124.936/8–342
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton)
[Received September 8.]
Dear Hamilton: [Here follows section on the health of the Embassy personnel, high costs of medical attention, length of service for officers assigned to Chungking, and the question of leave.]
[Page 120]Currie is here. I have seen him briefly once or twice, but do not know that he is making much progress. He promises to tell me all before he leaves; but so far I have had only a most sketchy account of his conversations and he does not appear to be very cheerful.
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The best military advice that I can get indicates that, come September, we are likely to see activity in the China theater in the form of a Japanese threat against Yunnan. Undoubtedly from Burma; but perhaps also from Indochina and Thailand, and perhaps also from Canton through Kwangsi. “They say” that China is wide open in the Yunnan area. When it is pointed out that our civilian sources of information indicate the presence of a substantial Chinese force disposed to face a threat from Burma, the reply then is that it is not properly disposed for the best results and that there is nothing to prevent a thrust from Indochina or Canton. On the latter situations, I must confess that we have no information to suggest that China is prepared to resist—and it takes months to move troops on foot; that is all that can be done now that gasoline stocks are running out. On the other hand, there is as yet no information to confirm that the Japanese are making concentrations in Indochina for a push up that difficult terrain into Yunnan. And even in the Burma border area, difficult terrain and few roads should make it possible for a comparatively small force of Chinese, properly equipped and well led, to stop the Japanese. A reasonable increase in our air support would also assist. It was the AVG which stopped the Japanese rapid penetration into Yunnan immediately following the Chinese debacle in Burma.
I am not a military man, and perhaps I should not be venturing opinions and comments on what are actually military matters, but I find such divergence of opinion amongst the military men that it has just seemed that as an ordinary civilian the best I can do is to gather what “facts” may be available and form my own conclusions.
Despite all rumors, I do not believe that Chiang can afford to consider peace with the Japanese, and I am convinced that he will not do so. But he has his head in the clouds so much these days that there is always the possibility that in looking over wider fields he may miss the dangers close at home. And, of course, if anything happens, he will gladly blame everything on the failure to receive American aid. The danger spots in my opinion will be found amongst his generals on the periphery—Yen in Shansi, Lung Yun in Yunnan, and Yu Han-mo in the Canton area. Any one of these might make a deal, or break; and if the Japanese once get this opportunity to move in rapidly, Chungking might readily fall. We speculate here at times whether the autumn may not find us all “treking” northwest into Shensi or [Page 121] Kansu, for we believe that if the government has to flee from Chungking the G-mo76 will seek to put himself with his so-called best army under Hu Tsung-nan, now quarantining the Communists in Shensi-Shansi.
Say what they will in their “war communiqués” and official statements of official and military spokesmen, China has done very little fighting since the war broke generally in the Pacific. They “resisted” successfully at Changsha, but did not follow through and avail themselves of the opportunity to inflict a severe defeat on the Japanese. They did send forces into Burma, but they gave a poor account of themselves (as did the British). Several units were exceptionally good; but others were poor, and when the latter broke and fled there came the debacle. Many of us here have wondered why Stilwell did not fly out when he had the opportunity and take up a directing position in the rear instead of mooching through the jungle—not with any body of troops but with refugees, Burmese nurses, etc. But perhaps he knew best. He now has some idea of 3 American divisions to “force” the British to undertake an expedition to retake Burma with American help and to induce China also to come in. I am told that this proposal is not receiving much support at home. That is a matter of high strategy. Stilwell would want supreme command; and I do not believe the British would give it to him. And I wonder how the Chinese feel. Of course a movement to retake Burma and penetrate into Thailand and French Indochina—a movement timed with a movement by Mac Arthur to “roll them up from Australia” (what a tremendous task), and a movement by our Navy to strike at the outlying Japanese island bases in the south Pacific, might be good strategy. But I gather that the British are determined to “re-take Burma” in their own time and their own way and they give little evidence of being interested in China.
As a layman trying to be rational and realistic, I can see only a reasonable distance ahead. An American military expedition to retake Burma means ships and supplies. Can we spare them; or do we actually have them? Until we do, we should in my opinion make a careful survey of the China situation and determine what aid we can send to China—not what China “wants” but what we decide we can give and what she can use effectively. Then give it—no diverting this or that or the other thing. China has facilities and reserves to support a small air force for 6 months to a year—perhaps not more than 50 medium bombers and 100 pursuits or fighters. Give her that—and support it with replacements, spare parts and personnel. And as a matter of fact, unless Japan ceases her more grandiose expansion expeditions and concentrates on China, I soberly believe that small [Page 122] air force—under Chennault, who knows his business—would accomplish wonders. But of course if Japan is not to penetrate toward India, or Australia, or Siberia, or Alaska, or the Hawaiian Islands, then Tokyo may determine to use full force to liquidate the China Incident. If that is done, China will undoubtedly continue the policy of resistance as long as possible—but China would undoubtedly collapse in the face of a strong Japanese effort. Japan has not made that effort in the past. Japan has been conserving her strength for the world war which has now come. China has been a training ground for troops and air force; but since the early years of the Sino-Japanese war, Japan has not made an effort in strength to liquidate the China Incident. Unless Japan is stopped before she turns in full force to that task, China must succumb when the full weight of Japanese pressure is put into this country.
We have had an unusually hot and trying summer this year. No actual air raids—so far, but there are still 3 months ahead. But the heat has been terrific and we are all feeling it. Last year I was fresh enough to remain down on the south bank and attend the chancery daily, and at night to try to sleep in our attic rooms under the hot roof. But we could not hold out this year and I am staying most of the time in an emergency cottage in the hills where the telegrams and despatches come up to me regularly to be worked on and sent down again. I alternate officers and clerks here—to give them a bit of clean air and an occasional light breeze. John Carter [Vincent] comes up every evening—or most every evening. He, too, feels it this summer and even when I remained down on the south bank he sought refuge up here for the nights and a better chance of sleep. I am fairly near the G-mo, Kung77 and others who are spending their time in the Hills also. But, since TV78 assumed the control in Washington, and we here no longer know what is going on, I have little occasion to see either the G-mo or Kung. I am going over to the G-mo’s tonight for dinner. Vincent goes to Kung’s frequently for bridge with the 3 Soong sisters79 (but there is seldom anything but bridge—and poor bridge at that, I understand). McHugh also goes for bridge from time to time, but since Donald80 left Mac does not have his old track in petticoat politics; and as a matter of fact he has repeatedly been told that it is known that he has made unfavorable or critical reports to Washington. I have a feeling that the same feeling is held toward me, but nothing has been said.
This letter, written early Monday morning in the Hills, when my bag of envelopes containing telegrams and despatches has gone down [Page 123] to the chancery and nothing has yet come, so that I am free, seems to have expanded to a great length. It is rambling; but it may contain news and views that may be of some casual interest.
With all good wishes [etc.]
[In his reply of September 18, Mr. Hamilton discussed extensively the various personnel problems raised by Ambassador Gauss and made the following comment concerning the other issues: “Your comments in regard to Lend-Lease aid to China, the position of General Stilwell as Chief of Staff, and the extraordinary job which General Chennault has done and is continuing to do are very enlightening. Mr. Currie has returned and we have had a few brief talks with him. John Davies gave us a great deal of information of value.”]