Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, China

893.24/1478: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

Kuibyshev, December 29, 1942—1 p.m.
[Received December 30—4 p.m.]

1152. Department’s 647, December 22, 9 p.m.³²

1. The chief of the American section of the Foreign Office informed me that matters relating to Chinese transit traffic across the Soviet Union should be discussed with Lozovski, Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs, who is handling them. Lozovski told me yesterday that there was no agreement with Great Britain on the subject; there had not even been negotiations with the British since the subject was clearly one for direct negotiations between the Soviet and Chinese Governments; that the Soviet Government had agreed in principle to the shipment of merchandise to China across the Soviet Union from Iran; that technical discussions with the Chinese in this regard thus far had resulted in no agreement; that arrangements for equipment such as trucks for use in this transit traffic must be arranged by China rather than by the Soviet Union. I said that it was my understanding that since the British Government would be responsible for delivering the merchandise at the Soviet frontier the British were interested parties and had been discussing with the Soviet Government and that the conversations had touched upon the number of trucks which the Soviet and Chinese Governments might need. Lozovski again denied that such discussions had taken place, insisting that the Chinese rather than the Soviets should negotiate matters relating to British and American equipment necessary for the carrying on of the traffic. Lozovski had been informed in advance of the nature of the questions which I intended to ask. I am therefore at a loss to understand his apparent lack of knowledge of the negotiations which have certainly been taking place between the British and the Russians.

2. Bagallay, the British Chargé d’Affaires, and Gifford, the Commercial Secretary, informed me yesterday that:

a. They are confident that no agreement or understanding had as yet been reached between the British and Soviet Governments with regard to Chinese transit traffic. Conversations on the subject had been taking place between the Ambassador and Molotov and between the British Embassy in Kuibyshev and Mishustin, Chief of the Trade Treaty Department of the Commissariat for Foreign Trade. They doubted that the British Government was planning to enter into any formal agreement with the Russians with regard to this subject. They thought that the British aim was merely to come to an informal understanding with the Russians which would permit foods to go forward from Iran to China. On November 8 Misnustin ad written a letter to Gifford stating that on the 10th of September, the Soviet Government had informed the Chinese Government that it had decided in favor of the transportation of goods from India to China via Iran and the Soviet Union. Attached to this letter was a list of equipment which would be necessary in order to transport 2000 tons of Chinese goods monthly from Sary-Ozek (the railhead near Alma Ata) to Hsinghsinghsia (a point about 200 kilometers east of Hami). The letter in referring to the list requested that “the respective British competent authorities should as urgently as possible consider the abovementioned specifications and state the date of delivery”. Among the equipment listed by the Russians in the enclosure to the letter (a copy of which has been given to us by the British Embassy) are 1120 Dodge auto trucks T–203–1; two mobile motor transport repair stations types A and B; one mobile battery charging station; one special mobile repair station for repairing tires; two passenger cars; and many spare parts.

[b] It was probably this letter which had prompted Currie to approach Lend-Lease. The British can do little [more in?] discussions here until the question of trucks has been decided. Early in December they suggested to the Russians that in view of congested traffic conditions in the Near East it might be advisable to ship trucks for use east of Alma Ata from the United States via Vladivostok. The Russians replied that they did not have ships for this purpose. The British therefore were planning to inquire whether the United States Government could not transfer bottoms to the Russians for the transportation of trucks to the Soviet Far East.

c. The ratio of 46 [4–6] was still a basic feature of Soviet-British discussions. Since, however, the Russians have recently stated that for some time to come they would not be able to transport more than 2000 tons monthly to China over the Russian railroad, the British were inclined to agree to allow the Russians temporarily more than 40 per cent and up to 50 per cent of merchandise shipped through Meshed provided the Chinese received their 2000 tons monthly.

d. The Soviet-British discussions had never been linked with the Soviet-Chinese negotiations and therefore from the British point of view any understanding reached between Great Britain and Russia would not be contingent upon the delivery by China [of goods] to Russia.

e. The Russians have not replied to the British inquiry as to whether the Russians or the British would serve the stretch between Meshed and [Ashkhabad. The Chargé d’] Affaires stated as follows:

(a) The Russians on November 4 had replied to the Chinese proposals outlined in the Embassy’s 954 of October 30 [31], 2 p.m. The Russians proposed that the volume of goods to be delivered to China would be 2000 tons monthly, including 300 tons of petroleum products, instead of 3200 tons, including 1200 tons of petroleum products, as suggested by the Chinese. The Russians also suggested that Hsinhsinhsia rather than Hami be the point of delivery to the Chinese.

(b) The Chinese Embassy last week, upon instructions from its Government, had replied that the Chinese Government preferred Hami as the delivery point since Hsinghsinghsia was a small village without the facilities, including water, which a transshipment point should have. The Chinese reply did not touch on the differences regarding the volume of petroleum products. It contained, however, a suggestion that in order to test the route an effort be made to send an initial shipment of 500 tons at once without awaiting the arrival of trucks or other equipment. (The Chargé has requested that information regarding this suggestion be kept especially secret.) The Russians, without formally replying to this suggestion, pointed out that they had no means of transporting any supplies beyond Alma Ata.

Conversations with the Russians on the subject of transit traffic could have little practical value until it had been ascertained that trucks could be furnished by the American Government and delivered at points where they could serve Zahidan–Adekhab [Ashkhabad?] stretch and the stretch east of Alma Ata.

He did not know whether the Chinese would be able to deliver promptly 2000 tons monthly of raw materials to the Soviet Union. He was under the impression however that there might be difficulties with regard to transport between points in the Chinese interior and the point of delivery to the Russians.

4. [sic] It is apparent the Chinese had been under the impression that at least some trucks would be available by the first of January and the Chinese Chargé d’Affaires was visibly depressed at the thought that possibly none had left the United States for the Near East.

5. It is my feeling that if we seriously desire goods to proceed in the near future to China via the Near East and the Soviet Union, we should begin at once, without waiting for the conclusion of any definite understandings or formal agreements, to send trucks together with equipment for assembling and repairing them and spare parts to points in the Near East where they could most easily be delivered to Zahidan for use in Iran and to Ashkhabad for use east of Alma Ata. In any event it is almost certain that many misunderstandings and differences will arise in connection with the shipment of goods across this route since obviously the Russians in view of their own difficult military situation are not anxious to make the sacrifices in shipping space, oil products, and personnel which they will be called upon to contribute. My impression, based on talks with Chinese officials here, is that there is more doubt than they will admit of the ability of China to make prompt deliveries of any appreciable quantity of raw materials to the Russians. I nevertheless feel that it would make an unfortunate impression on both the Russians and the Chinese if the project should be allowed to drop because of lack of American trucks.

Henderson

32. See footnote 31, p. 619.