741.933/100
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
No. 5005
London, August 25,
1942.
[Received September 2.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Department’s
strictly confidential instruction No. 1538 of July 1,7 transmitting a strictly confidential memorandum
entitled “China’s War Potential: Estimate”. In accordance with the
suggestion contained therein, we left a copy of the memorandum in confidence
with Mr. Ashley Clarke. He expressed his appreciation therefor and his keen
interest in the contents. In due course he wrote us a personal letter, a
copy of which is enclosed for the Department’s information. Subsequently we
took occasion to call on Mr. Ashley Clarke and to talk over both the
Department’s memorandum and his reply. He emphasized the general identity of
views of himself and his associates with the conclusions of the memorandum,
remarking that the points he has raised in the enclosed letter are, in
general, minor ones.
With reference to the third paragraph of his letter, we asked whether he did
not feel that the establishment of a continuous railway link from Manchuria
to Singapore, with the exception of short stretches in Indo-China and
Thailand, could constitute a probable immediate military advantage to Japan
in the event of a Chinese collapse. This he conceded. We also inquired
whether he did not feel that such a collapse would in fact release a
considerable number of Japanese troops for service elsewhere. While agreeing
that it would eventually, he thought that much would depend upon the form of
the collapse and whether guerrilla warfare would continue as factors
determining the number of troops Japan could immediately withdraw. He also
agreed that Japan would probably obtain greater access to a large supply of
labor and certain strategic raw materials. He went on to say that as far as
the immediate effects, however, of a Chinese collapse were concerned, he
felt that their principal importance would be psychological or political
(along the lines indicated in the Department’s memorandum), their economic
second, and the military third. At a later period, he believed, the relative
importance to Japan of the military and economic aspects of a Chinese
collapse would increase. The difference in the British and American points
of view, therefore, is largely one of degree or emphasis, and the British
fully concur with us that from every point of view a Chinese collapse would
constitute a major set-back. Personally, it is his feeling that Chiang
Kai-shek will never make peace with Japan and that
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such a development could only take place if the
Generalissimo were, in one form or another, eliminated.
As the Department is aware, the British are always sensitive on the question
of the independence of Tibet, which accounts for the mention of that
territory in Ashley Clarke’s letter; but he did not appear to take the
reference to that territory as “lumped with China” (Department’s
memorandum—paragraph 1) too seriously.8
Respectfully yours,
For the Ambassador:
H. Freeman Matthews
Counselor of Embassy
[Enclosure]
The Head of the Far Eastern Department of the British
Foreign Office (Ashley
Clarke) to the Counselor of
the American Embassy in the United Kingdom (Matthews)
No. F 5112/5112/10
[London,] August 7, 1942.
My Dear Matthews: A little while ago you left
with me informally a copy of a memorandum prepared in the Department of
State on China’s war potential which the Department had kindly agreed
that we should see.
When I was in Washington I raised this very question with Mr. Hornbeck
and Mr. Hamilton. In the grave situation created by the cutting of the
last main route connecting China with her allies, it seemed to me that a
review of where we all stood as a result was a necessary preliminary to
considering what remedial action was most needed. In other words, we
here are only concerned with what would happen if China fell out in
order to decide what you and we could do to keep her in.
The paper which you gave me answers my enquiry admirably and we have read
it with the greatest interest. May I say at once that we are in close
agreement with its general conclusions? While we are doubtful as to the
material benefits which Japan would immediately derive and still more
doubtful whether Japan could maintain herself as a continental power
after ceasing to be a naval power, we hold the view that the collapse of
China would prolong the war by removing a potential base for striking at
Japan, by the extent to which it would relieve the strain on Japanese
resources, by the adverse psychological effect it would have on all of
us and by the encouragement which it would give to our enemies. For
these reasons (and there are others) we share the anxiety of the authors
of the memorandum to help in
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maintaining Chinese resistance and we spend much time thinking how best
this can be achieved.
There are of course a few points in the memorandum which we ourselves
might perhaps have expressed differently. I was surprised for example to
see Tibet lumped in as part of the territory of China. In point of fact
the Tibetans not only claim to be but actually are an independent
people, and they have in recent years fought successfully to maintain
their freedom against Chinese attempts at domination. Their distinct
racial, political, religious and linguistic characteristics would seem
to entitle them, therefore, to the benefits of Chapter IV paragraph 2 of
the memorandum.
I should have thought that there were no advantages at all to be gained
if China were to cease resistance to Japan (see pages 13 and 14)! Nor can I
imagine that any of the United Nations entertain even a thought of
problematical advantages to be gained by the absence of China from the
Peace Conference. Finally, I wonder whether the implication of page 17 (probably quite unconscious) that no
nation except the United States has been actuated by high motives in its
dealings with China is not rather sweeping? So far as we are concerned,
for instance, the opium wars are a long way behind us: and the
abandonment of the Japanese Alliance at the Washington Conference,9 whatever
else it may have been, was not an act of imperialism!
But these lesser points do not obscure the moral of the tale, which is
that China has made and is making—within the limitations now imposed by
her isolation—a real contribution to the united war effort and deserves
that we should bend our energies to supporting her.
Yours sincerely,
P. S. If you like we could have a talk about all this. H. A. C.
