740.0011 Pacific War/1956
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton)6
Reference memorandum dated January 10 from the Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. McCloy, to the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, transmitting a memorandum of a conference on January 9 between Mr. McCloy and the Chinese Foreign Minister, with regard to the possible entry of Chinese troops into Indochina.
In discussing the political aspects of a possible entry of Chinese troops into Indochina it is assumed that the venture would be undertaken only if there existed a reasonable expectation of military success. If this expectation did not exist, there would appear to be little justification for the venture, especially in view of the reaction such Chinese action might have on Vichy.
Perhaps a primary political question relating to a possible entry of Chinese troops into Indochina is what independent authority General [Page 753] Chiang Kai-shek7 is considered as having with respect to the initiation of operations in the China theater of hostilities (it was stated in the White House announcement of January 3 that “His Excellency Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has accepted the Supreme Command over all land and air forces of the United Nations which are now or may in the future be operating in the Chinese theater, including initially such portions of Indochina and Thailand as may become available to the troops of the United Nations”). If General Chiang regards himself as the final arbiter of what action is to be taken in this theater we would presumably wish to weigh carefully and express with utmost tact any opposition which we might have to operations which he might contemplate in the area under his command.
It would seem that the most important political argument against the entry of Chinese troops into Indochina would be the possible reaction of such a move on Vichy. As indicated by the French Ambassador to Dr. Soong, the French Government at Vichy would view the entry of Chinese troops into Indochina with strong disfavor. It is not inconceivable that the French might utilize such Chinese action as an excuse for closer “collaboration” with the Axis.
With regard to the possibility of closer French “collaboration” with the Axis resulting from French resentment at Chinese entry into Indochina, it should not be forgotten that the French are realists of the first order, and that they desire to be on the winning side in the present world war. It is obvious that the driving out of the Japanese from their present bases in Indochina would weaken the Japanese military position and thus react unfavorably on the Axis position in general. This consideration would not be overlooked by the French in their consideration of “collaboration” with the Axis.
Furthermore, a successful Chinese invasion of Indochina might be expected to have a desirable political effect in China, strengthening the position of those elements favoring a determined prosecution of the war against Japan and discrediting the considerable [any]8 defeatist faction. Nor should there be overlooked the tonic effect of such a victory upon others of the United Nations.
In final analysis, the advisability of a Chinese invasion of Indochina would therefore seem to depend upon whether the military advantages plus the desirable political effects of such action would offset a possibly undesirable French reaction.
The foregoing observations might be orally conveyed to the War Department, obtaining at the same time the War Department’s estimate of the military feasibility of a Chinese invasion of Indochina.
[Page 754]Until we have a clearer picture of the military possibilities of such an operation, there would seem to be nothing to be gained by taking up the question with the Chinese Foreign Minister.
If the French Ambassador raises with us the question of a possible entry of Chinese troops into Indochina it might appropriately be called to his attention, [subject to Eu’s concurrence,]9 that (1) having permitted Indochina to be used as a base for Japanese attacks on China, the United States and others of the United Nations, the French Government would seem to be in an untenable position to object to the entry of Chinese troops into Indochina, and (2) the French must recognize, even though they may be unwilling to admit it, that Indochina under Japanese “protection” is lost to them, whereas if occupied by one or several of the United Nations it is more likely to be returned to France at the conclusion of hostilities. If the French Ambassador does not broach the question of a possible Chinese invasion of Indochina, there would seem to be no reason for raising the question with him.