893.00/14924
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 19, 1943.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy’s despatch no. 773 of December 3, 1942,74 and to enclose translations74 of (1) the Internal Solidarity resolution passed by the 10th Plenary Session of the Kuomintang, (2) the Communist Party’s reply to the resolution, and (3) an editorial which appeared in the Hsin Hua Jih Pao, the Communist daily newspaper published in Chungking. In connection with the foregoing enclosures, the Department may also wish to refer to the Embassy’s general evaluation of the work of the C. E. C. contained in its telegram No. 1486 of December 12, 10 a.m.
When the C. E. C. resolution on Internal Solidarity and its final Manifesto first appeared in public print in Chungking the reaction of many foreign officials was one of alarm. They interpreted the resolution and the portion of the Manifesto dealing with the matter of internal solidarity as a direct threat to the Chinese Communists; that [Page 265] “they had better be good or else”; and that being “good” meant identifying themselves thoroughly with the Kuomintang. They felt that there was little chance of the Communists agreeing to lose their identity within the Kuomintang ranks, and that an outbreak of civil hostilities was strongly indicated. From an initial reading of the resolution and Manifesto, such a conclusion was not entirely unwarranted.
Conversations with various informed Chinese officials, however, revealed that the situation was not serious; that in fact the resolution was prompted by an intent to bring about a détente in Kuomintang-Communist relations. Dr. Quo Tai-chi, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, who attended the C. E. C. meetings as a member, was quite surprised at the foreign reaction and described the resolution as a friendly gesture toward the Communists. Dr. Wong Wen-hao, Minister of Economics, who is also a C. E. C. member, stated that the resolution was prompted by remarks made by General Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang had at some length and with considerable show of moderation reviewed the relations between the Kuomintang and the Communists; had deplored the fact that these relations were not good, (that they had in fact been the subject of some adverse criticism abroad); had advocated tolerance permitting freedom of belief and speech; and had concluded that there was a place for all to cooperate within the broad framework of Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles for the salvation of the country and under the authority of the National Government. It was the elaboration of and the emphasis placed upon this final phrase in the resolution that caused apprehension that trouble might be brewing. A Chinese official present when Chiang made his remarks describes them as statesmanlike but says they were not enthusiastically received by the large majority of the party members.
Communist officials in Chungking have displayed little apprehension, either before or after the adoption of the resolution, with regard to any early open break in Kuomintang-Communist relations. General Chou En-lai, the official representative in Chungking of the Communist Party, is not concerned over the immediate future although he continues to believe that it is a case of when rather than whether the Kuomintang takes forceful action to liquidate the Communists. Chiang’s political wisdom, rather than any desire for reconciliation with the Communists, will steer away from trouble for the time being even though less wise party and military men might wish to have a showdown now.
Of interest in connection with the general subject of Kuomintang-Communist relations is the recent visit of General Lin Piao, a commander of Communist troops, to Chungking to confer with the Generalissimo at the latter’s request. General Lin states that he has been well received in Chungking but is pessimistic regarding cooperation [Page 266] between the Kuomintang and Communist forces. He tells the old story of no supplies, blockade and general suspicion. He refers to recent fighting between National Government troops and detachments of the “New Fourth” army in the Hupeh–Honan–Anhwei border region and states that the National Government, taking the position that the “New Fourth” army was ordered eliminated in early 1941, refuses to discuss matters relating to that force and is bent on its actual as well as theoretical elimination. He thinks that the rank and file in and out of the Kuomintang favor cooperation but that there are no strong elements capable of carrying out such a policy in the face of present party opposition.
The aim and end of the high Kuomintang command is to strengthen party control. It is understood that much of the work of the C. E. C. was devoted to the attainment of this objective. A Chinese official, not a member of the C. E. C., approving this policy of the C. E. C., said that it was necessary and good that the Kuomintang increase its strength because it was the agency to lead China to democracy and away from the dangers of communism. His views are most probably representative of much of the thinking in party circles.
It is a not uncommon phenomenon that the strength of an opposition party lies more in the failures of the party in power than in any positive strength of the opposition. This is true in the case of the Kuomintang and the Communist party in China. Whatever strength the Communist party has derives more from the failures of the Kuomintang than in any positive accomplishment on its own part. Had the Kuomintang had the foresight to adopt simple effective measures for agrarian reform, equitable taxation, and for promotion of home industries along the lines of the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, for example, it could have cut the ground from under opposition such as the Communists represent. This could still be done but it is feared that the present Kuomintang leadership, sterile in so far as social reform is concerned, is incapable of altering its conservative course.
Kuomintang leadership sees in the present serious economic situation in China a very real threat to its power. It endeavors to meet that threat by strengthening its control over industries and commerce through monopolies, over finance through centralized fiscal policy, and over education and social organization through propaganda and placing Kuomintang officials in key positions.
The Kuomintang leadership also sees in potential post-war developments a very serious threat to its power. If, as seems well within the realm of possibility, the Soviet army is largely instrumental in defeating Japanese land forces in the Far East, liberal and radical groups in opposition to the Kuomintang will be greatly strengthened; [Page 267] strengthened to the point that (1) they will have to be taken into the government on a cooperative basis for reform; or (2) eliminated by force; or (3) allowed to control areas, probably in the northwest and northeast of China, on a semi-autonomous basis. The obvious course for the Kuomintang to follow is the first.
Respectfully yours,