892.24/90
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Smyth)49
The Thai Minister called on his own initiative on Mr. Hamilton on November 28. He referred to recent newspaper reports in regard to increased Japanese troop movements to Indochina and stated that he was apprehensive that a Japanese attack on Thailand was imminent. He expressed the opinion that of the several possible areas in which the Japanese might attack, Thailand appeared to be the most logical; he commented that a Japanese attack on Siberia would bring Soviet air attacks on Japan, an attack from Indochina against the Burma Road would have to go through very difficult terrain, while an attack on Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies would be met by strong opposing forces. He said that the situation of Thailand was very different from that of China where the great extent of the country had permitted the Chinese to withdraw far into the interior in the face of Japanese attack. Thailand, however, was a very small country and retreat into the interior was not possible.
He continued in substance as follows: A Japanese attack on Thailand would probably be carried out by a drive of land forces through Cambodia, and by a simultaneous Japanese naval attack in the Gulf of Siam which would meet with only feeble resistance from the few small gunboats constituting the Thai navy. The Cambodian area is chiefly jungle, but one good paved road cuts through it; Japanese [Page 358] mechanized forces could proceed along that road. Conscription for military service exists in Thailand, but while the army includes some 200,000 men, only about 40,000 are properly trained and equipped. A part of the Thai army, including most of the small mechanized force, is now stationed in the area ceded to Thailand by Indochina in May, 1941. During the dry season, mechanized forces can operate without difficulty through the plains of Thailand where Bangkok is located; Bangkok is the nerve center of Thailand and its occupation by an invader would practically put a stop to resistance. Thailand has only one first-class airport (at Bangkok) where heavy bombers can operate; there are two or three other small air fields in Thailand but these can accommodate only small planes, such as fighters. The capture of the Bangkok area would cut off the transportation route for relief supplies coming by railroad over the narrow peninsula from Malaya and there would remain only a few rough roads over the mountains into Burma which could not be used except in the dry season.
The Minister stated that in the event of a Japanese attack, Thailand would resist with all its forces. He expressed the hope that the United States could now supply a number of airplanes to Thailand, as this would have a very important effect on Thai morale and would “raise their spirits” immensely. Referring to statements made to him by the Department that, in case of attack on Thailand by an aggressor the United States would place Thailand in the same category as China and would offer assistance, he suggested that immediate consideration be given to the problem of making such supplies available in Thailand, and suggested in particular that the question of transportation of supplies to the Thai military forces be carefully studied and plans made so that supplies could go forward without delay in the event that hostilities occur. Mr. Hamilton informed the Minister that this matter would promptly be brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities of this Government.
In discussing the general situation, the Minister remarked that Thailand has a non-aggression pact with Great Britain50 in which Great Britain promises to respect the territorial integrity of Thailand, but that this is not the case in Thailand’s treaty with Japan;51 Japan merely promises to promote cordial relations, exchange information, and cooperate in economic matters. This fact, he commented, increased his apprehension in regard to a Japanese attack on Thailand.