761.94/1366
Memorandum by Mr. William R. Langdon of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs47
The Soviet Union is technically protected from Japanese attack at this time and until April 13, 1946 by virtue of the provisions of article 2 of the Neutrality Pact with Japan of April 13, 1941 reading as follows:
“In case either one of the high contracting parties becomes an object of military action by one or more third parties, the other party shall observe neutrality throughout the entire period of such a conflict.”
By virtue of article 1 of the same pact each contracting party agrees to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the other, and by virtue of a joint declaration issued simultaneously with the conclusion of the pact Japan respects the territorial integrity and inviolability of the People’s Republic of Mongolia and Russia respects the integrity and inviolability of the “Empire of Manchukuo”.
If Japan at this time were to attack either Siberia or Outer Mongolia such attack, in view of the above-quoted provisions of the Neutrality Pact and Joint Declaration, would constitute a breach of faith that would irreparably injure Japan’s national honor. Nevertheless there are a number of issues pending between Japan and the Soviet Union that remain unsettled as far as Japan is concerned, and it is conceivable that the Soviet Union’s preoccupation at the moment may tempt Japan to use these issues as a pretext for seizure of Russian territory. The existence of such issues is specifically mentioned in the concluding sentence of Premier Konoye’s public statement made April 13, 1941, on the occasion of the conclusion of the Pact, namely: [Page 1021]
“I have no doubt that the Pact will serve as a basis for rapid solution in a concrete manner of various pending considerations between the two countries.”
No formal attempt has been made by either country to solve the questions pending between them since the above declaration was made. The most important of these issues at the moment are:
- (1)
- The fisheries question;
- (2)
- The Northern Saghalien oil and coal concessions;
- (3)
- A non-aggression pact (including Soviet abstention of aid to Chiang Kai-shek);
- (4)
- Border demarcation;
- (5)
- A commercial accord;
- (6)
- Soviet abstention from spreading Communism in Japan, China and Manchuria;
- (7)
- A pledge not to cede Siberian or Kamchatkan bases to a third power, or to lease such bases to such power;
- (8)
- Cession or leasing to Japan of Saghalien;
- (9)
- A pledge that the Soviet Union will not utilize in the Far East war supplies delivered at Vladivostok;
- (10)
- Demilitarization of border zone, including Vladivostok.
With regard to question (1), Japan wants a permanent fisheries convention, a convention that will take the place of the year-to-year extension of the Fisheries Convention of 1928—1941 is the sixth one-year extension of this treaty—whereby Japanese fishery companies bid against the Soviet Government for annual leases of given fishing grounds. The Japanese have been losing ground in this year-to-year arrangement, and annually suffer suspense and inconvenience from the Soviet’s obstructive tactics. A permanent fisheries convention on Japanese terms would be an important gain for Japan.
With regard to question (2), Japan acquired from Russia by the Treaty of Moscow of 1925, as a quid pro quo for withdrawing her troops from the Russian half of Saghalien, which she occupied during the Allied intervention in Siberia (1918–1920), prospecting and mining rights for eleven and forty-five years, respectively, in 272,000 acres of land in northern Saghalien. The prospecting rights were extended to 1941. In the meantime, Japan has been extracting some 150,000 tons of crude oil annually from wells discovered in northern Saghalien. In recent years the Soviet Union has made it very difficult for the Japanese concessionaries to operate these wells, as the Soviet Union has insisted on the use of a high quota of Soviet labor, Soviet labor conditions, payment of wages in rubles fixed at an arbitrary exchange rate, et cetera. Japan might propose to the Russians that (a) they extend the prospecting rights for ten years and (b) give extra-territorial jurisdiction to Japan over the area of the mining rights during the remainder of the mining term, which would allow Japan to use her [Page 1022] own laborers and pay them in her own currency, Japan paying to the Soviet Union a small royalty.
Question (3), concerning a non-aggression pact, is not in itself of value to the Japanese at this time, but such a pact could be phrased in a manner that would obligate the Soviet Union to refrain from supplying arms to a country with which Japan may be at war (viz., Chiang Kai-shek).
