811.917/234
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
No. 693
Chungking, October 21,
1942.
[Received November 12.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Department’s
telegram no. 939 of October 9, 9 p.m. setting forth the terms of the reply
to be made in respect to the complaint of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
regarding adverse criticism of China recently published in certain American
periodicals, and to enclose for the information of the Department a copy of
a memorandum of conversation dated October 17, 1942 reporting the consequent
interview in the premises between Mr. Shao Yü-lin, Director of the
Information Department of the Ministry, and Second Secretary O. Edmund
Clubb.
It will be observed that Mr. Shao Yü-lin was apparently somewhat reluctant to
abandon the Chinese objective of achieving the imposition on the American
press of a measure of control which would serve to prevent the publication
in the United States of adverse criticism of China and its leaders; and
that, after having had explained to him the general nature of American
censorship in wartime and after his having in turn explained how strictly
the Chinese censorship functioned, Mr. Shao expressed the desire of the
Chinese side that, even as they would use the information as to the workings
of the American censorship “for purposes of reference”, so should the
American authorities take note of the Chinese procedure “for purposes of
reference.” Mr. Shao nevertheless expressed the appreciation of the Chinese
authorities of that influence on American public opinion which the United
States Government had exercised in the past for the benefit of China.
Mr. Shao’s persistence very probably was due at least partially to the
circumstance that the Foreign Office reputedly achieved a measure of success
when it recently protested to the British Embassy at Chungking against the
passing by the censors of the Indian Government of two articles written by
Mr. Edgar Snow for the Saturday Evening Post (one of
those articles presumably being that which was the subject
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of the Chinese protest to this Embassy). In
that instance, by report, in spite of the opposition of Sir M. Zafrullah
Khan, Indian Agent General for China, the British Embassy transmitted the
protest to the Indian Government, which on its part promised that it would
in the future cooperate with the Chinese National Government to the end that
such articles should not be passed by the censors in India and stated
(evidently bearing in mind recent critical press articles and remarks of
Chinese officials attacking British action in India) that the Indian
Government expected similar cooperation from the Chinese Government. It
might perhaps be noted at this point that Mr. Shao Yü-lin observed to Mr.
Clubb, while depicting the workings of Chinese censorship, that unfavorable
news and comment regarding the situation in India was suppressed in China,
even as was news regarding strikes in American shipyards, out of
consideration for China’s relations with its allies. There is enclosed, for
the information of the Department, a copy of the strictly confidential
memorandum32 of a
conversation on October 16, 1942 between Mr. Basil Boothby, Second Secretary
of Embassy of the British Embassy, and Third Secretary of Embassy Philip D.
Sprouse, comprising the report of the above-mentioned Chinese protest to the
British authorities.
It is the considered opinion of this Embassy that the Chinese authorities
will continue to endeavor to prevent the publication of information or
criticism tending to portray the weaknesses and faults of their leadership,
but that it would be a mistaken policy for American governmental agencies to
foster in the minds of National Government leaders the belief that, even in
those circumstances where their actions are without merit, they can depend
upon the United States Government for assistance in maintaining intact that
highly favorable American public opinion vis-à-vis China which has owed its
development partially to artificial factors. As stated in my despatch no.
661 of October 2, 1942 in regard to this subject, it is believed that
critical comment by the American press of Chinese affairs, if well deserved,
may occasionally have a beneficial effect; in any event, such criticism
should not be expected to result in any weakening of the American position
in China. The maintenance of that position would seem to depend for the
greater part by far upon such elements of military and political strength as
the United States may display in actual performance in the field of the
present world conflict, and only to a minor extent on the continued
expression by the American press and public of friendly sentiments toward
China: the present Chinese leaders are realists who are guided by practical
material considerations when laying their political course.
Respectfully yours,
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[Enclosure]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Second Secretary of
Embassy in China (Clubb)
[Chungking,] October 17, 1942.
I called this morning by appointment on Mr. Shao Yü-lin, Director of the
Information Department of the Foreign Office. Mr. Y. S. Ch’en was also
present in the capacity of interpreter.
