892.00/226
The British Embassy to the Department of State 20
Thailand General Situation
The British authorities learned early last month from a good source that the Japanese were said to be plotting a coup d’état in Bangkok [Page 164] with the object of replacing the present Thai Cabinet by an entirely pro-Japanese one. When these reports were brought to the notice of the Thai Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs by the British Minister, the former urged insistently that the policy of His Majesty’s Government towards Thailand should be one of immediate help and sympathy. He represented that this was not a moment for the British Government to stand too punctiliously upon their rights, and that they should render assistance at once, and if necessary without thought of immediate consideration for value received. The Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs claimed that only in this way could the situation in Thailand be relieved.
His Majesty’s Government’s recent experiences in Thailand are such as to suggest that little reliance can be placed upon the Thai Government. In spite of frequent warnings from Sir J. Crosby the Thai Government appear to be in process of alienating their independence and freedom of action to Japan and since Japan has made no concealment of her hostility to His Majesty’s Government, the British Government can only regard any assurances received from the Thai Government with distrust. The Thai Government have persistently evaded suggestions that they should give an undertaking that they would not enter into any agreement directed against Great Britain. Furthermore, they have informed His Majesty’s Minister that they are disposed to favour a proposal by the Japanese Government that the whole of the Thai rubber output be reserved for Japan in return for which Japan would supply Thailand with all the oil she needs. Nevertheless, the British authorities consider that many of these factors may be due more to Thai fear of Japan than to Thai hostility towards Great Britain. They intend therefore to do what they can to diminish, by propaganda and in other ways, the impression that in the last resort Japan need take no account of the views of other Powers in the Far East. But the British Government feel that it is also important, if Thailand is prepared to give concrete evidence of good will, that the British authorities themselves should be ready to give her some assistance which would lessen her dependence on Japan. With their limited military resources, His Majesty’s Government cannot at present promise direct military support which might confirm the Thais in their professed intention to resist any military encroachment by Japan. They feel that also to refuse any economic assistance would only accelerate the process by which Japan is bringing Thailand under her control. It may not be possible to stop this process altogether at this stage, but it may be possible to delay it. Furthermore, even if the strategic aspect of the menace of Japanese domination of Thailand [Page 165] were to be disregarded, there remains the danger that the entire Thai production of rubber and tin might go to Japan and thence, in part at least, to Germany. His Majesty’s Government regard the prevention of this as an issue of vital importance, and are resolved to do everything possible to cope with it.
While His Majesty’s Government do not believe that economic palliatives will be decisive and are inclined to the view that the claim by the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, referred to in paragraph one above, was made in the hope of playing on the British Government’s anxieties regarding Japanese domination of Thailand in order to get what they wanted from Great Britain without any commitment on the Thai side, they have nevertheless decided to inform Sir J. Crosby that they stand by their earlier offer to help Thailand in connection with finance and oil supplies; but that such assistance can only be given provided that His Majesty’s Government can obtain adequate assurances in return and that they are not prepared to grant concessions of a more permanent nature without concrete evidence that Thailand’s resources, in particular rubber and tin, will not be pledged to Japan.
The very great importance of denying these resources to the Axis find also some of the points that will arise if it is found possible to give assistance to Thailand on the terms suggested are dealt with in a separate memorandum of today’s date.21 The observations of the United States Government on this memorandum and on the other papers regarding Thailand recently communicated to the State Department will be greatly appreciated.