Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Volume IV

740.0011 European War 1939/12860: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, July 6, 1941—9 p.m.
[Received July 7—3:31 a.m.]

944. (Note: The following telegram was drafted Saturday afternoon,¹⁹ but was held up pending certain developments of which the Department is aware. There is available to us here no trustworthy information which would make necessary substantial revision of this telegram.)

1. I feel that there is now available sufficient material to warrant my placing before the Department an appraisal (which, although still somewhat speculative, will indicate the general trend of my views) of the policy and attitude of the Japanese Government as reformulated by the decision of the Imperial Conference on July 2.

2. The 10 days of deliberations and conferences between groups and elements which formulate policy were among the many signs that the German attack on Soviet Russia produced on this country a serious disturbance, if not an internal crisis. The deliberations are said to have [boiled?] down to a conflict between Baron Hiranuma, representing the moderate school of thought, and Mr. Matsuoka, and they have been accompanied by rumors of the most sensational character, one being that Baron Hiranuma as Home Minister threatened to cause the arrest of several extremist politicians but was informed that if he should attempt to do so he would be assassinated and that he desisted. Whether or not these rumors are true, they are probably reflective of a sharp cleavage of opinion among the nation’s leaders. In the absence of unanimity or of a clearly dominant school of thought, we can say with some degree of assurance that the pursuit by Japan of a positive and dynamic policy creating new commitments and involvements would be unlikely.

3. Although Japan derived considerable self-satisfaction from securing a place among the great powers in the process of settling the first World War, the fact that she had become deeply involved in the problems of Europe, in which she did not have vital concern, was not fully appreciated until the Manchurian conflict came before the League of Nations. It will be recalled that Japan, following her withdrawal from the League in 1933, announced that she would proceed to liquidate her European commitments and would confine herself to the Far East. That policy, then labelled “free and independent policy,” was officially confirmed immediately after the outbreak of the present War. Thus, the conclusion of the Axis alliance, again involving Japan in the affairs of Europe, was a sharp reversal of a policy which had been pursued with some show of determination for 8 years; and for some months before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war there had been increasing realization that Japan, by allying herself with Germany and Italy, had assumed certain risks which had not been demonstrated to be unavoidable.

4. As pointed out in several of our recent telegrams, German concepts with regard to the relations between the German bloc and the Japanese bloc, especially the secondary place which the latter was to take in the new scheme of things and German desires for a privileged position in China notwithstanding the “new order in East Asia” had begun to raise doubts in the Japanese mind whether all would be well for Japan in the event of a German victory and whether after all full confidence could be placed on German promises. I hear that one of the points which has been repeatedly brought up for Matsuoka to answer is whether he could clear Germany of bad faith toward Japan in connection with the German attack on Russia. It is understood that the references to the German statement issued simultaneously with the attack on Russia to the intention of Germany, when concluding the nonaggression pact, not to be bound by that pact, and to the advice which was alleged to have been given Mr. Matsuoka while he was in Berlin (when plans were actually being laid to attack Russia) to conclude a pact with Russia and so improve Soviet-Japanese relations, have been repeatedly cited, with Mr. Matsuoka being repeatedly challenged to refute this German evidence of deliberate deception of Japan. While there would be no warrant for saying that Japanese confidence in German good faith has collapsed, I would not say that it is today sufficiently robust to form the basis of new Japanese initiatives calculated to serve German interests more closely than Japan’s own interests.

5. We believe that it would not have been possible to reformulate Japanese policy in the light of the Soviet-German war without regard to the above discussed three factors, namely, lack of united opinion, desire to restrict as far as consonant with accepted engagements the risks of involvement in the European war, and decreasing confidence in German good faith.

6. We have heard it stated with some confidence by certain foreign observers here that the policy alleged to have been adopted at the recent Imperial conference is to await the results or at least the trend of the German-Soviet conflict before considering a possible eventual attack on the maritime provinces and in the meantime to push the southward advance. The reported plan is, however, to proceed with the southward advance gradually and step by step in order to avoid an open clash with the United States, the first step in the program to be aimed at Indochina and the acquisition of air and military bases on Camranh Bay and elsewhere. It is also stated that the decision to proceed with the southward advance is to be actually aimed against the Axis with the thought that Japan must consolidate her position to the southward before Germany attains full victory in the war and is in a position to interfere with Japanese ambitions.

7. The best information available here is that the Germans are not pressing Japan to intervene against Soviet Russia but that they are anxious that Japan should engage in activities which would divert the attention of the United States to some extent away from Europe. The plan above described which has been attributed to the Imperial Conference would seem to fit in fairly well with reported German desires; and we think it not unlikely that what has been described as a plan on the part of the Japanese is either a German suggestion or an attempt to rationalize and put into concrete form such German desires.

8. So far as we can see, the “momentous decision” reported to have been taken by the Imperial Conference has many of the earmarks of a decision to adopt an attitude of watchful waiting, possibly for the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Indeed all the material now available would seem to support that appraisal—the statement of the Prime Minister to an American correspondent that Japan would honor its treaties with both Germany and Soviet Russia, the statement (already reported to the Department²⁰) of the Foreign Minister to the Soviet Ambassador, and the statement on July 4 of the Foreign Minister to my British colleague,²¹ whose report is being separately telegraphed to the Department. With reference to the last statement, I might say that normally an exposition by a Foreign Minister of his country’s policies and attitude so clear in most respects as that given by Mr. Matsuoka to Sir Robert would require little commentary, but the impression that he sought to convey—that mutual confidence and understanding between the members of the Axis alliance remains unimpaired and that unanimity of opinion prevails in this country—conflicts so palpably with the truth that his exposition needs to be treated with reserve. I hope that it will be read in the light of the present report.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Moscow. Code text via air mail to Peiping and to Shanghai for Chungking.

Grew

19. July 5.
20. See telegram No. 930, July 4, 10 p.m., from the Ambassador in Japan, p. 995.
21. See telegram No. 933, July 5, 7 p.m., from the Ambassador in Japan, p. 996.