740.0011 Pacific War/3067
The Consul at Kunmnig (Ludden) to the Ambassador in China (Gauss)51
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my despatch no. 11 of October 22, 1942 “Japanese Military Activity in Western Yunnan”52 in which reference was made to proposed offensive operations aiming at the recapture of Burma early in 1943 and to present below certain information with regard to active steps which are now being taken in this area to implement plans for an offensive.
Although it has not been definitely settled it is expected that operations originating in Yunnan will be under the command of General Joseph W. Stilwell and will be in conjunction with a simultaneous offensive movement originating in India and under the command of General Archibald Wavell, British Commander-in-Chief in India.
[Page 183]In the near future Central Government units will commence to move into this province from Wan Hsien, Changsha, and various other parts of China. It is anticipated that this force will eventually total thirty divisions. It is understood, however, that there is still a certain amount of disagreement between the Chinese military authorities and General Stilwell as to the units to be moved and there also appears to be some divergence of opinion between General Stilwell and the Chinese military authorities as to the amount of artillery that the force should have at its disposal. It is alleged by American officers closely connected with the preparations now under way that there is reluctance on the part of the Chinese to make available to the force artillery in quantities sufficient to satisfy the wishes of General Stilwell.
The bulk of the force will take up positions in western Yunnan along the line of the Burma Road, but a certain portion of it will be stationed in the Mengtze area, southeast of Kunming on the Indo-China Railway, for possible use in a diversionary attack against Indo-China when offensive operations westward along the Burma Road are opened.
As Central Government units arrive in Yunnan it is planned to attach American Army officers to the headquarters of the various units. It is not known at the present time to what extent this plan will be followed, but it is expected that the American officers thus attached will number approximately one hundred. Certain of the officers have already arrived in India and for the time being are at the Chinese Expeditionary Force Training Center at Ramgarh until Central Government units begin to arrive in Yunnan. The remainder of the American officers are expected to arrive at Karachi from the United States about January 15th. At least a portion of the officers have served previously in China.
The position of the American officers with Chinese units has not been made clear other than that they will have no tactical duties. From conversations with some of the American officers who will take part in the proposed campaign, I gather that the theory behind the presence of the American officers is that their mere physical presence at various Chinese headquarters during the course of the campaign may dissuade high ranking Chinese officers from disobedience of orders at critical moments or from precipitate departure from the scene of action which, it is alleged, so unfortunately featured the collapse of the Chinese Sixth Army during the last Burma campaign. The American officers will of course also serve in an advisory capacity. In addition to officers attached to tactical units, American supply officers will be attached to the Chinese Service of Supply.
The question of supply is one which is receiving attention and close cooperation is planned between the American Service of Supply at [Page 184] Kunming and the Chinese supply organization. I have been informed that during his recent visit to Kunming, Mr. T. V. Soong assured General Stilwell that China Defense Supplies flown from India would be used for the offensive operations planned in Yunnan and not diverted to other areas.
The proposed offensive against Burma has been delayed to a large extent, according to American sources, by the reluctance of General Wavell to commit his forces to such a campaign while the situation in the Middle East remained obscure. Now that Axis forces have been driven from their threatening position close to the Suez Canal it is understood that General Wavell is prepared to act against the Japanese in Burma.
It now appears that the previous proposal for an offensive against Burma from Assam down the Chindwin Valley has been abandoned and that the main attack will now be made from a bridge head to be established at some point on the coast of Burma, possibly Akyab. Such action presupposes adequate naval protection which is stated to have arrived already at Trincomalee in Ceylon, having been released from the Mediterranean Sea following recent Allied successes in that area. The total force involved on the Indian sector of the attack is unknown, but will include approximately 30,000 Chinese troops who are now undergoing training with American equipment at the Chinese Expetionary Force Training Center at Ramgarh. As stated previously, the force operating on the Yunnan sector of the attack will total approximately thirty Chinese divisions.
Because of the delay mentioned, time is growing short and it is necessary that the offensive be pressed to a conclusion before the monsoon rains halt operations about the middle of next May. There appears to be some apprehension on the part of American officers connected with the present plans that there has been too much delay and too much talk in India with regard to the offensive and they feel that the initiative may be taken from Allied hands by a Japanese attack in Yunnan before sufficiently effective forces can be moved to the Salween River front to carry out the plan.
As previously reported in my despatch no. 23 of November 25, 1942 “Chinese Military Strength Along Salween River”,53 the Chinese troops at present in that sector are not believed to be able effectively to halt any determined Japanese drive up the Burma Road because of inadequate equipment and general physical debility.
Although there has been some minor Japanese military activity north of Tengyueh in recent weeks, very probably looting forays, it is not believed that the Japanese are planning a crossing of the Salween in the immediate future. Aerial reconnaissance by American pilots confirm this belief.
[Page 185]At the present time it is estimated that there are approximately 100,000 Japanese troops in Burma, or about six divisions. Although definite information is not available it is thought possible that the Japanese now have either rail or highway routes in operation from Saigon to Mandalay via Bangkok and are in position effectively to reinforce their Burma garrison with great speed in case of necessity.54
Respectfully yours,
- Copy transmitted to the Department by the Consul at Kunming; received January 13, 1943. Noted by the Secretary of State.↩
- Not printed.↩
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- In a memorandum of January 20, 1943, addressed to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State (Welles), the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) observed: “This despatch is extremely interesting and merits reading in full. M. M. H.”. The Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) commented in a memorandum of January 23, 1943: “The information … although exceedingly interesting, would seem in large measure to be ‘washed out’ by current news to the effect that General Wavell takes the position that a campaign for the retaking of Burma cannot be undertaken until after the situation in North Africa has been completely cleared up. S. K. H.”.↩