793.94/16601: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 10—12:45 p.m.]
663. Since the return to Japan of Foreign Minister Matsuoka,83 the political atmosphere has been charged with expectancy. Cold examination of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact did not reassure the nation that Matsuokan diplomacy was nearing a solution of Japan’s major problem—settlement of the China incident—since cessation of Soviet aid to Chungking was not guaranteed. Furthermore, there were indications of increased American aid to Chungking. The press has almost daily repeated the theme that the focal point of Japan’s diplomacy must be a settlement in China, and a step in that direction has been awaited anxiously. In the meantime there have been murmurs of growing dissatisfaction at the continued stalemate in China and at the failure of the Government to take positive measures, especially in the face of the quickened tempo of European developments. While praising Matsuoka’s recent diplomatic successes, the press has warned the people against developing a dangerous sense of security. The need for some sort of action toward fortifying China policy is reflected in a recent statement made by Colonel Kenryo Sato, the Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry: “After 5 years of warfare we can in no way perceive on the continent or in Tokyo evidence of the concentrated power of a total war.”
It is in the light of these circumstances that the recent statements by Ambassador Honda and General Hata84 are believed significant (Embassy’s 654, May 8, 5 p.m. and 662, May 10, 4 p.m.85).
[Page 500]They answer the demand for clarification of policy and for action by affirming the existence of “a concrete plan”, proposing an intensified military campaign and indicating that a settlement through direct or indirect negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek is not to be expected. Ambassador Honda’s statement that the Nanking government must be strengthened through increase of its economic power and betterment of the conditions of the masses beyond that prevailing under Chungking’s jurisdiction has to the nation the ring of reason. Furthermore General Hata’s promise of efforts to deal the enemy a crushing blow and the reappearance in the press of long absent reports of military successes may serve as the awaited evidence that effort is to be made to break the stalemate.
There is therefore likelihood of intensification of blockade operations and consolidation of control within restricted occupied areas. It seems doubtful that extensive campaigns in new areas will be undertaken. The Japan Times and Advertiser in an editorial, probably of official inspiration, stated yesterday that military conquest of Chungking would not be commensurate with the cost involved and that a desired reduction of hostilities might be favored by a “shrinkage fronts.” Maintenance of garrisons over an extended area was judged to be of doubtful value.
The failure of both the Nanking government and the Japanese occupying army to establish strong and efficient control in China has been repeatedly emphasized in the press and of late increasing stress has been placed upon the need for winning the basic confidence and cooperation of the Chinese people as means to effective control. This has developed concurrently with the conviction that as long as British and American aid to Chungking and the European hostilities continue, Chiang Kai-shek will not come to terms with Japan. Ambassador Honda emphasizes that Japan’s only hope lies in the strengthening of Wang Ching-wei’s government, although Chungking may be “absorbed” later. General Hata states that Japan must not depend on diplomacy for settlement of the China incident.
These statements, coming at a time when a newly implemented policy toward China had of necessity to be indicated, suggest that the direction of that policy will be the intensification of efforts to consolidate the position of the Nanking government by the unilateral action of the Japanese army. The aim may be to create a régime resembling that of Manchukuo perhaps strong enough to maintain order in fact over the population within its jurisdiction. Thus, a “settlement” of the China incident, involving neither the capitulation nor the consent of Chungking, might be presented to the people of Japan.
Over and above speculation over the practical results of action apparently favored by the Japanese civil and military authorities there [Page 501] still remains to be satisfactorily answered the question why these authorities promulgated statements so obviously designed to invite the support of the people.