740.0011 European War 1939/14402
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
The Minister of Thailand called by mutual agreement. He had previously had a conference with Mr. Hamilton of the Far Eastern Division, in which he discussed the purpose of his call to see me. (Reference is made to the record of Mr. Hamilton’s conversation of August 12, 1941.65)
The Minister said that pressure had been brought to bear on his Government in connection with rubber and perhaps one or two other commodities; that the troops of Japan have been moved up to a point on the new border between Thailand and Indochina just opposite and overlooking Bangkok. He was of the opinion that their first objective is to go south and attack Singapore. He said that the largest military forces are opposite Bangkok and that the Navy and all of their military craft with few exceptions are stationed at Saigon. He believes that the Japanese will probably first move south and later against Rangoon in order to destroy the Burma Road terminal.
[Page 277]The Minister indicated that pressure on his Government was more and more threatening and that no one could tell what day or what hour Japanese troops and other forces might move into his country. He said that his Government had announced that it was neutral and friendly towards every country, but that if it should be attacked it would defend itself as best as it possibly could. He then stated that his real interest in calling on me was to ascertain what the attitude of this Government would be towards his country in case it should be attacked and endeavor in good faith to defend itself. I repeated to him what Mr. Hamilton had said concerning the long friendship existing between our two countries and about the probability of Japanese intervention by force at any time despite agreements and understandings to the contrary. I stated that we have ascertained this by experience with them in the Chinese invasion and in other instances; and that they are unquestionably out on a rampage of invasion by force, the seizure of any and all weaker countries, and the placing of them under a military despotism, which would dominate their political, economic, commercial and other affairs and interests and which would channel straight to Tokyo the cream of all benefits, advantages and gains.
I reminded the Minister that we have been aiding China against the aggression of Japan—aiding her in many ways—and that we would place Thailand in the same category; that I have already more than once expressed the serious concern of this country with reference to threatened Japanese intervention. I then added that in aiding all countries subjected to aggression and intervention by force, especially by countries like Germany and Japan, we do the very best possible to distribute such aid where it will be most effective. I said that we are increasing our production fairly rapidly and that the State Department will be glad to contact the officials in charge of the defense program and inform them of the needs and desires of Thailand. I finally said that I would be glad to have the Minister call at any time for the purpose of exchanging information about the situation. He remarked that Thailand had the money to pay for the matériel that they would like to purchase in the United States.
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