893.20/9–2542
Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Salisbury)21
It is realized that the War and Navy Departments are giving constant and serious consideration to the question of maintaining and strengthening the United States Air Force in China.
There are involved in this question a number of important political factors. Among these there may be mentioned the following:
In the recent activities of the United States Air Force in China and in the air operations by the Japanese brought on by those activities it is to a considerable extent Chinese persons and Chinese property that are damaged. Such destruction the Chinese do not, for the moment, mind. However, these developments create an obligation and a risk. If the current operations of our air force are not sustained and increased the present Chinese approval and appreciation of this effort will evaporate, we will be discredited, China’s confidence in her Allies will be further impaired, and China’s whole attitude toward the United Nations’ war effort will tend to become “sour”. By our launching of operations in China by United States armed forces, we have put ourselves in a position where it becomes from the political point of view of utmost importance that we maintain and extend the scope of these operations.
It is understood that the United States Air Force in China recently had only five bombers operating and had only something over thirty pursuits. Nevertheless, this force has made an amazingly effective showing.
[Page 156]It is realized that great practical difficulties lie in the way of maintaining and expanding this force. Some expert opinion holds that these difficulties cannot be overcome. On the other hand, General Chennault, whose record of accomplishment and first-hand experience in regard to this matter are probably not matched by any other person, is reliably understood to be confident that, with a minimum force of 150 planes—100 pursuits and 50 bombers, preferably long-range—supplied by 50 to 60 transport planes operating between India and China, he can carry on operations which will make a distinct and positive contribution toward defeating the Japanese. This would of course take care of the political factors involved.
The decision which the United States reaches in regard to the future of the United States Air Force in China will, it is believed, be of major influence in the course of events as regards China’s remaining or China’s ceasing to be an active belligerent, as regards an accelerated or a delayed defeat of Japan, and as regards a cooperative or a non-cooperative China in the solving of post-war problems.
These political factors have probably been given consideration but in as much as they are the type of factor to which the Department of State gives special attention they are being presented thus informally to the military authorities.
-
Attached is a memorandum to the Secretary of State from the Chief of the Division (Hamilton) as follows:
“In view of the importance of certain political factors bearing upon the questions of maintenance and increase in strength to some degree of the United States Air Force in China, FE has prepared a brief memorandum, attached hereto, calling special attention to those factors.
“It is suggested that during your next conference with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy you may wish to hand copies of this memorandum to them.”
Apparently in the handwriting of the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck), notation at top of memorandum states: “Superseded.” No memorandum to replace this has been found, however, in Department files.
↩