which has come to power since the outbreak of the war in China in 1937 has had as its primary objective “the settlement of the China incident.” Since early in 1939 the Japanese people have been repeatedly and explicitly promised that the Government would devote its best efforts to an attempt to bring about a cessation of hostilities in China. The collapse of organized resistance in China would undoubtedly give Japanese morale a great lift. Coupled with the victories Japan has already won it would probably go far to steel the Japanese public to meet later defeats and disasters with much greater equanimity than could be expected if hostilities in China were to continue.
2.
Japan’s propagandists in their psychological campaigns of “Asia for the Asiatics” and “the colored races of the world united under Japanese leadership against the white races” would claim a great victory. Japan would thereby gain the essential element which it lacks at present to promote such psychological warfare, A collapse of China would immeasurably contribute to the Axis’ psychological offensive against India and the Middle East and would in all likelihood greatly facilitate the Japanese effort to organize the populations of occupied countries including China behind Japan’s war efforts. Psychologically Japan might well obtain such a secure place as the leader of Asiatic races, if not colored races of the world, that Japan’s defeat by the United Nations might not be definitive.
3.
It has been affirmed that Japan, even if organized Chinese resistance should collapse, would be forced to keep large numbers of troops within China. Apart from the considerable number of forces which Japan has need for in its offensive thrusts as distinguished from operations in connection with occupation, this is no doubt true and would be in keeping with Japan’s plans for development as a great continental power. However, it seems clear that the quantity and quality of Japan’s troops and equipment in China could be reduced if organized Chinese resistance were to collapse. Japan’s war potential would be thereby increased.
4.
The present undeniable process of attrition against Japanese forces in China would be slowed down if not obliterated. The strain on the morale of Japanese troops in China would be immensely decreased once they were free of the constant threat of organized attack on their often weakly-held positions. Japanese troops would then face nothing more than intermittent raids or uprisings by ill-equipped and uncoordinated Chinese guerrillas or bandits. A comparison of tasks facing German troops in insuring tranquillity in the prostrated countries of Europe and their task in the guerrilla-infested areas of occupied Russia illustrates the difference in the situation which Japan would face in China were organized resistance to disappear there.
5.
With the collapse of resistance from Chungking Japan would be enabled immediately to strengthen and vitalize the Chinese political leadership at Nanking and would thereby obtain relatively undisturbed access to the important strategic materials and resources of all China. At the present time Japan in exploiting China is subject to continual harassment and non-cooperation coupled with a great measure of passive resistance. Were Chungking to collapse, there might well come to the fore the age-old Chinese spirit of accepting conditions as they are and of making the best of them. The spirit of the new China which has had as its keynote dogged resistance to Japan might die; it would certainly be driven underground. In all probability Japan would then be enabled, with little difficulty, to use the enormous manpower of China for economic, if not military, purposes.
6.
Japan would obtain safety from the danger of air attack from the Asian continent and from large-scale land operations against the Japanese armies. Japan would have under its control buffer territory stretching from India to the Pacific Ocean, from Malaya to the Soviet border. (Consideration of the possibility of hostilities between Soviet Russia and Japan has been deliberately omitted.)
7.
A collapse of organized Chinese resistance would enable the Japanese military leaders to develop in China as they have done in Manchuria a vast area of entrenchment in which they might attempt to hold out even though the Government at Tokyo were eventually forced to accept peace terms from the United Nations.
8.
In conclusion: A collapse of organized Chinese resistance would greatly bolster morale in Japan, would immeasurably increase the effectiveness and appeal of Japan’s psychological warfare, would release a certain number of first-class Japanese troops and would make available for use elsewhere practically all of Japan’s most efficient motorized and mechanized equipment and air power, would provide Japan with capable Chinese leaders to aid in the difficult job of administering China, would simplify the strategic military problems of the Japanese General Staff, would accord Japan relatively undisturbed [Page 76] access to the vital strategic materials and resources of China, and would permit the Japanese militarists to entrench themselves and their organizations on the continent of China.

These factors would immeasurably augment Japan’s military potential.

This is true in reference to Japan’s military potential against the United States.

This is true in reference to Japan’s military potential against Soviet Russia.

