Office of the Historian

740.0011 European War 1939/12902: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, July 8, 1941—4 p.m.
[Received July 8—12:40 p.m.]

953. For the Acting Secretary only. My 943, July 6, 8 p.m.

1.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to call this afternoon and handed me in strict confidence a Japanese text accompanied by a strictly confidential unofficial English translation hereof embodying a “message in reply sent by His Imperial Majesty’s Foreign Minister at the request of the Prime Minister for delivery to the President of the United States of America, dated July 7, Showa 16”.22 (See Embassy’s 954, July 8, 5 p.m.23)
2.
At the same time the Minister handed to me in strict confidence a Japanese text accompanied by a strictly confidential unofficial English translation of the oral statement handed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo on July 2, 1941.24 (See Embassy’s 955, July 8, 6 p.m.23)
3.
Having read the Minister’s message I said that I was in a position to advance pertinent comment on the final paragraph of the Japanese message and it [I] hereupon conveyed orally to Mr. Matsuoka the substance of Department’s telegram No. 355, June 27, 2 p.m. I particularly emphasized the first sentence of the second paragraph of that telegram and dwelt at some length on the policy of the United States in that connection. The Minister replied to the effect that reports reaching Japan have convinced the Japanese people that the United States is determined to intervene in the European conflict and that this conviction has caused widespread anxiety in view of Japan’s obligations to her allies in the Tripartite Pact.
4.
I then asked the Minister what sort of “future developments” he had in mind which would largely determine Japan’s future policy toward Soviet Russia as set forth in the final sentence of his oral statement of July 2 to the Soviet Ambassador. The Minister replied that he had in mind a good many possible developments among which he might mention as illustrations: the altered situation which would be created if Soviet Russia should form an alliance with Great Britain or if the United States should attempt to send considerable quantities of war supplies to Soviet Russia through Vladivostok to be used against Germany, Japan’s ally. He said that there are powerful elements in Japan who are trying to force him into hostilities against Soviet Russia and that if these elements and the Japanese people should become aware of the conveyance of such American supplies great [Page 1003] provocation would be created which would strengthen the hand of those extremists and would render his own position and his own sincere efforts to preserve peace even more difficult than they are at present.
5.
Mr. Matsuoka especially asked me to convey to you the fact that neither the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo nor the Soviet Government had raised any question or objection in connection with the public statement which he, Mr. Matsuoka, had issued on returning from Europe (please see Embassy’s 588, April 22, 7 p.m.25). He also said that he had recently appealed both to Stalin and Molotov to cooperate with him by endeavoring not to render more difficult the extremely difficult path which he is now treading.
6.
The Minister said that he had recently met the Soviet Ambassador at the railway station in Berlin [sic] when the latter was saying good-bye to his wife and other ladies of the Soviet Embassy who were about to return to Russia. He said to the Ambassador that the ladies of the Japanese Embassy in Moscow had left that capital in order to avoid the dangers of possible bombing by the German Army but that no such dangers existed in Tokyo and there was no good reason whatever for the Soviet ladies to leave. The Minister said that the Soviet ladies had, therefore, abandoned their plans for departure.
7.
The Minister said that in these difficult times we must all of us guard against the often baseless rumors which are floating around in every country and when I mentioned the reports published in various Japanese papers such as the Yomiuri, the Hochi, etc., Mr. Matsuoka shrugged his shoulders and said that he never read newspapers of that nature.
8.
In the light of the Minister’s written and oral statements I find it very difficult to believe that the Japanese Government has decided at this time to embark on hostilities against the Soviet Union.
Grew
  1. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, Vol. ii, p. 503.↩
  2. Not printed.↩
  3. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, Vol. ii, p. 504.↩
  4. Not printed.↩
  5. Not printed.↩