Both the British Ambassador and the Australian Minister are new to China and
their rather gloomy views may be ascribed in part to their lack of China
background and resulting difficulty in evaluating the situation; also, in
part at least, to the “defeatist” attitude of certain elements of the
community, including some American and British
[Page 64]
military officers, who should be more objective in
their viewpoint and more discreet in their expressions of opinion.29
[Enclosure]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in
China (Gauss)
[Chungking,] May 26, 1942.
Subject: The crisis in the China situation.
| Present: |
British Ambassador (Sir Horace
Seymour) |
|
Australian Minister (Sir Frederic
Eggleston) Counselor, British Embassy (Sir Eric Teichman)
and |
|
Mr. Gauss |
The British Ambassador and Australian Minister called on me by
appointment at my residence yesterday afternoon. The British Ambassador
asked the Australian Minister to explain the object of their visit, and
the latter stated that it was felt that the China situation had reached
a crisis where we should all consider whether there is anything that our
Governments might do to “keep China in the war on our side”. He
considered the situation in Chekiang and Yunnan to be grave and
indicated that he feared that China might stop fighting and collapse.
The British Ambassador added nothing to the foregoing.
I asked my Australian colleague what he had to suggest that we might
recommend to our Governments in the situation as he sees it. Sir
Frederick said that he had no specific proposals to make. He referred to
the recent plea of the Chinese Government spokesman for more air support
to China, suggested that the possibility of continuing supplies to China
by new routes should be considered, and remarked that perhaps there
might be something that the United Nations might say to China—something
more than appears in the Atlantic Charter or the Declaration of the
United Nations—something that will encourage China to go on fighting,
that will assure China that the United Nations will continue to fight on
until China’s aspirations as well as our own are achieved. He wondered
whether there is any other aid or assistance that can be given to China
and commented that while he understood the terms of the United States
loan to China had been
[Page 65]
settled,
he understood that there were unsettled points in the terms of the
British loan; he said that perhaps these might be settled and give
encouragement to China. The British Ambassador had nothing to add to the
foregoing; nor did he comment on the unsettled points, whatever they may
be, in the terms of the British loan to China.
I commented as follows:
1. Air Support. I had of course noted the statement of the Government
spokesman and had brought the plea to the attention of Washington,
recommending that, so far as practicable, further air support should be
given to China. But I pointed out that this matter of air support is not
a simple problem. So far as concerns planes from the United States, we
have been pressed for planes for Britain, Russia, India, Australia,
China and for other United Nations; in addition, we are endeavoring to
build up our own air force to offensive fighting strength. Whether more
planes can be spared for China is not a matter we can determine here; it
must be determined in the councils at Washington, so far as concerns
American planes.
I pointed out that planes alone are not sufficient; there must be
personnel to fly them, fight them and service them; there must be
airfields in China capable of taking them; there must be supplies of
aviation gas, and bombs, and spare parts; there must be ground crews. I
also pointed out that fighter planes cannot be flown from America to
China; there is the question of shipping space. China has only limited
personnel to fight and fly planes and service them. All these, I said,
are problems which require consideration; and while I had recommended
that so far as practicable, additional air support be given to China, I
could not say what could be done in that direction; but I pointed to the
AVG and what it had accomplished, and added that while I was en route to
India I had met AVG and United States Army pilots who had been flying in
fighter planes to China that had reached India from the United States,
and I had every confidence that my Government would do all in its power
to give air support to China.
The British Ambassador commented that he had recommended to London that
China have more air support.
2. Routes of Supply for China. I commented that according to my
information, all possible routes of supply are being investigated; that
to the northwest to Soviet Russia seems particularly important, both the
land route and the air route, but whether the routes can be opened seems
to depend on the attitude of Soviet Russia. I said that I believed that
our governments are well aware of this situation and no doubt they are
giving Chinese proposals all possible support. The British Ambassador
agreed.
I continued that I was aware that United States Army transport planes are
continuing to bring in essential supplies from India and Assam—American
lend-lease materials—notwithstanding dangerous conditions and
unfavorable weather.
