Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, China

893.24/1462: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

Kuibyshev, November 3, 1942—4 p.m.
[Received November 5—12:15 p.m.]

974. Department’s 544, October 29, 10 p.m.

1. In this telegram the term eastern route will indicate Zahidan–Ashkhabad, the western route various traffic lanes between Persian Gulf ports and the Soviet Union, stretch A Zahidan–Meshed, stretch B Meshed-Ashkhabad, stretch C Alma Ata–Hami, and railroad the Quetta–Zahidan Railway.

2. The British Counselor who has been participating in the recent British-Chinese and British-Soviet conversations in Moscow states that:

(a) The British have undertaken no obligations as yet with regard to Chinese traffic trade. They have, however, indicated their ability and willingness to [transport?] certain quantities of goods over the eastern route adhering to the formula that 3 tons out of every 5 shall be for the Chinese and 2 tons for the Russians.

(b) The British are planning, although they have not obligated themselves so to do, to provide trucks necessary for stretch A, and if requested by Soviet Government for stretches B and C, from equipment which has already been allocated to them or may be allocated to them by the American Government. Nothing has been said about terms. It is believed that transactions of this character will be on Lend-Lease basis. The Russians have apparently interpreted British inquiries regarding transportation needs for stretch C as an offer to furnish trucks to serve that stretch and British are aware of this interpretation. The British have also asked the Chinese whether they will need additional trucks to transport supplies between Hami and Chungking. They are planning to use Indian chauffeurs operating under British supervision for stretch A as well as for stretch B if Russians desire them to service latter stretch.

(c) Allied supplies executive in London has expressed the opinion that with trucks already in Iran or afloat it will be possible to meet needs of western route which carries Soviet supplies exclusively and to carry up to 7,500 tons monthly over stretch A, and that with the additional 500 trucks now in India earmarked for China to increase the tonnage carried over stretch A to 15,000 tons monthly, the “target” for eastern routes since that is the maximum amount that can be carried by the railroad. The British Embassy in the Soviet Union and British technical officials in Iran have informed the executive that they consider these estimates unsound and have expressed the hope that figures of such an optimistic nature will not be furnished the Russians or the Chinese. They believe that it is technically possible to carry 5,000 tons rather than 7,500 beginning about January 1 (the repairs of the railroad should be completed in the middle of December).

[d] The British are assuming that the Russians will furnish all oil and gasoline used on stretches A, B and C. They plan that trucks moving towards Zahidan for fresh loads of supplies will carry Russian fuel sufficient for the return trip. They estimate that 2,000 tons of petroleum products will be required to move 15,000 tons of supplies over stretch A. If Russians will not furnish fuel, a tremendous amount of carrying capacity will be consumed in transporting it from Iranian gulf ports to Zahidan and Meshed.

(e) The British informed the Russians on October 25 by letter that as soon as the railroad is repaired it will be possible to deliver “on Soviet account” 2,000 tons monthly to Meshed. They inform us that they should be able in addition to carry simultaneously about 3,000 tons monthly for the Chinese. Negotiations with regard to technical details between the British and Russians are still going on in Tehran and London, and negotiations regarding matters of principle are for the most part being carried on through the Embassy here.

[f] About 5,000 tons of supplies for Russia and 10,000 tons for China are being held up in India awaiting the repair of the railroad. The Soviet trade delegation in London in the meantime is insisting that 6,000 tons monthly of supplies from India including 4,000 tons of jute be sent over the eastern route.

3. My own impressions based on my talks with the British and Chinese are that if the British attempt to send any appreciable amount of supplies over the eastern route to China just as soon as the Railroad is repaired considerable confusion may result unless the Soviet Government shows a livelier interest in Chinese transit trade than it has in the past. The Russians have thus far not answered questions put to them in writing on October 13 by the British regarding transport over stretch B and assistance which might be required over stretch C. They may desire that for period following the reopening of the railroad the eastern route will be used exclusively for their benefit while they are negotiating with the Chinese and the British with regard to various questions which must be settled before goods destined for China can begin to flow.

4. In a conversation which I had with Lozovski on October 31 I told him that my Government was hopeful that it might be possible in the near future to begin sending supplies across the Soviet Union to China through Ashkhabad and Alma Ata and said that it would be appreciated if the Soviet Government would keep the Embassy informed regarding such progress as might be made towards the opening of this traffic. Lozovski replied that certain conversations had taken place between the Soviet Government and the British and Chinese Governments and were still going on: that he would make inquiries and inform me just as soon as any definite arrangements had been made. I told him that naturally the American Government was anxious to do everything possible in order to expedite the opening of the route.

Henderson