893.24/1451
Memorandum, of Conversation, by the Ambassador in China (Gauss)12
The British Ambassador having requested an appointment to see me, came for luncheon and a talk before and after.
Note: The Naval Attaché informed me this morning when he knew of the appointment for the British Ambassador, that the latter was likely coming in compliance with an instruction from London for an appraisal of the China situation. The British Military Attaché had informed Colonel McHugh that at a recent meeting of allied chiefs of staff in Washington our people had taken the view that aid should be extended to China; the British were of a somewhat different view, considering that China could go on for another year without aid. In consequence of this difference in views the British were calling for a reappraisal of the China situation, asking numerous questions as to the authority of the Generalissimo, whether it is still being maintained or could be threatened, what resistance could be expected from the Chinese if no aid were given, etc., etc. The British Military Attaché (a messmate of Lieutenant Colonel McHugh, our Naval Attaché) had put these questions to McHugh, quite frankly. McHugh understood that the British Ambassador would likely be seeing me.
Sir Horace said that he had been asked from London for an appraisal of the China situation; that, of course, he quite understood that a great deal depended on what the Japanese do, but did I not think that the Chinese could be expected to carry on, resisting in the manner they have been, for another year, without further aid.
I told Sir Horace that I had been impressed during recent months by the apparent weakening of Chinese military resistance; in the campaign of the Japanese in Chekiang and Kiangsi, there had been no effective resistance; our information had even indicated that the Chinese forces were under orders not to attempt any determined resistance, but gradually to withdraw; that is what they have done (despite their press communiqués of stubborn resistance, overpowering enemy forces, et cetera). Now that the Japanese had accomplished their objectives—of destroying the prepared airfields, of breaking up Chinese troop concentrations, and of seizing as much as possible of Chinese supplies at the air bases—they, the Japanese, were withdrawing, and the Chinese were reoccupying the areas from which the Japanese withdrew (not taking them by storm or heavy offensives, et cetera, as their propaganda reports indicate).
[Page 149]No doubt abroad, I said, many observers, like the press, were impressed by the Chinese military communiqués and received the impression that China is fighting stubbornly and offensively and forcing Japanese retirement, while we here know (and Sir Horace readily admitted) that such is not the case.
I said that in endeavoring to explain the weakening of Chinese military resistance as I had observed it over the past year or more, I had finally concluded that the situation is not due to a decreasing will to resist but to the fact that the Chinese military reserves in munitions, etc. are such that they have determined not to use them unnecessarily; they have little opportunity for their replenishment, and whatever promises might be made of assistance in replenishing them, they would not likely use their fighting power unnecessarily—not until they should feel that it can be used effectively for permanent gains—or unless they definitely have their backs to the wall and are making a last stand.
I said that we have, of course, been hearing of Chinese disappointment that they are not receiving aid from the United Nations (Sir Horace interrupted to say that some Chinese tell him that they were better off before the allies came into the war!); that complaint has been loud and continuous, and I noted considerable irritation as well as disappointment. On the other hand, if my information serves me correctly, the Chinese have probably been rather exorbitant in their presentation of their needs.
But, I said, you cannot expect Chinese troops to stand up constantly against Japanese forces with artillery and air support—particularly air support—you cannot expect that type of continuing resistance and you will not get it. No foreign commander would expect his troops to stand up against artillery and air-supported troops in the manner that the Chinese have had to do now for several years. So that, when one asks whether the Chinese cannot be expected to continue their resistance for another year without allied aid, the answer is certainly “no”, unless of course the Japanese leave the Chinese forces alone and there is no call for resistance.
Sir Horace asked what I thought should or could be done. I stated that I had previously outlined my views on that subject to him in other conversations;13 that China must have reasonable air support—not a great deal and not more than can be serviced at the air bases in this country—air support with our own personnel; and there should be a substantial effort to bring in by air sufficient raw materials or semimanufactured materials to permit the Chinese small arms arsenals and munitions factories to continue operating and supplying the forces in the field.
[Page 150]Sir Horace referred to the recent arrival at Chengtu of some 8 Lockheed-Hudson bombers (2 were lost by the Chinese bringing them in). He commented that these bombers had been built by Lockheed for the British; they are equipped with British type guns, etc., but the British had been persuaded to release them to China. He wondered what China would do with them.
