Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Volume V

893.00/14718: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

Chungking, April 29, 1941—11 a.m.
[Received 5:20 p.m.]

156. My telegram 154, April 29, my air mail despatch 835, April 15,⁷⁷ and previous on Kuomintang-Communist differences.

1. According to information available to the Embassy, there have been no significant developments in the Kuomintang-Communist relationship during the past month and more. In fact as far as can be ascertained there have been no concrete discussions among National Government and Communist authorities since Chiang Kai-shek’s informal conversation with Chou En-lai early in April. During this conversation Chiang is reported to have revealed a conciliatory attitude and to have urged upon Chou the desirability of persuading the Yenan leaders to adopt a cooperative attitude, that is to agree to comply with the military instructions of the High Command. Chou is generally regarded as desirous of being cooperative but it is commonly held that his influence is on the wane and that he has forfeited the confidence of the Yenan leaders. In passing, it may be remarked that at the last session of the People’s Political Council held in March a committee composed of representatives of the existing party organizations was established to seek a formula for the settlement of the Kuomintang-Communist problem. However, it is reported that this organization has not been active probably for the reason that the Communist members have refused to participate in the discussions.

2. Present indications suggest that Chiang has adopted a very cautious attitude toward the Communists, that he will while taking necessary military precautions to prevent further territorial expansion of the Communists, go to great lengths to avoid a decisive military conflict. It is believed that the Communists are equally desirous of avoiding a military struggle which could scarcely but prove disastrous to their cause, but the indications are that they will cling tenaciously to the bases which they have [occupied] in certain areas of Central China. It seems likely that the National Government will increase what may be termed “non-military pressure” against Communist forces in Central China including the use of blockade tactics. Another form of pressure is the refusal of the Government since the beginning of the current year to send the usual monthly allotment for military expenses to the Communist armies and it follows that [no equipment or] supplies are being distributed to those forces.

3. The effect of the Russo-Japanese agreement⁷⁸ on the fortunes of the Chinese Communists becomes worthy of interest. It seems that the Russian action in signing the pact is more than likely to alienate the attitude of friendliness and support which the Soviet Union built up among the Chinese toward [of the?] intelligentsia and student class during the Sino-Japanese conflict. As an example it is reported, subject to confirmation, that four of the “seven gentlemen” who were tried at Soochow in 1936 have professed disillusionment at the recent Russian action; it would seem that this reaction is general among Chinese intelligentsia. Confidentially, the Chinese Communists have gone to lengths to defend the Soviet action (see, for example, my air mail despatch No. 845, April 22⁷⁹) but the arguments which they advance are not likely to convince the patriotic Chinese of the purity of the Russian motive or of the alleged advantages of the treaties in force to China; on the contrary the efforts of the Chinese Communists to defend the Russian action before their compatriots tend to strengthen the conviction of intelligent Chinese that the Chinese Communists are tied inseparably to the chariot wheel of Stalin,⁸⁰ that they have their own interests more in mind than those of China. It seems an inescapable conclusion that the Russian agreement with Japan and the efforts of the Chinese Communists to defend the Russian action will result in a diminution of the influence and prestige which the Chinest Communists have hitherto enjoyed among the Chinese liberal and educated classes.

Johnson

77. Neither printed.
78. Signed at Moscow, April 13; see telegram No. 763, April 13, 11 p.m., vol. iv, p. 944.
79. Ibid., p. 965.
80. Iosif V. Stalin, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party.