With regard to developments in the northwest, the Embassy refers to its
telegram no. 954, August 19, 1 p.m., and to subsequent telegrams on the
subject.
With regard to the Sian conference (Kuomintang-Communist relations) reference
is made to the Embassy’s telegram no. 1005 of September 5, 9 a.m. As
logical, desirable, and correct as the solution described by Drs. Wong and
Tsiang for the communist problem may appear to be, it is felt that the
communists will be loath to accept such a solution. Officially they consider
themselves at present under the National Government (as distinguished from
the Kuomintang). So does the National Government. But what amounts to a
demand for their complete abandonment of identity (territorially,
politically,
[Page 236]
and militarily) will
probably meet with opposition, because, if for no other reason, the
communists will not have confidence in the Government’s promise to go
through with the “quid pro quo” offer; that is, the offer of freedom to the
communist party to organize and function in Chungking and in free China
generally without interference. Past performance and the present repressive
attitude of the Kuomintang and Government in free China support the
communists’ fears.
With regard to Sino-Soviet relations, the Embassy intends to follow the
matter with close attention, believing that, if and when Soviet-Japanese
hostilities occur, some fundamental or basic understanding between China and
the Soviet Union will be imminently and eminently desirable for the
prosecution of the war and the making of the peace in this area.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in China
(Vincent)
to the Ambassador in China (Gauss)
[Chungking,] September 9, 1942.
| Subject: |
Developments in the Northwest; |
|
Kuomintang-Communist Relations; |
|
Sino-Soviet Relations. |
This afternoon I called on Dr. Wong Wen-hao, Minister of Economics, and
on Dr. T. F. Tsiang, Director of the Department of Political Affairs in
the Executive Yuan (formerly Ambassador to Russia).
After disposing of the immediate question at hand—the transportation of
strategic metals to Kunming for air transport to India—the conversation
with Dr. Wong turned to recent developments in the northwest. Dr. Wong
expressed himself as satisfied with the way matters had turned out in
Sinkiang. He said that in so far as he knew Russian troops were still at
Hami but he thought fears that Russia might make trouble over the
extension of Chinese Government control to Sinkiang were ill-founded. He
said that, based on his observations while in Sinkiang during July and
on his subsequent conversations with members of the Russian Embassy
here, he felt that Russia was in no mood to place obstacles in the way
of the Chinese Government’s plans for bringing Sinkiang back into the
fold, politically at least. He said that the Foreign Office had already
sent a representative to Tihua and that Sheng Shih-tsai had given clear
evidence of his desire to subordinate the provincial administration to
the National Government. The matter of the withdrawal of the
[Page 237]
Russian troops might prove
difficult but it was not, he thought, serious. He said that the
assassination several months ago of the “fourth” brother of Sheng
Shih-tsai (provincial government chairman) by Chinese communist agents
had thoroughly frightened Sheng (this brother was married to a Russian
communist who Dr. Wong thought had engineered the assassination). Sheng
had been afraid for his own life. He had written to Moscow expressing
suspicion that the Russian Consul General at Tihua had been implicated
in the assassination, or at least was involved in communist plotting,
and asked for his recall. The Russians had replied not unsympathetically
but had denied that the Consul General was engaged in any activities
other than those connected with the discharge of his official duties.
Dr. Wong remarked that “this was to be expected.”
General Chiang Kai-shek’s successful visit to Tihua had been the
culmination of developments since July. The removal of Ma Pu-ching’s
troops from northwestern Kansu to Chinghai had cleared the way for loyal
contingents of national government troops thereby placing the route from
Lanchow to Sinkiang safely under government control. He did not say
whether government troops had entered Sinkiang but I inferred that
perhaps they had not, pending withdrawal of the Russian troops from
Hami.
Dr. Wong said that he knew nothing of what had taken place or was taking
place at the military conference at Sian which General Chiang is at
present attending. He thought however that settlement of the Sinkiang
problem would faciliate the discussions at Sian with particular
reference to those related to the communists in north Shensi. Without
expressing any optimism that it would be, he said the communist
situation should be solved and that the solution lay in the communists
(government and army) recognizing the authority of the National
Government and in the Kuomintang’s recognizing the right of the
communist party to exist and play a role in national affairs without
interference. He said that the existence within China of a communist
government and army which, whatever the face-saving formal status, acted
independently was an anomoly which should not be allowed to
continue.
I asked Dr. Wong his opinion regarding Sino-Soviet relations in general;
what he thought were the principal problems involved in those relations.
He replied promptly that the situation he had just described—the
communists in China—was the principal problem. He felt that, despite
protests to the contrary, the communists in China were receiving aid and
comfort from Russia which supported them in the attitude of
independence. I asked what he thought could be done about this,
suggesting that some understanding between China
[Page 238]
and Russia along the lines of the recent
Anglo-Soviet treaty35 might be worth considering (when, as
anticipated, Japan attacked Russia in Siberia) as a means of settling
the problem he mentioned and of removing Chinese suspicions and distrust
which no one could deny existed. He agreed adding that there were no
fundamental problems between China and Russia that could not be solved.
