893.248/261: Telegram
The Military Mission in China to the War Department 41
No. 256 Ammisca. It is a known fact that the Chinese are great believers in the world of make-believe, and that they frequently shut their eyes to hard and unpleasant actualities, preferring rather to indulge their fancy in flattering but fictitious symbols, which they regard as more real than cold facts. Manifestations of this national [Page 14] escape-psychology have been clearly discernible in China’s international relations. She has consciously given free rein to her native penchant for alluring fiction in Chinese propaganda abroad. People in other countries swallow such glib untruths whole without realizing that they are being deceived. As instances of this deceptive symbolism, I may adduce many reports emanating from Chinese diplomatic sources abroad, referring to the marvelous achievements and abilities of the Chinese Army. Such reports are absolutely without foundation. They are largely due to the above-mentioned Chinese love of symbolism, or else can be attributed to nothing other than a downright desire to achieve certain specific objectives by clever deception.
Such a spirit of Chinese symbolism is deep-rooted in the United States, mainly because of Chinese propagandists in America, and because of the sponsorship accorded such propaganda on the part of many outstanding individuals, including missionaries as well as adherents to radical and liberal viewpoints. This propaganda has influenced public opinion in the United States, usually so sane and well-informed, to a surprising extent. The realization of its falsity would undoubtedly result in the lessening of positive American support for Chinese projects that are devoid of any sound justification, even if it did not result in a weakening of the emotional appeal which China has always held for a great many Americans, many of them veterans in things Chinese.
Chinese officials demand such impossible quantities and such impractical varieties of arms and munitions that they are fast becoming a headache to deal with. Over and over again they recommend that air activity be carried on with Chinese landing-fields as bases. When they are politely told that no adequate transportation facilities are available for handling even a slight fraction of the tonnage needed for such air activity, they refuse to change their minds. They are unwelcome to any helpful suggestions about even the simplest methods of increasing the available rolling tonnage over present-day roads, yet at the same time they continually demand aid for projects that are unnecessary and chimerical. They know little or nothing about ships and maritime matters, such as the meaning of turn-around and the limitations imposed by floating tonnage.
It is true that Japan’s occupancy of China has for her the disadvantage of keeping her occupying forces away from other theaters of war, but nevertheless this military drawback is fairly well offset by advantages of the economic order. The Nipponese forces in China are given no trouble at all, except in places where they wish to repress guerillas from roaming around in quest of political or economic gain. It is foolish to label the reoccupation by Chinese forces of territory voluntarily evacuated by the Japs as a smashing victory for China. [Page 15] The American press has given absolutely disproportionate prominence to trivial engagements between Chinese and Nipponese forces.
Contrast such propaganda with the true picture. Japan has the best parts of China, including all of the seaports, under her own control. To maintain this control it is estimated that she maintains twenty-eight Japanese divisions (most of them inferior) in China. Some of these divisions are kept there for the purpose of handling any trouble on the Soviet front.
All that China says about her being unable to inaugurate an offensive on a large scale is quite true, because of the fact that she lacks the proper weapons for offense. However, she herself is to blame for her failure to carry on a successful program of annoyance and attrition. The reasons for this failure are found in her own lack of aggressiveness and initiative, and in the age-long practice of Chinese commanding officers of regarding their soldiers as static assets, to be conserved for assistance in fighting against their fellow-countrymen for economic and political supremacy.
Our extensions of credit and shipments of matériel to China have to a great extent given the lie to certain accusations hitherto leveled at us in some international circles. However, such assistance, no matter how great, is not to be regarded as having added substantially to China’s striking-power. The brunt of any offensive warfare in China must be borne by foreign troops sent there by Allied powers, and the only thing which we can with any confidence expect from the large resources of Chinese manpower is that they occupy areas evacuated by the enemy and consolidate advances won by others.
These remarks must not be construed to mean that I am against our lease-lend policy with regard to China. On the contrary, I am as much in favor of this policy as ever, mainly because of the foreseen positive benefits that are ultimately going to result from it. Some of these positive benefits are: the maintenance of Chiang Kai-shek in power; the preservation of a spirit of at least silent opposition on the part of China’s multitudes, and the possibility of employing Chinese landing-fields as air bases for bombing Japan.
Some radio broadcasts heard from San Francisco’s KGEI give me great cause for alarm. If they are at all typical, the true state of affairs in China is being seriously distorted, and China’s military successes are being highly exaggerated, by what is given out in American newspapers and over American broadcasting stations. There is grave danger that such continued distortions of fact as to the prowess of China’s military forces are spreading about a false sense of security on the part of the rank and file in the United States, and even on the part of Chinese officials themselves. It is highly possible that such propaganda could lead to grave defects in American war plans, if our [Page 16] own officials should be influenced by it even to the slightest extent. Perhaps all this is designed to raise popular morale in the United States and to flatter the Chinese. If so, it is going a bit too far.
An attitude of mind which, if not checked, is liable to spread in China and to become positively dangerous to us is indicated by the childish displeasure evidenced by high-ranking Chinese officials at a general statement recently issued by Secretary Knox.
Chiang Kai-shek can be expected neither to abdicate of his own free will nor to be ousted without a fight. He is a remarkable figure. It is due almost to his influence alone that the Chinese are held together as a nation. We should support him to the full, but yet be ready to oppose and temper his frequently exorbitant demands with prudence and intelligence. He can well be reminded that China, which has more than any other nation to lose if Japan wins the war, is putting out the least war-effort of all the Allies. Her contribution to the military strength of our Allied forces has been grossly exaggerated in propaganda emanating from both American and Chinese sources. Such a misconception as to the part China can accurately be expected to play in this war may harm us greatly if our own war plans are based at all substantially on any such exaggerated expectations. We shall consequently have to do away with all sham and pretense in our future discussions with Chinese officials concerning China’s position in our collective war-strategy.
- Original telegram received by the War Department February 12, 4:19 p.m.; paraphrase transmitted to the Department of State, received February 16.↩