740.0011 European War 1939/14624
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Minister to the Netherlands Government in Exile (Biddle)45
This morning Netherland Prime Minister Gerbrandy imparted in effect the following:
For some time it had been evident that the British War Cabinet, and particularly Prime Minister Churchill were dissatisfied with a plan conceived in Far Eastern conversations of last winter and Spring (to which, for sake of brevity, I shall hereafter refer as the “Far Eastern Plan”). At first they had given the impression that they [Page 261] considered this plan too rigid, and that it therefore did not allow sufficiently for unforeseen circumstances.
However, Mr. Gerbrandy had later ascertained that underlying the War Cabinet’s disinclination to accept the “Far Eastern Plan” as a basis for action, was the fact that in Mr. Churchill’s mind, victory in the “Battle of the Atlantic” represented the paramount objective. In other words, in respect of the Pacific and the Atlantic, in their relative potential bearing on an ultimate war victory, Mr. Churchill was more “Atlantic and British Isles-minded”. Mr. Churchill was therefore opposed to making specific commitments in the Pacific, entailing a possible thinning out of his forces in the Atlantic. So strong, moreover, were Mr. Churchill’s views in this respect, that Mr. Gerbrandy believed he considered the possible loss of a part of the Dutch East Indian possessions less of a danger to ultimate victory against the common adversary, than the thinning out of his Atlantic naval forces. His reasoning in this respect followed the line in effect, that once victory was obtained, the way would be open for the Netherland Government to bill Japan for its losses in the Pacific.
In disclosing the foregoing, Mr. Gerbrandy said it was clear that Air. Churchill considered the prosecution of the Allied war effort in terms of the broad view. He hoped, however, that the British Prime Minister had not overlooked the possibility that Japan might turn its aggressive attentions to Singapore before attempting a thrust at the East Indies. After all, Singapore represented, in terms of strategic value, the more desirable springboard for further bold adventure. Mr. Gerbrandy then referred to Mr. Churchill’s aforementioned suggestion that, with an Allied war victory, the Netherland Government might bill Japan for any losses which the East Indies might have suffered in event of a Japanese attack. He felt that Mr. Churchill had perhaps overlooked the possibility that by the time the Allies might have gained a victory over Germany, Japan might have disassociated itself from the Axis. Indeed, Mr. Churchill had already indicated the hope that Japan might be weaned, by degrees, away from the Axis, and that a mild application of the present licensing system might importantly contribute toward that end.
Mr. Gerbrandy went on to say that his Government looked upon the situation, arising from Japanese occupation of Indo-China, as serious and increasingly threatening. Anything could happen now. Japanese possession of air, as well as military bases in Thailand would measurably enhance Japan’s strategic position vis-à-vis Burma and Singapore, as well as the Dutch East Indies. Besides, it would place the Japanese at the back door of British India. Moreover, the increasing possibility of a surprise move called at least, in the opinion of his Government, for a first-stage plan of action. He and his associates [Page 262] had already communicated these views to Mr. Eden. In turn, Mr. Eden had taken up the matter with the War Cabinet. Subsequently, on August 1, Mr. Eden had handed the Netherland Government, a confidential document, containing a declaration by the British Government.
This declaration stated in effect the following: When Holland was threatened with invasion, Great Britain had undertaken to safeguard Netherlands interests to the utmost of its ability. It followed that Great Britain would continue to support the Netherlands to the utmost of its power in resisting an attack against the Dutch East Indies. Great Britain, however, must remain the sole judge as to the action and military measures likely to achieve their common purpose. However, should the United States be disposed to lend supporting action, Great Britain would be in position to do more than was found possible to undertake now.
In making this disclosure, Mr. Gerbrandy pointed out the absence of any reference in this declaration to the “Far Eastern Plan”. His Government, he said, had greeted this omission with a sense of real disappointment, in that it indicated no definite provision against a sudden move.
Furthermore, since his Government’s receipt of this declaration, it had had a message from Batavia. In substance the message stated that, in view of the “Far Eastern Plan” of action, the authorities in Batavia were prepared, in the matter of licensing, to apply the principle of withholding items which might increase Japan’s war potential.
Unfortunately, Mr. Gerbrandy said, in view of the absence of any reference to the “Far Eastern Plan” in the British Government’s aforementioned declaration, his Government had had to reply to the Batavian authorities that the British no longer regarded this plan as a basis for potential action.
Concluding his remarks, Mr. Gerbrandy said he was well aware that it was impossible for the United States to make commitments in advance of events. However, neither Britain nor Australia were bound by the same constitutional limitations, and he and his associates would meet with Mr. Eden on August 7 and 8 with a view to urging the British Government to take the lead in bringing about a three-cornered agreement between Britain, Australia, and the Netherlands, to some plan to provide against surprise moves. Moreover, he and his associates would make clear their opinion that notwithstanding its rigidity, the “Far Eastern Plan” was, under the threatening circumstances, better than no plan. At the same time, they would emphasize their willingness to agree to some alternative plan based on broader lines.
- Copy transmitted to the Department by the Minister in covering letter of August 6; received August 11.↩