I commented that that is not the type of aid that I had in mind when speaking of air support. We all know that China does not have a trained air force which can use these Lockheeds or at least use them effectively. My idea of air support is support similar to that given by the Chennault task force—planes, pilots, ground crews, etc. Of course, I said, a number of Chinese have recently been under training in the United States. These Chinese when they return could, if brigaded with the Chennault command and given practical battle experience, probably prove to be efficient and effective airmen; but if they are put into the Chinese Air Force under squadron leaders without the requisite training and experience, all our effort will be lost.
Sir Horace asked whether I had any ideas on the strength of force needed in China. I commented that this is a question for the military men, but I had understood that a force of about 50 bombers and 100 odd fighters, with personnel, including ground crew as well as pilots, supplied by about 60 transport planes, would be about all that China could handle—about all that the air base facilities in China could handle—and, judging from what Brigadier General Chennault has accomplished with a very, very much smaller force—they would be an effective air force in this country. But they would need to be kept up to full strength. If to the 60 transports required to service this force were added another 40 transports, it seemed to me that, with the aid of the commercial air line as well (the C. N. A. C.) we could, at the same time that we were supplying and servicing this air force, bring in, in at least reasonable quantities, the necessary materials for the Chinese arsenals and munitions plants. That, I said, was all that I had contemplated by way of immediate “aid to China”. Of course there are the swivel-chair johnnies who can argue that a force of 50 bombers and 100 or more fighters is not enough; that the Japanese can muster overwhelming air strength and blot out such a force, and so on and on. But Chennault has shown what he can do with a small force—and when the Japanese came in superior strength to “blot out” the small American force, he had shown what he could do in handling that situation. Chennault has “paid dividends” and substantial dividends with the small force entrusted to him. I should like to see him have a larger force under his command. If the Japanese determine at any time to move in strength against the Chinese at any point in China, they can reach their objectives without question if China has [Page 151] no air support. But given efficient air support such as Chennault has displayed can be handled, I believe we can expect continued—and effective—resistance. That, I said, is the substance of what we had to say to our Government in our reports on the China situation, and I am convinced that it is sound.
Sir Horace said that he agreed, and that he had, time and time again, put forward similar views to London, but apparently without result. All that he can do now is to put it all together again and send it along.
He then asked how I thought the Generalissimo stands in influence and power at this time. I said that the Generalissimo in my opinion remains the dominant figure in the Chinese Government and Chinese resistance. Of course his prestige among some of the military officers and the politicians and others may have suffered a bit by the failure of China to receive substantial outside support to win the war in China. He has always advocated resistance and has expressed the opinion that eventually Britain and the United States would come into the war and when they did, it would be won with American and British assistance. He has been disappointed as to the volume of aid he has received, and at times perhaps he has been impatient and irritated over the situation. But notwithstanding any loss of prestige that may have resulted, he remains the dominant influence and the center and inspiration of continued resistance. I commented that some of the Chinese military officers are reported not to have been enthusiastic for the substantial Chinese participation in the Burma campaign and they now point to the developments in Burma as justifying their views. Here again was another disappointment for the Generalissimo; but he has survived it.
When Sir Horace mentioned again that the British had been “persuaded” to release the Hudson (Lockheed) bombers for China, I commented that in my opinion the diversion to other fields of aid to China was probably more irritating to Chiang than would have been a refusal in the first place to give it. It is my understanding, I said, that repeatedly, planes or other military materials or equipment intended for—earmarked for China, have had to be diverted to other fields—to Britain, to Russia, to Britain in the Middle East and Africa, to Australia. We undoubtedly were persuaded that the need in those areas was acute and immediate; it is probably difficult for the Generalissimo to bring himself to the point of being persuaded that the need there in other areas is always so acute that aid must be diverted there and none come to the Chinese. His irritation is understandable; he is interested in this China field principally, just as others may be interested in their own theaters of war principally.
(It is difficult to get Sir Horace to express any views or opinions; he falls back on the fact that he is new to China, etc., etc.; but I did [Page 152] get him to say that he had repeatedly recommended to London that aid to China is essential, along the lines of air support and personnel and materials for small arms ammunition and munitions; and that all that he can do now is to get out his previous recommendations and repeat them. I might record that it has been my understanding that R. A. F.14 officers who visited China to report on the need for air aid to China found that such aid should not be given. This has been reported to me repeatedly from several sources which I believe to be reliable).