893.24/1448a
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton)8
We are, as I am sure you are, greatly concerned with regard to the Chinese situation.
[Page 52]With the cutting of the Burma Road by Japan and with Japanese advances into Yunnan Province, the Chinese Government is undoubtedly facing one of its most difficult periods.
If the Japanese get the idea that a military campaign against Kunming and Chungking would not encounter effective resistance there is every probability that Japan would launch such an attack. The best way to ensure against Japan’s making such an attack or, if made, of causing it to fail, is to help the Chinese militarily so that their resistance can be effective.
If the Chinese Government should be forced to withdraw from Chungking, the effects on Chinese morale might well be disastrous and the whole military, economic and psychological situation of the United Nations would be greatly impaired.
You will recall that in your address to the nation of April 28 in referring to China you stated:
“The Japanese may cut the Burma Road; but I want to say to the gallant people of China that no matter what advances the Japanese may make, ways will be found to deliver airplanes and munitions of war to the armies of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.”
I venture to suggest that two steps seem to be essential: (1) the putting into operation without delay of the projected air freight service to enable China to maintain contact with her allies and also to obtain vitally needed materials and (2) the making available to General Stilwell of aerial combat units at least sufficient to deny the Japanese command of the air.
With regard to the air freight service from India into China, I am told that the War Department is giving this matter active attention and that from thirty-seven to fifty planes are already in India or are due there shortly. It is believed that these planes should be put into operation at the earliest feasible moment and that the number should be increased as soon as possible. It is understood that last February you directed that twenty-five transport planes proceed to India in March for the India–China freight service, but that as yet virtually no freight has been moved.
With regard to making available to China additional aerial combat units, I realize the great need for such units elsewhere, especially in the Russian, Near Eastern and European theaters. However, the number of planes which would meet China’s needs in this respect would constitute only a small percentage of the planes which are being made available to our other allies.
It seems to me that the taking of comparatively minor preventive steps now may obviate the need of much greater and more difficult steps later on.
I offer the foregoing comment simply by way of suggestion in the light of my deep feeling that we must do everything possible to keep [Page 53] China fighting as an ally whose importance to our cause cannot, in my opinion, be too much stressed.
- This memorandum was prepared for the Secretary of State to send to President Roosevelt, but it was not sent.↩