811.20 (D) Regulations/3172: Telegram

The Minister in Thailand (Grant) to the Secretary of State

330. The Department’s 68, June 26, 5 p.m. and 71, June 30. Pursuant to paragraph No. 6 of the Department’s 68 and to the last paragraph of the Department’s 68, I have taken no initiative with the Thai authorities in the matter and so far I have not been approached by the latter regarding the recent negotiations in Washington although I called today to see the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. He did not mention the matter and I, therefore, had no opportunity to emphasize the desire of the American Government to purchase if possible the entire output of rubber and tin and at the same time express the hope of my Government “tactfully but strongly” that such negotiations as may be necessary with the American Government shall take place in Washington rather than in Bangkok. Pursuant to the further suggestion in paragraph 6 of the Department’s 68 I have called to discuss the matter with the British Minister. The only thing of any importance which he said was that if the two governments insist upon the entire output of tin and rubber the whole matter is off.

While, as I have indicated in previous telegrams to the Department, from the standpoint of the ultimate welfare of American interests, I am not optimistic and in fact I am dubious as to the wisdom of the adoption of a general policy, particularly the proposed $3,000,000 loan to Thailand, such as has been formulated recently in collaboration with and upon the recommendation of the British, at the same time I am, of course, prepared to carry out the policy of my Government and in this connection, I feel it my duty as the American representative in Thailand to point out the fact that I have been placed in a most awkward position in this matter as the result of the procedure adopted by the Department as I have indicated above in section 1 of this telegram.70 Specifically, although many weeks ago the Thai authorities, including the Minister of Justice representing the Prime Minister, approached me regarding Thai commercial needs and I thereupon promptly communicated with the Department by telegraph outlining the Thai thesis and requesting instructions, now at the very time the British Minister is continuing negotiations with the Thais on behalf of American as well as British interests, it would appear, the American Minister is actually prohibited by instruction from even mentioning to the Thai Government authorities with whom [Page 196] he keeps in close contact at all times, the fact that he knows anything about the negotiations that are going on in Washington and the policies agreed upon unless he is approached by them.

I cannot comprehend the meaning of such procedure and I respectfully submit that it is prejudicial to American interests here and also very unfair to me, especially since, as the Department well knows from a long series of telegrams and despatches, almost from the beginning of my term of office here nearly one year ago, as the American representative I have taken my full share of the keen resentment shown by the Thai towards my Government as the result of our policy in urging Thailand to maintain the status quo in connection with the territorial ambitions in Indochina, the subsequent hostilities, and the incident of the stopping of the war planes purchased by Thailand in the United States. I strongly supported the Department’s policy towards Thailand even to the extent of making some enemies for myself personally where I might have had them as friends while the British Minister was reversing British policy, which had coincided with ours, with a view [to] courting the Thai, resulting in leaving us “with the bag to hold”, making us the objects of all of the Thai resentment and also most unfortunately encouraging the events which culminated in Thai collaboration with the Japanese in the territorial partition of Indochina. Now the British Minister, who is looking out first and last for British interests to the exclusion of the interest of all others including ourselves, is actually carrying on the British-American negotiations while the American Minister looks on from the bleachers. This is a game of British imperialist army politics and I am confident that no real good can come out of it for us certainly as long as the game is played in such manner.

Grant
  1. Preceding paragraph.