762.94/484: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 25—7:30 a.m.]
581. For the President, Secretary and Under Secretary. On the invitation of the Japanese Ambassador I was afforded an opportunity of talking with Matsuoka for an hour this morning. Unfortunately he had not yet seen Molotov with whom he has an appointment late this afternoon only a few hours before his departure for Berlin. It is quite possible that he will see Stalin29 at the same time. Matsuoka emphasized that his visit to Berlin is primarily for the purpose of making the personal acquaintance of Hitler and Ribbentrop whom he has not met and in order “to size them up.” He said that it seemed absurd to him as the Foreign Minister of one of the signatories to the Tripartite Pact not to have made the personal acquaintance of Hitler and Ribbentrop after the lapse of six months and that he desires to hear from them personally exactly what they have in mind and what their plans are. He said it is his intention to ask Hitler point blank whether he intends to attack the Soviet Union as it is of vital importance to Japan to know Germany’s future intentions toward the Soviets. I judge that any decisions Matsuoka will make on his return to Moscow will be predicated on the information given him in Berlin as to whether or not Germany contemplates an attack on the Soviet Union.
When I asked Matsuoka whether it was his intention to visit Vichy he said he hoped to do so and that he also had in mind “if he could arrange it within the limited time at his disposal” to visit the capitals of several of the occupied countries.
In so far as concerns the progress of the war, Matsuoka expressed the opinion that the Germans have a great advantage in their ability by submarines and aircraft to seriously impede British imports but he did not give me the impression that he regards the British position as hopeless. He said he has “some ideas” on the subject of the new order both in Europe and the Far East and also on the general subject of world peace which he intends [apparent omission] in his reaction.
In so far as concerns the Far East he was emphatic in his statements that Japan would under no circumstances attack Singapore or any of [Page 922] the Dutch, British, or American possessions and insisted that Japan has no territorial ambitions. He said that Japan was prepared at any time to join the United States in guaranteeing the territorial integrity or independence of the Philippines. He referred to the outcome of his mediation of the Thailand–French Indochina dispute as evidence of Japan’s lack of territorial ambitions.30 Matsuoka said that Japan would not go to war with the United States. He added that his reading of American history indicated that it was the United States which went to war with other countries and that should a conflict take place it would be only as the result of affirmative action by the United States.
Matsuoka expressed his ardent desire to liquidate the war in China as soon as possible. He said that Chiang Kai-shek was relying upon American help and that the President was in a position to bring the Japanese-Chinese conflict to an end at any time on terms satisfactory to all concerned if he would use his influence in this direction with Chiang Kai-shek. When I asked him whether he had in mind terms which he was convinced would be entirely acceptable to Chiang Kai-shek and of which the President would approve, he said that he had recently sent instructions to Nomura31 to take up the subject with the President and to discuss with him the terms upon which the Japanese-Chinese war could be brought to an end.32 He said that the present was the time “for statesmen to take decisive action” and that “what matters are the big things and not the little ones” and expressed the view that the President has a splendid opportunity “to clear up the entire situation in the Far East” by discussing with Nomura the terms on which the war with China could be terminated. He then made the following comment:
“I wish Roosevelt and Hull would trust me. I do not blame them for not having confidence on the record of the last few years but if they will trust me I will prove to them that we have no territorial or economic ambition and if an understanding should be reached which we all regard as reasonable and elements in Japan should oppose it I would fight them to put it through.”
In reply to this statement I merely suggested to him that he give Nomura the most explicit instructions as to exactly what he had in mind as the basis for terminating the war with China and that he leave nothing to chance or misunderstanding. At this point he was again emphatic in his insistence that the terms he had in mind “would be acceptable”.
[Page 923]Matsuoka said that any fears expressed in the United States, that supplies of tin and rubber might be interfered with, were “ridiculous” as obviously these commodities were for consumption in the only market large enough to absorb them—the United States—and that it would be folly to interfere with their export to the United States.
As to Japanese-Soviet relations, he was vehement in his denunciation of communism and said that under no circumstances would the Japanese people ever accept communism. He added that any clash between Japan and the United States could only benefit the Soviet Union and would unquestionably result in the “communization” of China and probably all of the continental Far East. He admitted frankly that it is his intention to endeavor to reach a political agreement with the Soviet Government but intimated that he is not disposed to pay an excessive price and that he has little confidence the Soviet Government would keep any such agreement longer than suited its purpose. He expressed the view that it is in the interest of the Soviet Union to encourage war between the United States and Japan and that he was well aware of the harm that would result to Japan from any such conflict. He added that if the United States defeated Japan the whole Asiatic mainland would be “communized” but that “Japan would arise 30 years later stronger than before.”
Matsuoka asked me if I had any reason to believe that an understanding exists between Germany and the Soviet Union with respect to Finland to which I replied that I had heard of none. He expressed the opinion that the failure of the Soviet Union to take action in the Balkans to check Germany was the result of fear.
Upon leaving Matsuoka, I expressed the hope that he would lunch or dine with Mrs. Steinhardt and myself upon his return to Moscow, to which he replied that he would be glad to do so “provided I stay over at all”. When I expressed my surprise, saying that I understood he intended to stay at least 2 or 3 days in Moscow, he said, “That is by no means certain, but will depend upon the outcome of my talks.”
Please repeat all or part of the foregoing to Tokyo only.
- Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.↩
- See also vol. v, pp. 1 ff.↩
- Adm. Kichisaburo Nomura, Japanese Ambassador in the United States.↩
- With regard to the Japanese Ambassador’s visit to President Roosevelt, see memorandum by the Secretary of State, March 14, p. 77; see also subsequent correspondence.↩