740.0011 E. W. 1939/14920½
Memorandum by Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt 45
Conference at the Kremlin, July 31, 1941, 3 to 4 P.M.
| Present: | Mr. Molotov, Foreign Commissar U. S. S. R. |
| Ambassador Steinhardt | |
| Harry L. Hopkins |
Mr. Molotov stated that while the Soviet-Japanese relations presumably had been fixed by, first, the conversations with Matsuoka and, secondly, the neutrality pact signed between the two countries, nevertheless, the attitude of the new Japanese Government toward the Soviet Union is uncertain and, since the Soviet Government is by no means clear as to the policy which the Japanese Government intends to pursue, it is watching the situation with the utmost care.
He stated that the one thing he thought would keep Japan from making an aggressive move would be for the President to find some appropriate means of giving Japan what Mr. Molotov described as a “warning”.
While Mr. Molotov did not use the exact words, it was perfectly clear that the implication of his statement was that the warning would include a statement that the United States would come to the assistance of the Soviet Union in the event of its being attacked by Japan.
Mr. Molotov did not express any immediate concern that Japan was going to attack Russia and on Russia’s part Mr. Molotov stated repeatedly that Russia did not wish any difficulties with Japan.
He left me with the impression, however, that it was a matter of very considerable concern to him and that he felt the Japanese would not hesitate to strike if a propitious time occurred. Hence his great interest in the attitude of the United States towards Japan.
I told Mr. Molotov that the Government of the United States was disturbed at the encroachments which Japan was making in the Far East and I was sure the American people would not look with any favor on Japan gaining a further hold in Siberia; that our long period of friendly relations between Russia and the United States, with our two countries only fifty miles apart, should be some indication of our interest in seeing stability in the Far East, including Siberia.
I told him that our Government was watching developments in the Far Eastern situation with great care and looked with misgivings and concern at the threatening attitude of Japan, both to the South and to the North. I told him, however, that our attitude towards Japan was a reasonable one and that we had no desire to be provocative in our relations with Japan.
[Page 1014]I told him I would give the President his message regarding his, Molotov’s, anxiety about Siberia and his desire to have the President indicate to Japan that further encroachments would not be tolerated.
I asked Mr. Molotov what their relationships with China were in the light of new developments and whether or not they could continue rendering the substantial material assistance they had been giving to Chiang Kai-shek or whether the Soviet Union’s requirements in its own war with Germany would preclude their continuing to supply China.
Mr. Molotov replied that, of course, the Soviet Union’s requirements for war material must of necessity adversely affect delivery to China; that while they do not wish to cut them off entirely and would continue to give everything they could, the necessities of their own situation required them to divert the Chinese supplies to their own battle line. Molotov expressed the hope that the United States would increase its own deliveries to make good the deficiency caused by Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union.
I told Mr. Molotov that the American people were impressed by the gallant defense of the Soviet Army and assured him of the desire of the President to render every possible aid in the terms of materials to the Soviet Union as speedily as possible.
Mr. Molotov asked me to convey the Soviet Government’s thanks to the President for sending his personal representative on this mission to Moscow.
- Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by President Roosevelt.↩