892.24/831½

Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations ( Hornbeck ) to the Under Secretary of State ( Welles )

Mr. Welles: Reference, your memoranda of October 2716 covering two memoranda left with you by Sir Ronald Campbell, with dates October 25; and your request for draft replies as soon as possible.

I am handing these papers at once to the Far Eastern Division, as that Division has been currently studying recommendations regarding policy which have been sent in by our Minister to Siam, Mr. Peck. I am asking FE17 to confer with me regarding reply to be made to the British Embassy sometime today.

In the interval, may I make certain comments and observations.

In my opinion both the Thai Prime Minister and Sir Josiah Crosby manifest undue alarm as regards the imminence of the possible Japanese intervention (involving military operations) in Thailand. I have no doubt but that the Japanese are pressing the Thais, probably [Page 328] with threats, toward causing the Thais to make concessions which would facilitate Japanese military penetration into Thailand, but I see no reason for expecting a crisis to develop in that situation within a week or even a month.

Nevertheless, the question of giving support and material assistance to Thailand is of immediate and urgent importance. The questions raised in the shorter of the two British Embassy communications under consideration are, in my opinion, questions for the British themselves to answer.

Regarding the general question of support and assistance by the American Government, I myself feel that, in endeavoring to cause small nations to resist powerful aggressors by offers or pledges of material assistance on our part rather than by announcement on our part that we will, if and when aggression is launched and armed resistance is made, give military support, we are constantly misdirecting our efforts and are permitting the world situation to become worse instead of making it become better. In the particular case of Thailand, it is quite possible that, by giving or promising material assistance, we and the British may cause Thailand to stand up to the Japanese, but I for one am convinced that if we and the British would give the Japanese clearly to understand (by procedures not requiring threats or publicity) that an armed assault by Japan upon Thailand would result in armed support of Thailand by Great Britain and the United States, Thailand would be made secure against Japan and the whole situation in the Pacific would be improved. I firmly believe that, with the scarcity which prevails as regards airplanes, et cetera, given increments of weapons and munitions in British and American hands will have more influence upon Japan and more effect toward defeating the Nazis than will the same airplanes and munitions taken out of British and American hands and placed in Thai hands. As things stand in the Pacific, a huge amount of arms and munitions has been and is immobilized. The only people who are actively using arms toward withstanding and putting an end to Japan’s aggressions and nuisance activities are the Chinese. Huge amounts of arms and munitions are lying inactive, in our hands, in Russian hands, in British hands, in Dutch hands. And now we consider adding to or redistributing this dispersed and immobilized aggregate of weapons by supplying weapons to Thailand. I would rather that we and the British, with weapons in our hands tell the Japanese that they are not to invade Thailand than to have the Thais, with our weapons in their hands, tell the Japanese that. The more we place of weapons in Thai hands the less we will be able to place of weapons in British hands and Chinese hands, hands of people who actually are fighting in resistance to the Nazis and indirectly to Japan. I know full well that the course which I advocate is, as between the two courses, the [Page 329] more difficult (temporarily). But, I am firmly convinced that, by following and continuing to follow, as we have been doing, an easier course, we are not making things better but are letting them become worse.

Of the various things for which the Thais ask, I see no reason why we should not supply them with petroleum products, et cetera (including aviation gasoline). It had been my understanding that those questions had been taken care of. But one can only infer from the British Embassy’s communication that they have not. Weeks ago we informed the British that we were willing for them to work those problems out with the Thai Government and look to us for cooperation in implementing whatever was, within certain indicated limits, agreed upon.

S[tanley] K. H[ornbeck]
  1. Not printed; they included a personal memorandum of Mr. Welles to Dr. Hornbeck, requesting draft replies.
  2. Division of Far Eastern Affairs.