I communicated to Mr. Shao essentially verbatim (without, however, using
a written text) the Department’s reply of October 9 to the Foreign
Office’s protest in regard to the appearance of items adversely critical
of China in the columns of American periodicals. I made that
communication in English. When Mr. Ch’en was translating the last part
of the Department’s reply, I intervened to make it clear and to
emphasize that the Department’s assurance that the United States
Government would continue to exert its influence and to lend its
guidance along appropriate lines to maintain and further a friendly
American public opinion in regard to friendly Governments and nations
(1) did not propose any departure from the procedure heretofore employed
to the same end and (2) had reference not particularly to China and the
case under discussion but was general in its import.
Mr. Shao asked if there did not exist under present conditions an
American censorship of publications. I said that there was a censorship
of information referring to military matters such as movement of troops,
the manufacture of new types of armaments, ship movements, et cetera,
but apart from information of that category the publication of news was
unrestricted; and, particularly, there was no censorship of the
expression of critical opinion by American periodicals in regard to
political and economic developments, or in regard to governmental acts,
whether on the part of the United States or of other countries.
Mr. Shao asked if the same censorship could not be applied to the
publication of material of a general nature as in the case of
specifically military information, to which I replied that I thought
that would be very difficult. I returned at this point to emphasize that
it was to be feared that any attempt to interfere with the freedom of
the press in the United States would probably in the event be attended
by adverse results for the spontaneous support the American public has
hitherto given the Chinese Government and the Chinese people. Mr. Shao
asked whether, after the formation of OWI, it was that agency which was
concerned with matters pertaining to the censorship of information. (I
believe that his question probably grew out of a particular reason,
perhaps not unconnected with the functioning of an OWI office in
Chungking.) I said that I could not be sure on that point, but
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that I believed that the OWI
was not the responsible agency, but that instead censorship was effected
through such particular agencies as the Department of War, Department of
State, and the Navy Department.
Mr. Shao proceeded to outline the Chinese procedure for the exercise of
control over the press, observing that all information, whether it had
to do with political, economic, financial or social affairs, as well as
that pertaining directly to military matters, was subject to censorship;
and that the expression of opinion fell in the same category. He said
that this was in accordance with the concept of “total war”, and that it
was on that basis that the Chinese Government acted to control news
which it might be considered would be detrimental to the interests of
friendly states should it be made public. He referred to the case where
certain newspaper correspondents in India had reported the arrival there
of a certain number of American planes, stating that the Chinese
authorities in that instance had considered that the publication of such
news constituted an act detrimental to the interests of the United
Nations; and he said that, when there had been a strike in a shipyards
in the southern part of the United States—I suggested that it might have
been San Francisco, but Mr. Shao did not remember—the Chinese
authorities had kept the news out of the Chinese press. I said that
there was no question when it came to the matter of control of
information of a strictly military character, but that, as regards the
American shipyards’ strike in question, it seemed to me very probable
that the news was published in the United States itself.
Mr. Shao desired to be informed further in regard to the nature of
American control over the press, and I said that the State Department,
for instance, had a section which followed public opinion and the news
as published in the current press, that in the Department press
conferences there were sometimes issued communiqués, and statements of
policy, that there were in those press conferences exchanges of news and
views, that the press was informed as regards the policies of the United
States Government and for the major part could be expected to follow
those policies in time of war, but that if any newspaper chose not to
follow the Government’s policy there was still no control imposed upon
it (to prevent the expression of adversely critical opinion) . I
emphasized again that the American censorship was directed against
publication of military information only and not against criticism. I
remarked again that, as indicated in the Department’s reply, the Chinese
Government and people enjoyed a very favorable press in the United
States, and said that a few expressions of critical opinion should be
considered as bearing comparatively little importance when viewed
against the whole. I added that, in my personal opinion, the
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indirect approach to such
problems was sometimes superior to the direct.
Mr. Shao said in conclusion that the Chinese authorities appreciated the
influence the United States Government had exercised in the past for the
benefit of China. He asked whether what I said could be taken as
representing the American policy as regards the question of censorship.
I said that it could. Mr. Shao then said that the Chinese authorities
would use that information “for purposes of reference”, but hoped that
the American authorities would also take note of the Chinese procedure
as set forth by him, likewise for “purposes of reference”.
