Office of the Historian

893.20/760: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State

Chungking, September 5, 1942—9 a.m.
[Received 9:47 p.m.]

1005. 1. Vice Minister of Information Tong31 told Vincent the following in confidence:

A military conference will be convened at Sian shortly. In addition to discussions of northwest military problems in the light of recent developments in Sinkiang, the conference will take up Central Government relations with the Chinese Communists in North Shensi. Mao Tse-tung, invited to attend, declined but is sending a representative. The Generalissimo will probably attend the conference. He had a long talk with Chou En-lai, Communist representative in Chungking just before he, Chiang, departed for northwest.

2. It is understood that proposal along following lines will be made to Communists: (1), that they permit the complete integration of Communist armies with National army; (2), that Communist controlled territories be placed completely under Kuomintang Government administration and, (3), that Communist leaders, including Mao Tse-tung, came [come] to Chungking where they will be completely free to organize their party and play their role in national affairs.

3. Informant mentioned in paragraph 1 speaks of rift in Communist ranks, describing it as a difference between indigenous or “Chinese Communists” and “Russian Chinese Communists”. He thinks the former may go [be?] prepared to “Cooperate” with the Kuomintang.

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4. The Embassy is not sanguine over the outcome of the conference. Chiang Kai-shek is no doubt anxious to settle once and for all the Communist problem. Fortified with his success in Sinkiang and taking further advantage of the present adverse military situation of Russia and its probable involvement with Japan in Siberia; he hopes to liquidate the “Communist menace” in the northwest. It appears likely however that the Yenan Communists will reject the proposals listed in paragraph 2. Whether the Generalissimo will then authorize a use of force remains to be seen. The suggestion in paragraph 3 of a split in the Communist ranks may give a clue as to future line of action. So-called “Chinese Communists” may be produced who will agree to the proposals, a united front will be established, and if internal and external factors appear favorable, an attack may be launched on the “non-cooperative” Communists in north Shensi.

Gauss
  1. Hollington K. Tong.↩