794.00/254

The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State

No. 3075

Sir: I have the honor to enclose as of possible interest to the Department a copy of a letter dated April 2, 194171 addressed by Dr. J. Leighton Stuart, President of Yenching University, to his Board of Trustees in the United States. This is one of Dr. Stuart’s periodic reports to his Board on conditions at the University and in the Far East in general; copies or summaries of some of his previous reports have been sent to the Department in telegrams and despatches from this Embassy.

Much of Dr. Stuart’s letter follows the general lines of previous views expressed by him. He believes that the Japanese hold tenaciously to their southward or oceanic expansion policy, but that a number of obstacles exist, as well as divergences of opinion among the Japanese. He feels that war between the United States and Japan in the immediate future is unlikely, but that the “real danger is that, aware now of our determination to oppose any further southward aggression, Japan will penetrate unobtrusively while issuing declarations to the contrary, and will thus have made such strategic gains that we shall then feel compelled to act under conditions far less favorable to us than at present”. He comments that the “reverse of this policy of stealthy intrusion is that Japan invariably withdraws [Page 774] when convinced of the strength of the opposing force”, and cites as the classic instance the withdrawal of the Japanese when faced by strong Soviet forces at Nomanhan.72 He expresses the opinion that the “surest method therefore of averting a truly calamitous conflict later is to convince Japan of the folly of provoking America to hostile action”. He believes that the most effective way to circumvent Japan’s “piratical ambitions in the South Seas”, and with the minimum cost to ourselves, is to aid China by all measures short of war, and that the more promptly and publicly this can be done the better.

Dr. Stuart makes the interesting suggestion that

“It would be a wise and gracious bit of statesmanship if at this critical period we took the initiative in abrogating all the treaty privileges which have been forced on China and thus recognize her right to equality of treatment. If Japan wins, or is able to keep her grip on any part of China, we lose these as well as all our interests wherever Japan is in control, and if China wins these anachronistic and insulting encroachments on her sovereignty will be cancelled as soon as her Government feels sufficiently well established. But spontaneous action by us now would be extremely cheering to the Chinese nation in its heroic struggle and would neutralize Japanese propaganda at the only point where the western powers are really vulnerable.”

The Embassy feels that there is much merit in Dr. Stuart’s suggestion. Japanese propaganda in the Far East during the past months has frequently stressed Pan-Asianism and denounced the alleged encroachments of Occidental powers in China and elsewhere. The Embassy considers that an immediate abrogation by the United States of its extraterritorial rights in China might not be advisable, in view of certain conditions such as the situation at Shanghai,73 but it does believe that a public announcement by the United States Government of intention to give up its extraterritorial rights upon the conclusion of hostilities in China might have a salutary effect and counteract most effectively present Japanese propaganda.

It should be borne in mind, in reading Dr. Stuart’s letter, that it was written before the announcement of the signing of the recent Soviet-Japanese “neutrality” pact.74

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:
Robert L. Smyth
  1. Not printed.
  2. See Foreign Relations, 1939, Vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.
  3. See pp. 822 ff.
  4. Signed at Moscow, April 13; see telegram No. 763, April 13, 11 p.m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Vol. iv, p. 944.