751G.94/292: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 25—8:30 a.m.]
98. Chauvel again asked Matthews to call today and read him a number of telegrams on the Far East. They showed (first) that the French are convinced that the Japanese sincerely believe the French are conniving in some way with the British contrary to the interests [Page 39] of Japan, and (second) that the French are also convinced that the Japanese are not bluffing and are prepared to go to great lengths to assure “tranquillity” in Indochina and their own predominance in Thailand.
Chauvel read first a telegram from Arsène-Henry recounting a “very disagreeable” 2-hour interview with the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs.55 It set forth the strong Japanese suspicion that the French were dealing with the British behind their backs and Japanese opposition to direct negotiations between France and Thailand.
He likewise read the French reply to Tokyo telling the Ambassador to point out that for 2 weeks the French had been trying to settle their difficulties with Thailand by direct negotiations and inquiring what possible disadvantage such procedure could have for Japan. The telegram likewise pointed out that the Domei despatch dated the 18th, which reported direct negotiations between the two countries on which despatch the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs had based his objections, antedated the French acceptance of Japanese mediation. Shortly after sending this cable a second section to Ambassador Henry’s telegram was received. It indicated that he had anticipated the foregoing instructions and had defended the French right to have direct talks with Thailand. The Vice Minister had then referred to certain alleged conversations between the Governor of Singapore and a French commander named Jouan—the individual referred to in the Embassy’s telegram No. 92, January 22, 8 p.m. The Japanese, Henry reported, suspected that the French had first sought British mediation and then, when they realized Japanese opposition, engaged in direct talks with Thailand as a subterfuge. The Japanese, reported Henry, were determined not to admit any British intervention in the question. In spite of all Henry said, the Japanese continue to believe that Admiral Decoux is in negotiation with the British and state that it would be “a catastrophe for Indochina if British interference continues”. Henry was instructed to reply that when the French accepted Japanese mediation it meant that mediation by any other foreign power was quite inacceptable. Chauvel said, however, that the French did not renounce the right to continue direct talks with Bangkok. Unfortunately, he said, these talks were handicapped by the lack of communications with the Thai capital and that telegrams to Vichy for one reason or another took about 4 days in transit.
A further telegram from Henry also dated the 22nd reported that Thailand had accepted Japanese mediation and reiterated insistence that the French likewise accept. This telegram, said Chauvel, contained a very important bit of news: the Japanese were putting great store on a statement made to the Japanese Minister at Bangkok56 by [Page 40] the Thailand Premier to the effect that the British had offered to mediate the Franco-Thailand dispute and guaranteed that Indochina would agree to cede the enclaves along the Mekong in return for some minor frontier changes; that assurances in this sense had been given to the Governor of Singapore by Commander Jouan. Chauvel said that this explained the reason for Japan’s sudden agitation; for the situation had been calm until about a week ago. He hoped that we could ascertain and let the French Government know what if anything in this sense the British Minister at Bangkok may have said to Premier Luang Pibul. The Japanese, he reiterated, are still convinced that the French are working hand in glove with the British in this Thailand question and they are therefore prepared to go to extremes to assure their position in that area. In evidence thereof he showed a telegram from Hanoi, also dated the 22nd, reporting that the Japanese commander there had informed the Governor General that Japanese warships would proceed along the coast of Indochina and the Thailand coast and that the two governments should take immediate steps to assure that there should be no incidents. Furthermore, said this commander, Indochina must not permit “warships or other ships of third powers” except Japan to anchor in Indochinese waters since Japanese ships might want to anchor there themselves. A previous Japanese suggestion, said Chauvel, that Japanese officers should be sent on both sides of the Thailand-Indochinese frontier allegedly to supervise the cessation of hostilities was refused by the French.
Following the receipt of this Hanoi telegram Henry was being instructed to see Matsuoka with whom, said Chauvel, he is on very good terms (any “disagreeable things” which the Japanese have to say to the French are left to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs) and express the French surprise at this unwarranted action. The Ambassador is to appeal to the Japanese “sense of honor” and the assurances given by Matsuoka in connection with the mediation proposal; he is to tell him that the foregoing notification with reference to the ships is “distinctly objectionable” to the French and constitutes a challenge which the French Government cannot admit. If the Japanese, Henry is to say, do not accept the French assurances in good faith “the climate will be greatly changed”. Matsuoka is being requested to exert his influence to stop other departments of the Japanese Government from taking the measures contemplated.
Chauvel, in conclusion, likewise read a copy of a telegram transmitted by the French Embassy in Tokyo to the French Embassy at Moscow in reply to the latter’s request for the former’s opinion on the present Japanese attitude towards Russia.
Tokyo reported the development of an anti-Russian press campaign as indicating that questions in the north with Russia should be settled [Page 41] before any move to the south. The pendulum, said Henry, however, swung in both directions: the Secretary’s last speech57 had impressed Tokyo “most unpleasantly” and the President’s address58 “was a veritable bomb”. The impression in Japanese circles at first was that a settlement must be reached with Russia before making any move to the south. Henry’s feeling 3 days later, however, was that the pendulum is swinging in the other direction: the tendency for the moment is toward “appeasement with Russia” and a stronger attitude with respect to us. At any rate, said Chauvel, “something big is brewing” and the Japanese wish at all costs to assure their predominant position in Thailand and quiet in Indochina no matter in which direction they decide to move.
In conclusion, he reiterated that it would be of great assistance to know just what [apparent omission] at Bangkok is and what if any is the role of the Governor at Singapore. (He said it would be quite natural in view of current shipping and other questions which might come up were Admiral Decoux to send Commander Jouan whose existence has not been verified or someone else to Singapore. Whether he did in fact go there and what was his mission is not known in Vichy. While Governor General Decoux asked [him] to report, the absence of code privileges for French consuls at Singapore makes it difficult to get an early reply.)
He spoke again of French reluctance at having to agree to Japanese mediation and admitted privately that cession of the Mekong enclaves in direct negotiations with the Thailandese would have been preferable. There is no question concerning current French anxiety with respect to the situation in Indochina and the possibility of Japanese aggression there.
Acceptance of the Japanese offer of mediation was made public in a brief communiqué issued here this evening.
- Chuichi Ohashi.↩
- Yasusato Futami.↩
- See statement before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, January 15, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 131.↩
- Inaugural address, January 20, Congressional Record, vol. 87, pt. 1, p. 189.↩