This is true in reference to Japan’s military potential against Australia and India.

This is true in reference to Japan’s military potential to hold the areas it has occupied.

B. The Effects on the United Nations.

(Note: Some factors presented under other headings apply to this section, but in order to keep repetition to a minimum an attempt has been made to mention only new factors. Even so, some repetition has been unavoidable but it is believed that an approach from various angles serves to present a comprehensive picture.)

1.
It is impossible to say that the war against Japan will not be of long duration. Were organized resistance in China to collapse, the United States and the other countries opposing Japan would have lost one of their most important “aces.” It is not to be forgotten that Japan is both an island naval power and a continental army power. It is problematical whether a defeat of Japan as an island naval power would accomplish our objectives unless that defeat were accompanied also by the defeat of Japan on the continent of Asia and the elimination of its paramount influence on that continent. The loss of China as an active partner in the war against Japan would greatly increase the difficulties of land operations against Japan, whether by modern armies or by land-based air armadas.
2.
The collapse of organized resistance in China would deal a serious blow to the psychological warfare efforts of the United Nations. The success of psychological warfare of the United Nations vis-à-vis the Far East and to some extent the Near East hinges upon the continuance of war between China and Japan.
3.
The American people have in the past few years clearly demonstrated their friendship and sympathy for the cause of free China and their belief in the unity of that cause with our own. A collapse of China would bring inevitable political repercussions in this country and would be a blow to the morale of the American people. It is not too much to expect that the American people would place blame upon their own political and military leaders for failure in China.
4.
The prestige which the United States now enjoys in South America and in the Near East would be seriously diminished were the Chinese to throw down their arms.
5.
The economic warfare of the United Nations would suffer from a collapse of Chinese resistance. The United Nations would lose and Japan would obtain important strategic materials such as antimony, tungsten, tin, silk, bristles, and tung oil. Japan would be rendered practically invulnerable to any blockade by the United Nations. There would be offered to Japan the opportunity to develop railways and land communications from Manchuria to Singapore. At the same time Japan could organize and utilize a vast network of airdromes and air communication lines over the continental area of eastern Asia.
6.
In the war against Japan, China’s place at the moment is not unlike that of Great Britain when she alone stood against the forces of Hitler. British tactics were defensive. Yet as long as Britain continued to resist, Germany had not won and could not win. Similarly Chinese tactics have been defensive. Yet as long as China continued to resist Japan had not won and could not win. China is now also comparable in part to occupied Europe. Loss of China would take from the United States not only the advantages of an ally close by its enemy but would also remove the very definite aid gained from rebellious people within enemy-occupied territory.
7.
Certain advantages would accrue to the United Nations if China were to cease resistance to Japan.
(a)
To a limited extent the problems of over-all strategy of the United Nations for the immediate future would be simplified. The necessity of diverting any strength to aid China from any offensive efforts which were organized would vanish. Defensive operations and concentrations would be strengthened to the extent that aid for China could then be diverted to such operations or concentrations.
(b)
Such shipping, both by sea and by air, understood to be small in quantity, as is at present engaged in carrying aid to China would be released and become available for use elsewhere.
(c)
The materials which are at present being sent to China or earmarked for China would become available for other purposes.
(d)
Some of the United Nations, not including the United States, might avoid by the collapse of China certain political difficulties at the coming peace conference. Such difficulties would be likely to arise were China to attend a peace conference as a victorious nation with large armies intact.
(e)
The collapse of Chinese resistance would remove whatever pressure Chinese officials and representatives are at present exerting or attempting to exert on the United States.
(f)
The collapse of China would, of course, prevent China from exercising an effective voice at the coming peace conference and would thereby reduce the number of effective voices which must be heard at the conference.
The foregoing advantages are more apparent than real and their only value is of an immediate or opportunistic character.
8.
In conclusion: Collapse of organized Chinese resistance would adversely affect the cause of the United Nations by loss of the most important factor in combating Japanese psychological warfare, by lowering of American morale, by loss of prestige, by loss of certain important strategic materials and by loss of the help of an ally close to our enemy and the benefits of guerrilla and civilian resistance in important enemy-occupied territory.