The border demarcation question (question 4) is no longer important, as a Commission is in progress of delimiting the Soviet-Outer Mongolian-”Manchukuo” frontier. However, concessions might be made by the Soviets in the way of moving the frontier backward to give “Manchukuo” some additional territory in Outer Mongolia, some islands in the Amur River, a strategic hill or two along the Korean frontier, et cetera.
Question (5) regarding a trade agreement is not important at the moment because of Russia’s preoccupation, but an accord advantageous to Japan could be signed now for implementation following the restoration of peace.
The question of Communism (question 6) is not a very real question between the two countries, as Japan can and does take care very well of the problem of Communism in territory under her administration or occupation and would not in any event trust Russian pledges to abstain from spreading Communism by undercover methods. However, a formal undertaking by Russia to abstain from association with subversive Communist activity in Japan, China and Manchuria might have some psychological value at this time, especially in view of the growing strength of the Chinese Communist Party.
The first six questions pending between the two countries seem capable of negotiation, as they do not impinge on the Soviet Union’s sovereignty. A pledge not to cede bases to a third power on the Pacific or Sea of Japan Littoral (question 7) may very well be given to Japan, as an attack on Russia by Japan would release Russia from this pledge. A pledge not to store at Vladivostok military supplies obtained from the democracies but to move them to European Russia (accompanied possibly by permission to Japan to maintain a mission to supervise the movement (question 9)) likewise could be given without harm to Russia’s position if Russia should feel that circumstances did not require retention of such supplies at Vladivostok and other Far Eastern bases.
The cession or lease of Saghalien and the demilitarization of the border zone (Manchurian as well as Korean), including Vladivostok, (questions 8 and 10) are fundamental matters for Russia and it is seriously doubted whether Russia could yield in respect to them. [Page 1023] Even were the Russians disposed to yield on matters of this kind to a friendly neighbor, it is certain that they would not be similarly disposed to Japan owing to their deep distrust of Japan. However, if the Japanese could convince Stalin that the making of concessions by Stalin would result in Japan’s moving southward militarily rather than northward, Stalin might be disposed to make some rather far-reaching concessions. While it is believed highly unlikely that Stalin would be willing to agree to dismantle existing defensive fortifications, he might be willing to give an undertaking to Japan to withdraw Soviet airplanes from Vladivostok to some point such as Habarovsk. He might also, should there develop in European Russia a desperate need of planes, be willing to go so far as to agree to transfer the entire Soviet Far Eastern air force to points west of Lake Baikal. It is conceivable also that Stalin might under pressure of circumstances agree to lease northern Saghalien to Japan for a term of years.
The probability is that the Soviet Far Eastern army is so strong that, even with a substantial reduction, this army would remain confident of being able to defend the Soviet Far East against a foe as pre-occupied and weakened and industrially incapacitated as Japan. If Stalin should share this confidence, it seems extremely unlikely that Russia would be willing to yield to Japan any territory or sovereign rights in the Far East. A firm, unyielding attitude on fundamental issues by the Soviet Union at this time, when winter is descending upon Siberia and making campaigning out in the open almost unendurable for human beings, would seem to be the most likely attitude that the Soviet Union will follow with respect to Japan. Another point to remember is that it may be in the mind of the Soviet leaders that a Japanese attack on Soviet territory would precipitate American entry into the war, and that the desire of these leaders that America enter the war may cause them to take an adamant stand vis-à-vis Japanese demands, which might provoke such an attack. However, it is believed that the Soviet Union would prefer, as between a Japanese attack to the north or a Japanese attack to the south, to have Japan move southward.
The foregoing discussion is an attempt to explore the probabilities of a negotiated settlement of points of conflict between Japan and the Soviet Union. While a negotiated settlement of issues not of a fundamental nature would seem to present no great difficulty, it appears improbable that Russia would yield to any Japanese claims touching upon the Soviet Union’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Such a yielding remains, however, a possibility.48