740.0011 Pacific War/2680
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
No. 508
Chungking, July 9,
1942.
[Received July 31.]
Sir: I have the honor to enclose for the
information of the Department, a memorandum prepared by the Counselor of the
Embassy, Mr. John Carter Vincent, on the subject of continuation of Chinese
resistance to Japan and the suggestions that if American support for China
is not forthcoming in the measure China expects consideration might be given
to peace with Japan.
The Embassy has long been of the opinion that little more could be expected
from China in the present war than continued resistance with the object of
containing in this country a substantial Japanese military force which might
otherwise be used elsewhere against the United Nations. I believe that the
major battles of the war of the United Nations will be fought in other
theaters. I have recognized that China might afford a springboard for aerial
offensives against Japan from air bases in eastern China—Chekiang and
Kiangsi—provided those bases could be supplied with aviation fuel, bombs and
service facilities; but those air bases have recently been lost to the hands
of the Japanese. Incidentally, the Chinese charge that the loss of these
bases is due largely to lack of air support for the Chinese armies in the
Kiangsi-Chekiang area; air support which had been expected from the United
States.
For the time being at least, there remains in this theater of the war the one
important problem of continuation of Chinese resistance to Japan; and
effective resistance, not only to the measure of Japanese resistance which
has been experienced in the past but to the greater pressure which Japan may
at any time bring to bear for the settlement of the “China Incident”.
Military and other observers have long maintained that if Japan had been
disposed to throw into China heavily increased forces, with air support on a
larger scale, Chinese
[Page 105]
resistance
could readily be crushed. But for over four years, Japan has been husbanding
the Japanese military strength for the greater program of aggression on
which that country has now embarked.
With the success of the Japanese offensive southward, it now remains to be
seen in what direction Japan will turn in the near future. If Japan becomes
involved in a substantial way in major offensives against Siberia, India, or
Australia, it is not likely that increased Japanese pressure can be applied
at this time on China; but unless Japan does so become involved in other
directions, it is to be expected that added pressure on China will develop,
and I do not believe that, without reasonable outside support, China will be
able effectively to resist such Japanese military pressure.
China of course cannot service any large air force; but it does have the
facilities to service a reasonable number of fighter and bomber planes,
operated by American personnel; and a reasonably strong air force would give
substantial backbone and aid to the Chinese military forces in defensive
operations against Japanese pressure and in harassing tactics against
Japanese positions and lines of supply and communication in this country.
Air operations against the Japanese in China, independent of the operations
of the Chinese ground forces, would also be capable of rendering results
commensurate with the force available for the purpose. China is also in need
of munitions and materials for the manufacture of munitions, without which
the Chinese ground forces cannot be expected to continue resistance for an
indefinite period.
I believe that an effort should be made without delay to give China
reasonable American air support and to maintain and develop air transport
facilities capable of providing a continuing supply of munitions and
materials for the manufacture of munitions. With such support, I believe
that China can reasonably be expected to continue effective resistance to
the Japanese in China and even to increased Japanese pressure in this
country. As the war continues, however, and Chinese reserves are depleted
and morale deteriorates, I do not believe that continued effective Chinese
military resistance to Japan can be expected to continue without outside
support.
Respectfully yours,
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in China
(Vincent)
[Chungking,] June 28, 1942.
The “question” of a continuation of resistance by the Chinese has been
raised again in the recent conversation between General Stilwell
[Page 106]
and Generalissimo and Madame
Chiang.67 Although there are in the situation factors, phases and
angles—psychological as well as factual; personal as well as
political—which must be considered, it is possible nevertheless to offer
a reasonably satisfactory answer.
First, it is believed that the answer to the question is to be found in
the internal situation rather than in external circumstances; that is,
ruling out the possibility of allied reverses so serious that the
Chinese lose confidence in an allied victory (losses such as Tobruk are
a shock but they do not appear to shake confidence in ultimate victory),
the continuation of resistance does not depend upon the reception of
allied aid, as General Chiang implied and Madame Chiang stated in their
conversation with General Stilwell. Chinese in a position to assess the
potentialities do not, I believe, consider that the amount of assistance
that can be brought into China now or in the near future can have any
decisive result—can in fact effect a material change in the situation.
Neither air support nor artillery in sufficient force to make possible
an offensive can, in the case of air units, be maintained in China and,
in the case of artillery, be brought into China. Small arms and
ammunition are needed but are not essential to a continuation of
resistance of the kind that has characterized the hostilities in China
for the past two years. Hence the attitude adopted by Generalissimo and
Madame Chiang toward the recent diversion of planes and other supplies
from China has its explanation more in face than in the actual facts of
the situation. American planes would be useful in China: they are in no
sense vital to a continuation of resistance. The statements made
therefore by General and Madame Chiang, while worthy of serious
consideration, should not be cause for alarm.
When the Generalissimo says, as General Stilwell reports, that he wants
to know whether the United States continues to consider China as a real
theatre of war in order that he may know what course China should follow
in the future and when Madame Chiang explains that the Generalissimo
means whether China should come to terms with Japan, the question
arises: Who is going to come to terms with the Japanese?
There are three possibilities. General Chiang might come to terms.
General Chiang, and the family and political intimates supporting him,
might voluntarily retire from the scene and permit others less committed
to resistance to come to terms. Or, Chiang and his immediate associates
might be forced to retire by those desirous of coming to terms with
Japan.
