893.00/14897
Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in China ( Vincent ) to the Ambassador in China ( Gauss )44
During the dinner given by the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang for Mr. Willkie45 (October 3) I had an opportunity for an extended talk with Mr. Foo Ping-sheung, Political Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs. Regarding recent developments in Sinkiang Province, Mr. Foo stated that the Russian reaction to an extension of central government control to the province had been satisfactory, and gave two reasons for the present Russian attitude. The Soviet Government realizes now that the policy of penetration into Sinkiang was a mistake even as they found that the policy which supported and encouraged the activities of Borodin46 and the Comintern in China during the twenties was a mistake. (It is worthy of note that the Russian “penetration” into Sinkiang during the thirties occurred at a time when central or Kuomintang government influence in the province was virtually non-existent and that the character of the penetration was largely economic and commercial; was not at the expense of China proper in as much as trade relations and Chinese investment were also virtually non-existent; and was beneficial to the inhabitants of the province and to economic development.) The other reason is the realization by the Soviet Government that, in the event of a Japanese attack on Siberia, Chinese good will will be very helpful and that therefore the amicable removal of possible sources of friction or misunderstanding is good policy. (In this connection it is pertinent to recall Mr. Willkie’s comment to the effect that Stalin had within recent weeks ceased to be especially concerned with regard to a Japanese attack on Siberia.)
I asked Mr. Foo what he thought of the possibility of carrying the good start made in Sinkiang further to reach a general basic understanding with Russia regarding present problems and post war relations—something along the lines of the Anglo-Soviet agreement in the event of a Japanese attack on Siberia. Dr. Foo said it would be advantageous to have such an agreement, indicated that he had long favored closer understanding between Russia and China, but seemed to feel that it would be difficult of achievement. (He probably had [Page 246] in mind the strong, prevalent belief in conservative and military circles that the Chinese communists in Shensi Province are supported by Moscow and that Moscow would not withdraw that support.) He expressed the opinion—similar to that expressed to me by Dr. Kung several weeks ago—that America might be able to bring its influence to bear toward effecting some basic understanding between China and Russia. He agreed that such an understanding should precede the convening of a peace conference.
Dr. Foo then made the rather startling statement that there was some feeling that the Anglo-American combination was not being entirely frank with China. He said that it was essential that complete confidence be maintained with regard to plans and aims. I told him that I felt that America had made its aims completely clear; that it could not undertake to speak for Britain; and that I did not think there was any “Anglo-American” understanding hidden from China.
The conversation then turned to the Foreign Office’s recent complaint to the Embassy regarding articles in American magazines critical of China (Edgar Snow’s article in the August 8 issue of the Saturday Evening Post in particular). I told Mr. Foo that the American Government did not exercise control over expressions of opinion in the press and that I felt he would agree with me that it would be undesirable for it to attempt to do so. We placed a very high value on the freedom of the press; the press was free to criticize the activities of the American Government; and it would be unwise to exercise control over expressions of opinion either on foreign or domestic matters except where military strategy and operations were concerned. Mr. Foo agreed. He said that it had been unfortunate that the American press during the months following Pearl Harbor had been so fulsome in its praise of China; that this had misled Chinese into thinking more of their role than was warranted; and that criticism now came as a shock to many. He said what China needed and wanted was neither praise nor criticism but American air support for its armies.