893.24/1341: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 30—3:15 p.m.]
465. Department’s 243, May 23, 6 p.m.6 Because of the political factors involved it has not been believed that further direct approach to the Soviet authorities with a view to obtaining the information sought would be productive at the present time (see my 418, May 20, 4 p.m.7). The following partial data have been obtained through conversations between the Chinese Military Attaché, Major General Kuo, and Colonel Michela:8
By way of preliminary General Kuo stated that estimated shipments over the Burma Road into China had run to approximately 17,000 tons a month. He expressed the opinion that if quantities of materials shipped in by other routes now that the Burma Road is closed should not fall below 10,000 tons a month this would be adequate to replace [Page 597] the loss of the Burma Road to a sufficient degree to “keep China going”. General Kuo discussed the following overland routes (reference is made in this connection to the Department’s 224, May 15, 2 p.m.); Sergiopol (Ayaguz)–Usu–Hami; Alma Ata–Kuldja–Hami; Osh–Kashgar–Ansi; and Osh–Kashgar–Yarkand–Khotan–Ansi. General Kuo stated that each of these roads has a capacity of 300 3-ton trucks daily in either direction and that the last two (more southerly) routes were the best as food and water were more readily available. So far as China is concerned, gasoline depots could be set up without special difficulty on all the roads. From Hami to Lanchow, he added, it is a 2 weeks’ trip one way.
General Kuo also referred to the rail route from Karachi to Rawalpindi, thence to Srinagar, from which point there is a pack trail to Aze into the road between Yarkand and Khotan. Pack animals in quantity are available here, he said, and such materials as ammunition could be carried into China over this route.
The General referred further to the Karachi–Zahidan–Ashkhabad route and also the Karachi–Peshawar (rail)–Kabul–Termez (road)–Bukhara (rail) route, connecting at Bukhara with the Ashkhabad–Osh Railway.
From the foregoing it appears that there are plenty of routes available for the shipment of upwards of 10,000 tons a month of essential materials into China and that the real crux of the situation is the attitude of the Soviet Government with respect to the utilization of its transport facilities for this purpose. Three ships a month putting in at Karachi, Basra and/or Archangel with supplies for China would amply meet the requirement set forth and it is believed that the rail and road transport means could be made available.
As regards the air route Alma Ata–Chungking, reference is made to Military Attaché’s report to War Department number 1981, November 10, 1941.9 Little is known of the Irkutsk–Hami air route but it is the opinion of Michela that this would be practicable in summer. The northern river routes mentioned in Department’s telegram under reference have not been investigated for the reasons stated above but in view of the short time which these are open it is feared that they may remain little more than academic for the present.