III

China’s Contribution to the War Against Japan

(Note: Some factors already discussed under other headings are applicable to this section but have been omitted here in order to minimize repetition. An attempt has been made to discuss only new factors. Some repetition has been unavoidable but it is believed that an approach from various angles serves to present a comprehensive picture.)

1.
China, the largest Oriental power, by its war against Japan, prevents the success of Japan’s psychological warfare and contributes the most important defense which the United Nations have at this time against Japanese efforts to promote race warfare.
2.
China forces Japan to utilize an important part of its military strength both on land and in the air in the theater of China.
3.
China forces Japan to expend war matériel and to utilize shipping which otherwise might be employed in other theaters of war whether active or inactive at the present time.
4.
China prevents Japan from unhampered utilization and exploitation of the territories and resources Japan has occupied in China.
5.
The continuance of organized Chinese resistance keeps alive the possibility of the United Nations organizing and executing large-scale air and possibly land operations against Japan. The United States will soon become the greatest air power in the world. Japan is peculiarly vulnerable to large-scale bombing of industrial centers.
6.
China effectively contributes to the general weakening of Japan’s war potential.
7.
China is producing quantities of important strategic materials needed by the United Nations—antimony, tungsten, tin, silk, bristles, and tung oil.
8.
China is in a position to make effective contribution to any effort to recapture Burma—a key strategic area.
9.
China by continuing to resist is dampening Japanese morale.
10.
In conclusion: China is at the moment engaging large numbers of Japanese troops which employ important amounts of war equipment [Page 79] and matériel, is supplying the decisive factor in the psychological warfare against Japan and is denying to Japan the possibility of uniting Asia, is reducing Japan’s war potential in other active or inactive theaters, is preventing Japan from freedom in the exploitation of its conquests in China, is holding areas which may become vitally important to future air and land operations by forces of the United Nations, and is dampening morale in Japan itself by stubborn refusal to accept Japan’s program of “Asia for the Asiatics.”

IV

Positions and Attitudes of Some of the United Nations Toward the Far East

1.
Japan opened its assault on the Western nations and their Pacific possessions by a vicious attack on the United States. There has subsequently developed not only in the United States itself but throughout all of the United Nations a feeling that it is the responsibility in the first instance of the United States to put down Japan and to destroy Japanese military power. While our responsibility toward the war in Europe is no less than our responsibility toward the war in the Pacific, in Europe we do not occupy the front lines. In the Pacific we do.
2.
The United States has throughout its history treated the Far Eastern countries as equals and has encouraged their independent development. The United States has treated the peoples of the Far East as free peoples. American citizens and officials in their dealings with the Far East have no imperial ambitions. The United States desires to see a strong, free and prosperous China and the American people hope to see develop in other areas in the Pacific independent and autonomous free governments.
3.
Other nations among the United Nations have not had in their Far Eastern relations a background or a general political attitude similar to those of the United States in its relations with the Orient. Their background and their general policies have rather been colored by their preoccupation with empire. As a result there has grown up over the years among some of the officials and nationals of such nations a subconscious and unconscious attitude of mind which fails to take due account of some of the factors which have been set forth in this memorandum. Such persons fail to grasp what we consider to be accurate estimates of the potentialities and capabilities of certain of the peoples of the Far East, particularly the Chinese. With such differing attitudes of mind, it is only natural that there have resulted various and sometimes conflicting views and estimates of the Far Eastern situation and in particular of the war potential of China.
4.
Some qualified observers and experts have made charges of serious incompetence if not malpractice against Chinese in their military operations. It should be borne in mind that the Chinese are not the only ones among the United Nations who on occasion have been found wanting in abilities to make proper utilization of available men and matériel, and who have been charged with gross blunders in their maneuvers against and estimates of the capabilities of the enemy. In reaching any reasonable estimate in regard to China’s military potential it should be remembered that Chinese soldiers and many officers have unquestionably demonstrated on numerous occasions great courage and endurance. The over-all tactics of defensive retreat employed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has been proven to be a brilliant military and political move.
5.
Chinese war-weariness has been pointed out. Whatever the position and attitude of any of the United Nations may be, it should be remembered that we cannot assume that Chinese resistance will continue if China is neglected and if China’s allies do not demonstrate that they are determined to assist China. The United States has on many occasions both publicly and privately promised to deliver all necessary aid to China. On April 28, 1942 the President of the United States publicly stated:

“The Japanese may cut the Burma Road; but I want to say to the gallant people of China that no matter what advances the Japanese may make, ways will be found to deliver airplanes and munitions of war to the armies of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

“We remember that the Chinese people were the first to stand up and fight against the aggressors in this war; and in the future an unconquerable China will play its proper role in maintaining peace and prosperity not only in Eastern Asia but in the whole world.”