I suggested that if anyone had anything to offer to assist in the
situation I, for one, should be glad to learn of it.
3. On any “assurances” to China which might help the situation, it has
seemed to me that the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration of the United
Nations had been clear indications of our determination
[Page 66]
to fight for China as well as ourselves. I
had nothing to recommend to my Government in the present situation, but
if anyone could make a suggestion I should be glad to discuss it. I
commented that I knew nothing of the matter of the British loan to
China. I added that as they perhaps knew, we had sent substantial
amounts of supplies to Burma for China; in fact more than China had been
able to move into China from Burma; no doubt considerable amounts of
these supplies had been lost in Burma and inside China along the Burma
Road, but I had no official information on the extent of such
losses.
The British Ambassador commented that he and the British Counselor of
Embassy had turned up their file showing the texts of the Atlantic
Charter and the Declaration of the United Nations at Washington and had
nothing to suggest further at this time.
Turning to the military situation (I knew that the Australian Minister
has long been of the opinion that Japan would stop to liquidate the
China situation before venturing toward India or Australia) I commented
that I did not yet see indications that Japan intends to undertake a
major offensive against China; that there are as yet no reports of
substantial Japanese reinforcements for the China theater; that it is
true that for some days the Japanese thrust up the Burma Road appeared
ominous, but after the AVG had intervened and given the Chinese time to
move troops into position that situation seemed improved and I doubted
whether the Japanese, at the present time, intended to do more than (a) block all access from India and Assam into
China and (b) reach, and seize or destroy all
possible American and other supplies for China stored along the lower
reaches of the Burma Road. Japan may later determine on an offensive
into Yunnan along the Burma Road, and perhaps from Indochina and
Thailand, but such an offensive would require extensive preparation, and
the present is not the ideal season for such a movement.
As to the Chekiang front, I conceded that the situation there is
discouraging; Japan undoubtedly intends to seize the Chinese airfields
in Chekiang and Kiangsi, and to shut off all Chinese access to the coast
(where smuggling routes have long functioned); but the move in Chekiang
seems to have been undertaken by local forces from the surrounding
areas—there has been nothing as yet to indicate substantial Japanese
reinforcements from outside China.
I commented further that in my contact with the higher Chinese officials
I had observed no suggestion that China’s will to resist is weakening,
nor had I observed that those elements which perhaps would be disposed
to look to a possible compromise with Japan had gained any strength.
Both the British Ambassador and the Australian Minister being new to
China, but the British Counselor of Embassy, Sir Eric Teichman,
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being an “old China hand”, I
looked to him for helpful comment; but in response to the request for
his views on the subject he would not comment further than to say that
he considers that China “is in an exceedingly difficult position”.
Summing up, the Australian Minister said that he proposed to report to
Canberra, as the result of our conversation, that the matter of
additional air support for China has been brought to the attention of
both London and Washington, that the question of new supply routes to
China has not been overlooked and is being explored along with the
Chinese, and that there is no suggestion as to any recommendation which
we might make to our Governments for further “assurances” to China at
this time.
Sir Eric Teichman in summing up my comments on the military situation
said that he understood that I did not consider the situation hopeless,
that I did not anticipate that the Japanese would undertake a major
offensive in China at the present moment—though they might prepare to do
so later—but were concentrating on shutting off the Burma Road and
seizing and destroying all military supplies they could reach in that
area, while in Chekiang they were moving to take over the Chinese
airfields which might be used as bases against Japan. That I did not
find China less determined to continue to resist.
(Note: Except that the British Ambassador and the Australian Minister are
both new to China and are apparently helpless in evaluating the China
situation, I would have considered their visit in which they offered so
little and demanded so much by way of information and opinion, a
peculiar move. I felt however that there has been so much of a defeatist
attitude taken in some foreign (including military) quarters at
Chungking that it was desirable to be frank and outspoken in the
expression of my views which they had sought).
