[Enclosure]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of
Embassy in China (Vincent)
[
Chungking
,] May 6, 1942.
I had an interesting and frank conversation yesterday with Chou En-lai,
official representative in Chungking of the communist party.
His estimate of the reaction to and possible developments from the
disintegration of resistance in Burma was in general conformity with the
opinion I had previously formed based on conversations with other
Chinese officials. He did not think that the Japanese had any intention
of making a major drive toward Kunming from Burma. He interpreted the
rapid motorization advance toward Paoshan as being primarily a foraging
expedition. He felt that the Chinese forces in Yunnan would be able to
cope with the situation.
He said that the defeat in Burma would have an adverse effect on morale
primarily in official quarters but did not think it would be serious.
Commodity speculators would no doubt take advantage of the situation
further to boost prices and hoarding would increase [Page 198] somewhat. He considered, however, that
these effects would be temporary. He estimated that the cessation of
shipments into China from Burma would not directly affect the livelihood
of ninety-five per cent of the people and would have little indirect
effect. Curtailment of motor transportation facilities in an effort to
conserve gasoline supplies would be the most widely felt result of the
severance of communications with Burma.
I mentioned reports of Japanese peace overtures to the Chungking
government. He said that he had not heard of them. He expressed
confidence that General Chiang was determined to continue resistance and
said that there were no elements in the government with sufficient
strength and influence to initiate an appeasement policy although there
were some elements that might be inclined to do so. I asked him what he
considered the strongest elements in the Kuomintang under Chiang. He
enumerated them as follows: (1) Tai Chi-tao, President of the
Examination Yuan. Tai had been quite a liberal in the early days of the
Kuomintang but with the passage of years had become very conservative.
He now had a political philosophy closely bordering on paternalistic
monarchy. Chiang thought highly of him and was attracted by his ideas.
(2) Chen Li-fu, his brother, Chen Kuo-fu (the CC clique) and Chu
Chia-hua (Chen is Minister of Education and Chu Chia-hua is Vice
President of the Control Yuan). These men have a strong influence in
educational and party personnel spheres. They are ultra-conservative and
are strong exponents of party discipline and the strengthening of party
influence among the people. Chu Chia-hua has fascist leanings and Chen
is strongly imbued with ideas of a Chinese renaissance under close
Kuomintang supervision. (3) Chang Chun, Chairman of Szechuan and
confidant of General Chiang, and the so-called Political Science group
of which he is a leading figure. The so-called “members” of the “group”
are generally Chinese officials with a conservative Chinese outlook,
with a certain antagonism towards what may be called the “returned
student” (from England and America) element. Many of the high provincial
officials and many returned students from Japan are adherents of the
group. They are not pro-Japanese however. They are pro-Chinese with a
strong feeling for Chinese institutions and ways of life. (4) The
military leaders of which Ho Ying-chin, Hu Tsung-nan and Ch’en Cheng are
the outstanding. General Ho, as minister of War and Chief of Staff, has
a strong position in army administration. There is not the suspicion
between General Ho and General Chiang that is mentioned at times.
General Hu is in direct or indirect command of the largest, best trained
and best equipped army in China—approximately 440,000 men. His command
extends from Loyang in Honan, through Sian in Shensi, and then northward
to Lanchow in Kansu. He has direct access to General Chiang but his
relations with General Ho are on an easy basis. [Page 199] General Ch’en is commander of the
important 6th War Area (Hupeh province) and is also very close to
General Chiang. (5) The Soong family group. The antagonism between Kung
and T. V. Soong weakens the group but Kung is dominant in the financial
sphere and T. V. Soong is the strongest force in foreign relations. (6)
Tai Li, who has various titles, but is actually head of the principal
secret service organization in the country. He is close to General
Chiang and exercises a strong influence through his extensive police
organization said to number at least 40,000 men.
There are of course other elements but the foregoing constitute the
strongest elements in the Kuomintang—the controlling elements. Chou said
that none of them are animated by any well defined political philosophy
or concepts. Their primary objective is to maintain the Kuomintang in
control and, in so far as consistent with that objective, to increase
their own influence within the Kuomintang.
Chou said that the “quarantine” of the Communist forces by Hu Tsung-nan’s
armies continued to be very effective. I asked him what he thought would
be the developments in the northwest area in the event of a
Russo-Japanese war. He said that he did not anticipate an early outbreak
of such hostilities. He expressed fear that, if they did occur, the
Chinese Government forces would not take advantage of the situation to
start offensive operations in the north. He said that the Communist
forces, numbering about a half million men, would request the National
Government for equipment to undertake such an offensive. If this request
were refused (he thought it would be), request would be made for small
arms and ammunition for active guerilla operations in the north and
northeast. Upon the refusal of this request (which he considered likely)
the Government would be asked to agree to the Communist forces receiving
military supplies from Russia. He said that such a request would place
the National Government in an embarrassing position because it would not
wish to agree—would probably not agree—but would find it very difficult
to explain its position to the other immediately interested United
Nations.
Chou said that, while an attitude of “wait and see” might be advocated by
some Chinese officials, he felt that there was little actual “defeatism”
in China and that by and large there was confidence in victory over
Japan. He said the economic-financial situation was the most serious
problem in unoccupied China; that it did more to depress morale than
anything else, and that the Government should actively and immediately
concern itself with ameliorative measures. He is an advocate of
increasing the production of agricultural and other consumption goods as
rapidly as possible without special regard for cost. He suggests land
reform and reclamation and full support of industrial cooperatives as
means of accomplishing these ends.
