740.0011 European War 1939/13721: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 6—5:35 p.m.]
985. Embassy’s telegram 970, August 1, 4 p.m. Lagarde41 handed us this evening the following aide-mémoire initialed by Darlan in reply to my oral conversation with Marshal Pétain and Admiral Darlan on August 1. Lagarde also expressed the hope that our Government would endeavor “to understand the extremely difficult situation in which France is situated”:
[“]The Embassy of the United States has been good enough, on the first of this month, to inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the views of its Government with respect to the recent arrangements which have taken place regarding Indochina.
Desirous of avoiding any misunderstanding and in order to explain the reasons which have motivated the French Government in the matter, the Ministry desires to recall the general conditions and the particular circumstances in which France found herself.
The defeat suffered by France in 1940 placed Indochina in a particularly perilous situation. There was, as an immediate consequence, a military threat of Japan against Tonkin. The Department of State was kept informed of all the difficulties with which the French Government was confronted in view thereof. It has never been ignorant that the means which the French command in Indochina possessed did not permit any resistance against an act of force. The Japanese demands had assumed a character of exceptional gravity since Tokyo sought to send troops to Tonkin and to claim the free utilization of certain airdromes.
Under these circumstances around the middle of the month of August of last year detailed expressions were given by M. Laval to the Chargé d’Affaires of the United States.42 Under date of August 21, the same question was made the object of an exchange of views between Mr. Sumner Welles and the French Ambassador at Washington. Mr. Sumner Welles declared to M. Henry-Haye that the United States was not in a position to assist France effectively (positivement) in case she should decide upon resistance. The Under Secretary of State concluded: ‘we understand the situation of the French Government at the present time and inasmuch as we are not in a position to come to its aid we do not believe that we are justified in reproaching it for conceding military facilities to Japan’.
[Page 258]Such are the circumstances in which France, anxious, in order to ensure the maintenance of the status quo, to obtain from Japan the recognition of her sovereign rights over Indochina, authorized that power to land troops in Tonkin and to make use of certain airdromes.
Preoccupied by general conditions for the defense of that territory, the French Government did not, however, neglect anything in order to strengthen the military means which the Union possessed. To this end, a mission had been sent to the United States at the beginning of the month of June 1940. It suspended its discussions at the time of the conclusion of the armistice to resume them in the month of October. The question was then all the more vital for Indochina since, in the interim, that land had presented broad claims and a new conflict appeared inevitable.
It was in emphasizing the dangers of that situation that the French Government urged the Government of the United States on many occasions to agree to deliveries indispensable to the defense of the Union. It was in the same spirit that similar démarches were undertaken with a view to obtaining the free passage for four battalions stationed at Djibouti. All the efforts were in vain. The American authorities refused the shipment both of arms and airplanes just as the English authorities refused free passage by sea for the troops. There remained nothing for France, thus disarmed before Thailand, but to accept last January Japan’s mediation.
The continued success of Japanese policy and the fact that no serious opposition arose to impede her new undertakings could but encourage Tokyo to amplify her designs. These projects aroused in territories bordering Indochina reactions which ran the risk of involving the Union in conflict. Being in no position to resist Japanese pressure, or any other menace, France knew by experience that she could expect nothing from others and that she could count only on herself. When Japan recently demanded that the facilities granted the year before for Tonkin should be extended the rest of Indochina, the situation was still more grave in view of the categoric attitude of that power.
Informed of these facts on the 16th of July, the Ambassador of the United States refrained from any remark which could lead to the belief that his Government had changed its attitude in this connection. On the 19th Admiral Leahy limited himself to giving Admiral Darlan advice to gain time, but the hour for delays had passed. The French Government, if it refused the overtures of Japan either by resisting or by yielding only under the threat of force, had to expect the seizure by that power of Indochina, Nothing under these circumstances could stop the landing by Japan of fifty thousand men by July 31. On the other hand, by falling in with the views of Tokyo, the French Government obtained the formal renewal of the guarantees [Page 259] that Japan would respect the sovereignty of France over the Union and the territorial integrity of this possession. It thus protected the future to the best of its ability.
It would be misleading to establish a parallel between the situation in Indochina and that in which Syria and the Lebanon found themselves.43 France was, in fact, the object in the Levant of a deliberate aggression as well as an infringement of its rights. Disposing of relatively important means (of defense) it could not escape the obligation of resisting such an act of violence.
Such was not the case in Indochina, both because of the disparity of the forces of a far off colony cut from all connection with the metropolis and because of the imposing number of Japanese military, naval and air forces. France which alone would suffer the consequences of this inequality was likewise alone in a position to estimate the far reaching effect of this threat.
Faithful to the general policy that it has traced, France remains no less vigilant in the defense of her empire. Without question Indochina has been compelled to suffer the repercussions of an international policy which tends to involve it in the field of war. But the other French possessions are, in view of their geographical position, protected from this danger.
France, all the more since she has to face problems so grave that it is difficult for third parties to appreciate their extent, is endeavoring by all its means to safeguard its vital interests both on metropolitan soil and overseas. She counts upon the comprehension that the United States has never ceased to show in hours of trial to ask of it a just understanding of steps in which it would be unfair to see anything but the indirect consequences of her military defeat.”
Repeated to Casablanca.
- Ernest Lagarde, of the French Foreign Office.↩
- For report of conversation with the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, see telegram No. 362, August 17, 1940, 4 p.m., from the Chargé in France, Foreign, Relations, 1940, vol. iv, p. 80.↩
- For correspondence, see vol. iii, under Syria and Lebanon, section entitled “Interest of the United States Regarding the Impact of European War Upon Syria and Lebanon,” pt. III.↩