893.00/14834

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Salisbury)1

The change of officials in the Chinese Government reported in Chungking’s telegram No. 545 of December 29, 3 p.m.2 should be alarming to this Government, for the reason that the growing strength of ultra-conservative or reactionary officials in the Chungking Government increases the possibility of Free China’s giving in to the Japanese, at the worst, or, slightly less evil, relaxing their war efforts to the detriment of our part in the war.

This telegram is not the only evidence of a deteriorating situation in China. There is also evidence of discontent, inefficiency, and the like in Mr. Gauss’s despatch no. 214 of November 17, 1941,3 enclosing an account of a visit to Szechwan, Shensi, Honan, and Hupeh by Jack Belden.4 We have had previously in other reports similar evidence of ineffective prosecution of China’s war against the Japanese, including the placing of self-interest before national interest on the part of key men in the National Government.

Unless this Government takes some step intended to check the growth of this situation, we may find China out of the war—or practically out of the war—a development which would be most detrimental to our efforts. Should not consideration be given to the possibility, say when our next loan to China is made, of President Roosevelt’s expressing to Chiang Kai-shek5 his perturbation over these developments? If this is not feasible, some action of some sort along these lines ought to be taken, especially in view of the fall of Manila, which will undoubtedly strengthen the peace party in Chungking and those officials who, even if they don’t want peace, want to prosecute the war at a pedestrian level. Radio propaganda is not enough.

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Should not continuous thought be given to avoiding any action on the part of this and other allied governments which ignores Chiang Kai-shek and thereby causes him to lose “face” and to taking action which helps to give Chiang Kai-shek “face” in his relations with the allied nations? Should not consideration be given to the feasibility of having the British send into Yunnan Province a military force, say, an artillery unit, even though it be only of token size? Such a step would presumably please the Chinese authorities and give them a sense of unity with the other allied forces. India is not at present under attack and perhaps some Indian unit or units could be spared.

  1. Memorandum shown on January 5 to Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt.
  2. Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. v, p. 553.
  3. Not printed.
  4. Jack Belden, American reporter and writer.
  5. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Chinese Executive Yuan (Premier).