In fact, there was only the problem of the position of the Chinese
communists in China and the attitude of the Russians toward them. He had
no fear of Russian territorial designs upon China (Manchuria) at the
conclusion of the war. There ensued some discussion of the desirability
of China and Russia arriving at a basic understanding prior to peace
rather than waiting for a peace conference to reach (or debate) such an
understanding. I said that with mutual goodwill it should not be
difficult to do so and that certainly the possibilities were worth
exploring.
Dr. Tsiang and I discussed Ambassador Davies’ book36 on Russia and also a monograph which
Dr. Tsiang had done some years ago on Russo-Chinese relations. He said
that he was the “expert” on Far Eastern affairs to whom Mr. Davies
referred in his book; that he and Mr. Davies had been close friends
while they were together in Moscow. I asked for a copy of Dr. Tsiang’s
monograph but he said that there was no copy in Chungking; that it had
not been translated into English; and that it only dealt with early
Russo-Chinese relations from their beginning down to 1860. He spoke of
one heretofore unpublished document he had found in Peking regarding the
peace of 1860 which terminated the 1858–60 hostilities between China and
the Anglo-French combination. He said that in this official Chinese
paper he found the statement that, although it had been England and
France which had made war on China and advanced to Peking, Russia was
the nation against which China should be on guard.
The foregoing statement provoked a general discussion of present and
prospective Sino-Soviet relations. There was nothing new in his remarks
regarding Sinkiang developments. He seemed optimistic; mentioned a
Russian “brigade” in Sinkiang as one of the principal still unsettled
problems; said he did not feel that Russia really had political
ambitions in Sinkiang; and considered commercial relations between
Russia and Sinkiang as “natural as those between Canada and the United
States”.
With regard to the Sian conference, he, as Dr. Wong, hoped for a solution
of the communist problem. The problem and the solution he described in
almost identical terms as Dr. Wong. He was not opposed
[Page 239]
to a communist party in China but he was
opposed to a communist government and army acting independently in
China. He felt that, although the relation between the Chinese
communists and the National Government was an internal problem, it
involved relations between China and Russia. He believed that a
satisfactory understanding between Russia and China with regard to
Chinese communists or communism in China was essential to any
fundamental agreement between the two countries, and that such an
understanding should be simply one involving a sincere Russian
undertaking to refrain from any interference in internal politics of
China. He expressed himself as emphatically not among those who harbored
some fear that, if Russia defeated Japan on land in the east, it would
want territorial concessions in Manchuria or elsewhere. He referred back
to his period as Ambassador in Moscow and said that he still felt that,
had they received the support of their respective governments, he and
Litvinov37 could have produced a
satisfactory solution of outstanding problems. Litvinov had agreed with
him that the Chinese Government could not be expected to tolerate
independent or semi-independent communist administrative or military
organs in China. This was in 1937. The war with Japan followed soon
thereafter.
Returning to the territorial question, Dr. Tsiang said that he felt about
Outer Mongolia much the same as he felt about Tibet. He had some weeks
ago told me that he thought that Tibet should have the status of a
self-governing dominion and that Dr. Kung held the same view. He said
that if both China and England refrained from any interference in
Tibetan affairs the Tibetans would be able to govern themselves at least
well enough to prevent the area from becoming an international problem.
China’s historical attitude toward Outer Mongolia had been mistaken. The
Mongolians were in no sense Chinese and there was no valid reason for
denying them self-government.
The sum and substance of Dr. Tsiang’s remarks on Sino-Soviet relations
was that, if Russia would give a sincere pledge to refrain from
interference (actively or by propaganda and 3rd International tactics)
in China’s internal affairs particularly as they related to Chinese
communism, a fundamental understanding between the two countries along
the lines of the Anglo-Russian treaty would not be difficult to achieve.
I said I thought the Russians might be prepared to give such a
pledge.
In connection with these conversations with Dr. Wong and Dr. Tsiang, I
recall remarks made to me by Dr. Kung some ten days ago in the course of
a general discussion on political and military developments. Dr. Kung
said that the Russian attitude toward the communists
[Page 240]
in China was the principal obstacle to
easy relations between Russia and China and was sceptical with regard to
the feasibility of any basic agreement between the two countries. He
admitted the desirability, however, of reaching an early, pre-peace
understanding with Russia and commented that “American influence with
Russia is very strong at this time and America might be able to do
something to bring about a satisfactory understanding or agreement.”
(Note: In considering the foregoing
comments of Dr. Wong and Dr. Tsiang, it should be borne in mind that
these two officials represent a more moderate or liberal point of
view regarding Chinese Communists and Russia than is to be found
generally among leading military and Kuomintang officials who are by
and large anti-communist and suspicious of Russia to a degree that
is unreasoning and prejudicial to national unity and long-view
interests. However, it is felt that the viewpoint of Drs. Wong and
Tsiang is well worth consideration as representative of a large
element in and out of the government which does not sympathize with
the one-party “reactionarism” of the Kuomintang and military
leadership as now composed. J. C. V.)
