840.50/1014
Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China ( Clubb ) of a Conversation With Mr. W. V. Blewett of the British Embassy in China 16
In a fairly intensive discussion of the problems of post-war economic rehabilitation in China, Mr. Blewett expressed his firm belief [Page 745] that the concerned Powers which would contribute to that rehabilitation, presumably the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, should insofar as possible maintain a united front on policies and actions in that regard. He expressed the strong conviction that there should be no competing for favors, or trying to steal a march, by one power vis-à-vis another. He went on to say that he considered that the problem of that economic rehabilitation, because of the status of the Chinese people (in terms of intelligence and economic wants), and the number of people and the extent of the national needs, would be perhaps the one biggest thing and that most worth doing in the post-war world. He was nevertheless of the opinion that, inasmuch as the Chinese Government was becoming increasingly autocratic, the possibilities of success of working out properly a vast program for economic construction in China—which, he pointed out, would benefit the rest of the world in an economic sense as well as it would benefit China—depended upon our putting our cards on the table before the Chinese. He believed that we should abandon the present practice of paying unwarranted tribute to the economic and political capacities of the Chinese and that with particular reference to economic projects we should indicate that we were prepared to embark upon them as partners with a hand in the conception and running of them, but that we would not be contented with the mere investment of funds. He considered that we had all the cards on our side and therefore were in a position to apply considerable leverage in connection with the large-scale projects envisaged. He said that he himself thought that much could be done by beginning with people below, in terms of seeing that there were put into practice laws for the betterment of labor and the improvement of factory conditions, and that in general he felt that we could approach the Chinese in regard to particular projects and say that we were prepared to carry them out under certain conditions, and make our stand on that basis. He cited in particular situations existing in Shensi, saying that he thought that one could, for instance, in accordance with such a hypothetical general program approach the groups in control in the so-called Red area with the proposition that certain developments could be effected there if the Chinese on their side were prepared also to meet certain conditions.
I agreed in principle with Mr. Blewett’s observations in regard to the desirability of other United Nations avoiding competing for Chinese favors, remarking that it was a common practice in Chinese history for China to play one nation against another when the opportunity [Page 746] offered.17 I said that it was agreed that the need for economic rehabilitation in China would be tremendous, and that that need constituted a powerful lever that we could use to make certain that projects undertaken in China should be economic in nature (using the term “economic” to mean that they would be practical and designed to meet an economic need, instead of political in purpose). I asked whether Mr. Blewett saw any persons or any group of persons whom he thought one might approach in connection with this general matter with a good chance of getting adequate understanding of the significance of the general problem. I followed up my question with another, desiring to be informed whether T. V. Soong might, for example, be considered one through whom a first approach might be made. Mr. Blewett said that he felt that Mr. Soong might prove to be one of the Chinese capable of bringing a broader understanding to the matter, and suggested that it might be well if Mr. Soong were shortly to return to the United States. Mr. Blewett said that he himself had considerable faith in the good sense of the liberal and leftist groups in China.
Mr. Blewett having made mention of the attitude of the Chinese as expressed in connection with the matter of the appropriation by United China Belief of NC$4,000,000 for the relief of members of Chinese faculties, I, with reference to the cultural relations programs as handled by the American and British Embassies, remarked that I thought that we could probably begin profitably to introduce into the material that we were communicating to the Chinese certain American and British ideas on post-war reconstruction which might be the beginning of education of certain Chinese groups to a realization of the relation of their own economic problems to those of the rest of the postwar world. Mr. Blewett agreed.