893.248/262: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State

141. Reference Department’s No. 110, February 17, 6 p.m. Magruder showed me his telegram on February 15. A proper evaluation of China’s military effort requires a sober estimate of what we may reasonably expect from China in this direction. I have repeatedly pointed out that China is not prepared physically or psychologically to participate on a major scale in this war, that the Chinese armies do not possess the supplies, equipment, or aggressive spirit for any major military offensives or expeditions, and that we should not expect from them more than a continuance of their past resistance to Japan. It would indeed by [be] unwise to count on more than that, whatever assurances or offers of greater cooperation may be forthcoming. In this connection see my telegrams No. 384, September 11, 7 p.m.;51 494, December 14, 1 p.m.;52 527, December 24, 1 p.m.;53 22, January 7, 9 a.m.;54 45, January 17, 11 a.m.; and the enclosure to my despatch No. 220, November 19.55

It is true that the Chinese have made extravagant requests under the Lend-Lease program and that they have exploited the existing situation in their recent request for a huge loan. It is also true that China is not now making any all-out war effort on the military front; that the Chinese armies probably could do more by way of local offensives, harassing tactics against the enemy, and constant attacks on lines of communication and supply. I have for some time been of the opinion that Chinese reserves of supplies and ammunition are limited to a point where the high command does not wish to undertake extended activity until reasonably certain of its permanent effectiveness. The time may come when we may have to do some “plain thinking” but I believe that in the present circumstances we will accomplish more if we seek our ends by constant and realistic but tactful persuasion, remembering that the Chinese feel that they have sustained a patient resistance over long years.

The Generalissimo, in my opinion, is irrevocably committed to the policy of continued resistance to Japan and I do not believe that he could be supplanted or persuaded to stand aside to permit others to stand on that policy except under most extraordinary circumstances.

It is unfortunate that he seems in a measure to have lost his direct [Page 25] and active interest in military affairs in recent years and to have acquired a touch of unreality derived from a somewhat grandiose or “ivory tower” conception of his and China’s role in world affairs but we must take him with his weaknesses as well as his strength as the only person capable of maintaining China’s resistance to Japan in the present conflict. We must also take China as she is with all her faults and shortcomings.

I agree that the American press has unwisely accepted and exaggerated Chinese propaganda reports of alleged military successes which with the exception of the Japanese reverse at Changsha have little foundation in fact or are distortions of minor skirmishes or Japanese withdrawals and it is true that American and other radio commentators and editorial writers are over-emphasizing the military potentialities of China’s great manpower. I have confidence that this propaganda will not be permitted to affect American military planning to our future detriment. But I agree that all this fulsome praise of China’s war effort may have the effect not only of intoxicating the Chinese with ideas of their own prowess over the past years in comparison with the military ability of the United Nations in Hong Kong, Malaya, Burma and the Netherland Indies, but also of inducing a greater complacency as to any vital need for real military effort on China’s part at this time. I have recently approved and transmitted through the Department several messages to the Coordinator of Information,56 [from] Fisher, of our information service here, directing attention to the overplay of Chinese propaganda reports of military successes.

Gauss
  1. Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. v, p. 537.
  2. Ibid., vol. iv, p. 753.
  3. Not printed.
  4. Post, p. 192.
  5. Despatch not printed; for the enclosure, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol, v, p. 545.
  6. William J. Donovan.