The possibility that Chiang might come to terms with the Japanese is so
slight that I believe it can be dismissed. Chiang, as the Embassy has
stated on several occasions, is irrevocably committed to resistance.
[Page 107]
Unity and resistance are the
two pillars of his policy. Through the latter he has achieved a large
degree of the former. He could not give up the one and retain the other
under his leadership. And there is also the personal equation. Chiang
envisages himself as one of the four great leaders on the allied war
front. As such he can demand support but he cannot seriously consider
abandoning the fight.
The possibility that Chiang and his immediate adherents might voluntarily
step aside in order to permit others to come to terms with the Japanese
is merely a possibility. It is in no sense a probability largely for the
reasons cited in the preceding paragraph which apply forcefully, if less
directly, to the contingency of voluntary retirement. Chiang would have
everything to lose and nothing to gain by such a gesture. Furthermore,
the question of voluntary retirement presupposes the existence of a
group capable of leading the country and government to the acceptance of
terms with Japan. This supposition leads to consideration of the third
possibility.
Under certain contingencies, it is possible that a group in the
government less committed to resistance than Chiang might be able to
force his retirement and come to terms with the Japanese. This
possibility could only become a probability should the allied fortunes
of war fall so low as to undermine general confidence in an allied
victory. At present there exists no group within or without the
government or party capable of initiating and pursuing a policy contrary
to that of Chiang. In fact it is doubtful if there exist within the
government individuals of importance who have a desire to oppose Chiang.
The most powerful men in the government in their various fields—(Chen
Li-fu, Minister of Education, and with his brother Chen Kuo-fu, the
leader of the influential “C-C” clique; H. H. Kung, controller of the
finances of the country; Chang Chun, Governor of Szechuan and leader of
the “political science” group of officials who, although oriental in
their outlook, are not pro-Japanese; Ho Ying-chin, Minister of Military
Administration and “elder officer” of the Whampoa military academy
clique which has much influence in the army; and Tai Li, chief of the
Chinese gestapo with a large “army” of political agents and also
“Whampoa”)—these men or the groups they lead are not inclined to oppose
the Generalissimo even though they may not be as determined upon
resistance as the Generalissimo. They are, in fact, bound to the
Generalissimo by bonds of personal loyalty in varying degrees which
seems to preclude their taking action against him. Their importance in
the political picture lies in the role they play in the government under Chiang and the role they would play should
Chiang fortuitously be removed from the picture rather than in any role
they might play in opposition to Chiang. Chiang is not a dictator but
Chiang is so astute a politician
[Page 108]
and manager that he has been able to maintain control over the
various groups, preserving a certain bond with each and playing one off
against another when and where necessary.
There is another important angle of the situation which must be mentioned
in connection with discussion in the foregoing paragraph. Although
public opinion in China is not well organized or vocal, it is in fact
committed to resistance and it is doubtful, even should there be a group
or a combination of groups within the government desirous of setting
themselves up in opposition to Chiang and coming to terms with the
Japanese, that such a group could carry opinion among the rank and file
of the country and the army with them. More likely they would bring
chaos—or a degree of disunity close to chaos. Furthermore, it would be
extremely difficult to “sell” the people on the idea of peace with Japan
because they could be shown very little in the way of practical benefits
that would accrue therefrom.
It is clear from the foregoing, I think, that there is actually little
“question” in present circumstances of a discontinuation of Chinese
resistance; that resistance will be continued upon its present and past
“non-offensive” basis; and that any move or inciting of a move for terms
with the Japanese is so remote a possibility that it is hardly worth
consideration. Confidence in an allied victory persists generally and
may be relied upon to continue unless shaken by reverses of considerable
magnitude. It is true (as a sidelight) that there is a large and
influential body of Chinese officials who would view a Russian land
victory in Asia over Japan with hardly less misgiving than a Japanese
victory over Russia but this feeling is not shared by most people in and
out of the Government.
Although terms with Japan may be ruled out, there are possibilities in
the situation less spectacular and decisive that cannot be. One of these
is the possibility that there may be a peripheral disintegration of
authority and disaffection should confidence in allied victory be
weakened. Further deterioration in the economic situation might have a
like effect. Provincial leaders such as Yu Han-mou in Kwangtung, Lung
Yun in Yunnan, and Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi might be persuaded that
association with the Japanese puppet regime at Nanking would be more
advantageous to them than continued loyalty to Chiang. I do not think
this will occur but it is a possibility that cannot be overlooked, and
it is a possibility with which the Chungking Government would be
ill-prepared to cope. And there is another element in the situation.
Under the influence of those in government who have little sympathy with
western concepts of democratic government, who have a fear of Chinese
communism which beclouds their judgment, and who are intent upon
conserving the dominant position of the Kuomintang now and after the
war, the
[Page 109]
government might be
persuaded to reduce its resistance to a minimum in order to conserve
military strength for the future. In such a contingency, Chinese
insistence upon receiving assistance from us might prove a greater
embarrassment to us, viewing the war globally, than to the Japanese.
In conclusion, the Embassy’s view has been and I think should continue to
be that China should be given all practical assistance—practical from
the standpoint of ability effectively to utilize such assistance in
China, practical from the standpoint of transportation facilities, and
practical from the standpoint of needs in other theatres of the war.
Assistance should not be given because of a fear that failure to do so
would result in the Chinese authorities’ ceasing resistance and seeking
peace with Japan.
