762.94/485: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

586. The Rumanian Minister told me this afternoon that Matsuoka received the Chiefs of Mission of the Axis and associated powers this morning and addressed the following remarks to them:

1.
Japan was “one hundred percent with the Axis.”
2.
His visit to Berlin and Rome was for the purpose of conferring with Japan’s “allies” as under existing conditions no nation acted alone but only as part of a “bloc” and that the “character of his visit” in Moscow on his return trip would depend entirely upon the result of his conversations in Berlin and Rome. He then made the categoric statement that he would not go “beyond Berlin and Rome and had no intention of going elsewhere”. It is interesting to contrast this statement with his remark to me that he desired and intended if possible to visit Vichy and several occupied capitals (see my 581, March 24, 3 p.m.).
3.
Japan wants peace and had not entered the Tripartite Pact to make war but to maintain peace and specifically to “prevent the United States from entering the war.” He was convinced that the United States would not enter the war but if it did Japan would do likewise and fight with its allies.
4.
According to his information, the United States could not “increase its production substantially before June” and could not give “decisive help” to England before the end of 1941. By then England would be beaten although, of course, an empire as big as the British could not collapse “in a day or two.”
5.
After the collapse of the British Isles, the United States would “not continue the struggle” but would withdraw and “think of its own interests and affairs.” He said that the continuance of the war by the United States aided by the British fleet and dominions was a “chimera”. The possibility that England could continue the war by transferring its capital to Canada or elsewhere was “to his personal knowledge” an illusion.

At the close of Matsuoka’s remarks, the Bulgarian Minister asked him his ideas concerning the Balkan situation to which he replied that he believed Germany and Italy would succeed in persuading Greece to conclude peace “now that Yugoslavia is entering the Tripartite” and that he could not imagine that Greece would continue a hopeless fight against two great powers. Matsuoka added that as soon as Greece made peace Turkey would not be able to do anything and “peace would be assured in the Balkans.” He said he did not believe Greece could expect effective help from Britain sufficient to enable it to continue resistance and expressed the opinion that as the Greeks were “intelligent” they would consider their own best interests.

At this point the Rumanian Minister remarked that it seemed to him that everything depended on how the Greeks “played their cards” and on the conditions Germany might offer as a basis for peace, to which Matsuoka replied that he knew and could state definitely that Germany had no desire to force the issue and would do its best to convince Greece by diplomatic means that it was in its interest to make peace.

Steinhardt