Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1942, China

740.0011 Pacific War/2691

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Calvin H. Oakes of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[Extracts]

[Washington,] May 26, 1942.

Participants:	Colonel Johnson15
	Colonel Herrington16
	Mr. Murray17
	Mr. Alling18
	Mr. Parker19
	Mr. Oakes

In the course of their conversation today in Mr. Murray’s office, both Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington stated that Burma is completely gone and that with the loss of Burma, particularly of Lashio, all possible routes to China are closed. Those roads which are alleged to be under construction would take at least two years to complete. Even the air freight route is no longer feasible as the planes must now fly in bad weather at 23,000 feet which those available are unable to do, and even in good weather must fly so high as to render attempts at ferrying freight into China almost useless. Personnel can still be flown in and out of China, but at great hazard. The effect on China has been catastrophic and it is the opinion of the speakers that the Chinese no longer intend to fight. Discouragement on the part of the Chinese has been intensified by the behavior of the British as indicated below.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington were both of the opinion that the British had determined long before the Japanese attack on Burma started to lose Burma to the Japanese rather than to make concessions to the Burmese or to be indebted to the Chinese for retaining it. Thus the Chinese were allowed to send in troops only when their offer of assistance could no longer be refused, and once the Chinese arrived no effort to support them was forthcoming. According to Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington the British preferred to lose Burma because of their belief that it would be either recaptured for them by the Americans or returned to them at the peace conference once the war was won, and they would then be committed to neither the Burmese nor the Chinese with regard to its future form of government. Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington felt that the policy involved emanated from Wavell, who in turn was supporting a policy determined in London. They said that the loss of Burma would, however, probably be laid by the British to Stilwell who had actually made a very good showing under the circumstances.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15. Louis A. Johnson, personal representative of President Roosevelt in India, who had just returned to the United States.
16. Arthur W. Herrington, member of the American Technical Mission to India, who had returned with Colonel Johnson.
17. Wallace Murray, Adviser on Political Relations.
18. Paul H. Alling, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.
19. William L. Parker, Division of Near Eastern Affairs.