751G.92/152: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 9—1:22 p.m.]
40–41. Embassy’s 38, January 9, 9 p.m. From a secret telegram addressed to the British Ambassador from London which he has shown me the British position is that, although Japanese mediation may have been rejected by the Thais, the Japanese may induce the Germans to force the French to give way in order that the Thais may be led to believe that the solution reached was due to the efforts of the Axis powers. It is the British view that the Thai Government must be shown that any settlement effected through Axis mediation will probably be bought only at a price which will result in Thailand being brought in on the side of the Axis, an eventuality which would render the Thais liable to the various financial and economic measures imposed by the British against countries having especially close Axis relations.
The British, however, feel that it would be premature to make representations along the foregoing lines, accompanied by an expression [Page 10] of a willingness to be helpful in looking for a solution of the present conflict, until after consultation with the American Government.
The fact is that the British are of the opinion that the United States Government’s position regarding the Thai claims is somewhat too uncompromising in view of the importance of Thailand as a base for operations against Burma, Malaya and Singapore. They feel strongly that the present critical stage is one in which expediency should dictate American policy, especially in view of our recognition of the value of Singapore as a strategic base. On this point I am, of course, unwilling to express an opinion.
In view of the inability of the British to approach the French directly in this matter they feel entitled to ask us to do so. They urge the utmost expedition, feeling that time is of the essence.
The British are unaware of the extent of the territory which the French would be willing voluntarily to surrender. A telegram from the British Minister at Bangkok states, however, that it would be tragic if prompt action could not be taken believing that a peaceful settlement [is possible?] if the French, for instance, are prepared to give up limited territory on the right bank of the river Mekong. He feels that by this action the Prime Minister’s face would be saved and that irredentist agitation in Thailand could be controlled.