Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, China

740.0011 Pacific War/1965

Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)⁴⁷

[Washington,] February 16, 1942.

Mr. Welles: Reference, your memorandum of conversation with the Netherlands Minister, on February 12, subject of which was Chinese attitude regarding war.

With regard to the message from the Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies the substance of which was as outlined in your memorandum:

Is it to be wondered that the Chinese Government has not rushed into offensive military operations? Should it not be remembered that Chiang Kai-shek has for four and one-half years successfully carried on defensive operations which most of the military experts of practically all of the other powers (including Japan) thought and said at the outset and at intervals could not be continued beyond a few weeks or at the utmost a few months; that throughout that period Chiang Kai-shek has begged the powers to give him equipment; that neither the British nor the Dutch gave him, until they themselves were drawn into war in the Far East, anything; that but for Russian and American aid, Chiang would have had nothing from outside; that Russian and American aid have never, even to this day, reached large proportions—on a comparative basis; that Chiang has not today the airplanes or the artillery that are needed for the prosecution of a strong offensive movement; that Chiang sees the United States, Great Britain and the Dutch strictly on the defensive in the Far East; that Chiang has been foremost among the now associated military leaders in urging prompt coordination of effort; that Chiang has seen, even as the Dutch have seen, the United States and Great Britain assuming a position of somewhat dictatorial superiority in the United Nations councils; that Chiang has reason to believe that his military judgment is at least as good as that of any of the British or American generals and admirals (with the possible exception of MacArthur) who have thus far been put to test in the matter of operations during recent years; and that Chiang is just as much entitled and just as well qualified to play national interest politics in connection with allied strategy as are responsible leaders of any other of the allied nations.

To speak of “the lack of any action by the Chinese Government against the Japanese in China” is to talk nonsense. While doubtless it is true that the recent Chinese victory at Changsha was not as glorious as Chinese reports would indicate, that victory also was a good deal more substantial than some of the foreign military critics are now making it appear to have been: it was substantial enough to have convinced the responsible Japanese general that he had suffered a defeat sufficient to call for his committing hara-kiri; it does constitute the only case in which one of the fighting members of the United Nations group has definitely repulsed a substantial Japanese offensive during the warfare of the past ten weeks.

The idea that “China has more than sufficient means to undertake an offensive but wishes to wait until the end of the war ‘probably for political reasons’” is open to a good deal of easy refutation. China is definitely short on means for a large-scale offensive. Yet, China has indicated willingness to give support—at various times and for various theaters of operations; the British rejected Chinese offers in connection with Hong Kong and in connection with the Malay Peninsula until too late; the British have been reluctant to accept Chinese aid in connection with Burma; and there is no indication that in the allied councils there has been given any encouragement to the Chinese idea of a Chinese invasion of Indochina.

Chiang Kai-shek knows perfectly well that the recognition which the powers other than Russia and the United States have given to his efforts, recognition given only since December 7, is a recognition which arises out of the realization by those powers of their own needs and not out of overwhelming sympathy by those powers for the cause of defending China’s sovereignty and independence. Chiang probably sees no good reason why he should launch an offensive for which he is not prepared while the other powers do not launch offensives for which they are not prepared. Chiang no more desires to tempt Japanese bombing planes to begin again their brutal hammering of China than we have to tempt them to begin a bombing of the United States.

The Chinese at least have a record of having “taken it” for four and one-half years and having destroyed a million Japanese and having absorbed 25 billion yen of Japanese expenditure on war effort.

In connection with the above, I call attention to expository paragraphs in Hugh Byas’ The Japanese Enemy, and to a brief memorandum of today’s date⁴⁸ in which I have commented on and copied a few statements from that book. Note especially Mr. Byas’ statement that “Realism might begin by dropping the fiction that China can give us substantial military help at present. Chiang Kai-shek is pinned in his remote northern hinterland by superior Japanese forces. He cannot defeat them until he gets the planes, tanks, and guns needed. This does not minimize his heroism or the strength of his resistance. It has been a magnificent feat, but it has consisted in harassing the Japanese army along their extended lines and refusing them the orderly occupation in which they could sit down and exploit their gains. Later, when the Japanese line begins to sag and break everywhere, it will break in China also.”

It is interesting to find that coinciding in time with the coming of this complaint from the Dutch, with an implication that General Wavell concurs, there has come into the War Department, under date Chungking February 10, a long telegram from General Magruder heartily “damning” Chinese mentality and deeds in so far as military activities are concerned. Still more interesting, however, is the fact that, in the course of this over-all “damning”, General Magruder makes a statement which in effect flatly contradicts the Dutch contention that the Chinese are equipped for an offensive. General Magruder says: “All that China says about her being unable to inaugurate an offensive on a large scale is quite true, because of the fact that she lacks the proper weapons for offense. However, she herself is to blame for her failure to carry on a successful program of annoyance and attrition.”

S[tanley] K. H[ornbeck]

47. The Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) concurred in this memorandum and suggested that Mr. Welles call in the Netherlands Minister to “straighten” out the facts; Mr. Hornbeck, in a separate memorandum to Mr. Welles on February 16, also suggested that he “talk with the Netherlands Minister toward straightening out—or flattening out—the Dutch criticism of the Chinese attitude regarding the war.” Mr. Hornbeck added: “In view of a peculiarly ‘sour’ telegram which General Magruder sent the War Department under date February [10–] 12, I would suggest that you also have this subject in mind when next you talk with General Marshall and Admiral Stark.”
48. Not found in Department files.