Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Volume IV

894.00/1091

Memorandum by Mr. Max W. Schmidt of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs⁹⁹

[Washington,] June 24, 1941.

The Effects on Japan of the Present War Between Germany and Russia

1. The most immediately apparent effect of the declaration of war between Germany and Russia is the closing, for the present, of direct transportation routes between Germany and Japan and the stopping of shipments of goods and travel via Russia between Japan and Germany. Existing economic and political relations between the two countries are such as apparently to make it desirable to both Germany and Japan that transportation and travel routes between the Far East and Europe be reestablished as soon as possible. Those circles in Japan, however, which desire that Japan’s ties with the Axis be weakened, probably look with equanimity upon the severance of physical connection with Germany.

2. It is believed that the immediate reaction of the Japanese people by and large will be one of confusion, giving rise to considerable uncertainty, even in highly placed circles, of the most desirable course to follow. Pro-Axis elements will attempt to foster the feeling that Germany is now actually and directly aiding Japan by attacking and weakening Japan’s traditional enemy, Russia. This view will probably receive rather wide acceptance. The “golden opportunity” arguments will be subjects of further polishing by Japanese pro-Axis orators. At the same time, large numbers of Japanese will find considerable difficulty in adjusting their minds to the continuing rapid changes in German political tactics (Matsuoka’s conclusion recently of the Neutrality Pact with Russia adds to the confusing series of the anti-Comintern pact, 1936, the German non-aggression pact with Russia, 1939, the Tripartite Pact, 1940, and now the German declaration of war on Russia). Hitler and the German cause will most likely be lowered morally in the eyes of many Japanese, especially in the eyes of such men as Baron Hiranuma and his associates. There should be readily apparent to many Japanese leaders the probability that a German success against Russia, if achieved and stabilized, would in the long run turn Russia in the direction of Asia to the detriment of Japan.

3. The Japanese people and leaders cannot be expected to forget what they have for many years considered as the Russian dagger pointed at the heart of Japan. Providing that an attack on Russia should be deemed to be militarily feasible, many Japanese would regard such an attack at this time as presenting an opportunity to remove the threat to Japan from the maritime provinces and to settle such perpetually troublesome problems as the maritime fisheries, concessions in northern Sakhalin, border disputes stretching from Mongolia across Sakhalin, Russian aid to China, Russian tutelage of Chinese communists, et cetera. The desirability of removing the military and ideological danger of Russia is well-known to and appreciated by Japanese of all classes. An attack by Japan on Russia might further confuse thinking in the United States and might be in Germany’s opinion highly desirable so far as that attack would not interfere with Germany’s probable ultimate objective for eventual control of the Far East through offsetting Russia, China and Japan one against the other. Should Germany experience difficulty in speedily settling its war with Russia, it is believed possible that Hitler might encourage Japan’s natural inclination to attack Far Eastern Russia.

4. If Japan can assure itself that Russia is no immediate threat (possibly through knowledge of Russian large-scale transfer of troops and equipment or of such aggressive weapons as bombing planes from Siberia to the European front) and if Japan can further assure itself that no third country would be allowed or would be in a position to use Siberian bases against Japan, then Japan may decide “to go southward”. It is likely that Hitler will urge the Japanese to continue to threaten the Netherlands East Indies, Singapore and the southwestern Pacific areas in order to continue tension between the United States and Japan. It is probable that Germany would prefer that there be no decisive action or definitive settlement in the Pacific until such time as Germany itself may be in a position directly to participate. However, in the event Germany shows considerable promise of advancing to Suez and/or the Persian Gulf (possibly with the benevolent neutrality of Turkey), Japan and Germany, if their present political relations continue to exist or are further strengthened, may find it highly desirable to attempt to establish connection between the Far East and Europe by sea. To accomplish this objective Japan would necessarily have to undertake its “advance to the south”.

5. It is believed that should there develop in Japan following the declaration of war between Germany and Russia any real sentiment favoring further military undertakings, such sentiment is far more likely in the first instance to be in the direction of action against Russia than toward a reinforcement of whatever sentiment there may be in Japan at the moment favoring an attack against European possessions in the southwest Pacific. It is conceivable, however, that developments in the German-Russian war may be of such a character as subsequently to turn Japan’s paramount attention southward.

99. Initialed by the Chief of the Division (Hamilton).