Office of the Historian

711.94/200511/14

The Postmaster General (Walker) to the Secretary of State 58

[New York,] March 18, 1941.

Memo

1. Dangers of Delay.

(a)
The Draft Document is a proclamation of a revolution in Japanese “ideology” and policy as well as a proof of the complete success of American statesmanship. Therefore, Konoye–Arima–Kido-etc, can not manage it piece-meal.
(b)
The Japanese leaders will possibly be assassinated. Mr. Wikawa and Col. Iwakuro expect assassination in any event. (Mr. Wikawa’s mother expressed herself ready for this.)
(c)
Delay may be misinterpreted in Japan and so fortify the “fifth columnists” (Shiratori, etc.) to cement the Axis Alliance through Matsuoka at Berlin.

2. Immediate procedure suggested.

Complete review by the two or three persons and substantial change introduced or substantial approval given—so that Tokyo can immediately instruct its Embassy to submit the Draft officially—upon which both Governments can announce an “Agreement in Principle”, publicly indicating some of the general points. In Japan, this announcement would have the Emperor’s approval.

3. Proof of Japanese sincerity.

If an authoritative approval of substance is privately, but categorically, given to me by the two persons, we will request the Japanese leaders to instruct (within two weeks) Admiral Nomura to present personally to Mr. Hull the Draft of the “Agreement in Principle”.

If this is not done, we can properly doubt the sincerity of the Japanese. I have such confidential information that I am thoroughly satisfied we must help the Japanese to “put it over”.

4. Length of the Draft Document is required in itself and in order to emphasize a complete change in policy.

5. Possibility of personally going over the material this week?

  1. Possibly written by Bishop Walsh.↩