893.00/14740
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 6.]
Sir: I have the honor to enclose, as of possible interest to the Department, a copy in translation of an interesting document91 which is neither marked nor dated that has come into the possession of the Embassy. The document was supplied to the Embassy in confidence by an American citizen, Professor J. Lossing Buck of Nanking University, Chengtu, Szechuan, who could not vouch for its authenticity or antecedents. The Department will note that the document purports to divulge certain aspects of the fixed policy of the Chinese Communist Party as related by Mr. Mao Tse-tung, who, as the Department will be aware, is both the titular and real head of that party.
Summary of document. The Sino-Japanese conflict offers the best opportunity for expansion of the Chinese Communist Party. At first the Party must sacrifice to win public support. The Party must foster dissension in the Kuomintang by playing off certain cliques against one another. The Party must gain control of north China, liquidating Kuomintang influence. If Japanese strength becomes too strong the Party must seek rapprochement with the Kuomintang. After establishing the Party in north China communist influence will be established [Page 506] throughout China and dissension instigated among Government troops. The Party Central will then be strengthened and efforts made to take over authority from the Kuomintang. [End of summary.]
In view of the doubtful authenticity of the document in question, comment thereupon may appear uncalled for. However, it may not be amiss to observe that there appears to be a striking similarity in some respects between the policy outlined in the document and the policy actually pursued by the Chinese Communist Party since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict. Before that conflict started, the Chinese communists were active in fostering a “united front” in opposition to Japanese encroachment and they played an active part in the famous Sian Incident which was to crystallize Chinese sentiment in active opposition to Japan. And it is now generally agreed that in the early part of the Sino-Japanese conflict Kuomintang-communist cooperation was satisfactory, that the Chinese communists fought bravely and well. But by 1939 a growing rift was evident that has now grown to an almost unbridgeable chasm. The Chinese communists themselves admit that their armies have expanded; and it is also quite evident that they have succeeded to control of large portions of Shansi, Hopeh and Shantung, and that they have military garrisons and bases in certain areas of central China. There is also evidence, based on independent reports from north China, that they are inactive in a military sense against the Japanese. Three years ago the average observer would probably have regarded the enclosed document as spurious, as designed for ulterior purposes. But in the light of the developments of the past two years, it is respectfully suggested that the document merits study as a possible indication of the true policy of the Chinese Communist Party.
Respectfully yours,
Second Secretary of Embassy
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