6.
Strong military, psychological and political considerations dictate that those pledges must be fulfilled.

V

General Comments and Conclusions

There has been deliberately omitted any attempt to discuss the technical question of the ways and means of delivering aid to China. That problem is one for qualified experts. This conclusion would be incomplete, however, were emphasis not to be placed on the highly beneficial results which could be accomplished in bolstering Chinese morale and tenacity in this war by the establishment of a regularly-operated air link between China and its allies to provide steady increments of material aid. A substitute for the Burma Road is essential.

It is impossible to state definitively the amount of aid necessary to keep China in the war. It is reasonable to expect that if China remains isolated and without concrete evidence (in the form of delivered [Page 81] goods to China and of a regularly-operated link with the outside world) of our determination to implement our promises of aid, China will be given further impetus toward disintegration. The psychological factor is of great importance in keeping resistance alive in China.

China’s war potential must be assessed not only in the negative values of what China denies to Japan, but also in the positive values of what China contributes to the total war effort. To these two important factors, there must be added the possibility of eventually creating in China a concentration of offensive military power to be released later conformably with over-all strategy. Supplies to China sent now will not only meet immediate and urgent needs but may become a part of later offensives.

In considering China’s war potential, the United States has to bear in mind interests and policies differing in some respects from the interests and policies which motivate some of the other United Nations.

Were the United Nations to disregard China in their over-all strategy, to concentrate everything upon the defeat of Hitler, and to allow the situation in the Far East to drift until, following the defeat of Hitler, full attention could be directed to Japan and the Far East, a combination of important developments and factors would make complete victory for our cause over Japan’s cause extremely difficult if not even problematical. These factors include:

(1)
Chinese resistance to Japan would probably collapse, bringing into play the adverse developments already discussed in this memorandum. As a result Japan might augment its internal strength in great measure, might become firmly entrenched in China and other occupied areas, and might establish a strong position of permanent leadership of the colored races. The threat of a future world conflict between the white and the colored races of the world might be enhanced.
(2)
Popular feeling in the United Nations might become so relaxed in relief at the victory and peace in Europe that a compromise settlement in the Far East would be welcomed by large elements among the people.
(3)
There might develop in the Far East such a feeling of solidarity of purpose and of unity of position among Asiatics vis-à-vis the balance of the world that it would be impossible to create in that area groups of peoples or nations friendlily disposed to the democratic principles motivating the United Nations. This development would seriously hamper the implementation of long-range high policy of the United States in its foreign relations.

China’s over-all war potential is sufficiently great at the present moment to warrant exceptional efforts on the part of the United States to keep China in the war against Japan. The immediate objectives of successful prosecution of the war against Japan warrant those efforts. The long-range policy of the United States also warrants those efforts.

[Page 82]

The psychological, military and political situation in China requires that there be provided urgently tangible evidence in China of the practical implementation of our decision to keep China in the war.

When there is added to the foregoing estimate consideration of the possibility that the United Nations might be faced with disintegration and collapse not only in China but also in Russia and in India, the vital importance of maintaining the war potential of China is even more apparent.

  1. Memorandum transmitted by Mr. Hamilton on June 23 to the Under Secretary of State (Welles) and the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) with this comment: “It is believed that you will be interested in the attached copy of a memorandum prepared in FE, at Mr. Hornbeck’s suggestion on the subject ‘China’s War Potential: Estimate’.” Copy of memorandum transmitted by the Department with its instruction No. 1538, July 1, to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to be made available as “an informal and unofficial paper” to H. Ashley Clarke, Chief of the Far Eastern Department of the British Foreign Office (741.933/95).