Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Volume IV

711.94/200512/14

Mr. Joseph E. Davies to the Secretary of State ⁵³

[Washington,] March 17, 1941.

Ambassador Saburo Kurusu, whom I knew well in Belgium, and who, as Ambassador, went from there to Berlin, wirelessed me that he would be in Washington enroute home; and that he would like to have a visit with me. He had lunch with the writer this day.

After a visit, discussing the plight of many of our friends in Belgium, he stated the following:

He had sent in his resignation to the Japanese Foreign Office and was joining his wife (an American woman) and family in Japan. As he had stated to me in Belgium, he had gone to Berlin upon the direction of the then Japanese Cabinet for the purpose of preventing Japan from joining the axis and if that could not be prevented then to make it as harmless as possible; that he failed he said because his group (the anti-military) in Japan had received no support from either Britain or the United States. The result was that the military clique had prevailed, the whole matter had been taken out of his hands in Berlin, and had been transferred to Tokyo; leaving to him only the formal signature of the treaty in Berlin which he had done under the direction of his government.

He then went on to say that, in his opinion, the only hope for saving any part of ordered civilization in the Pacific area, was for the United States and Japan to come to an understanding; that the situation was deteriorating so rapidly that it was developing into a torrent which could not be stopped. He did not think that his country had any designs of a military character upon Singapore or any military or naval activity in the southern Pacific, but that there was a real danger lest, because of the application of economic sanctions by the United States, sheer desperation would drive the Japanese into a corner which would cause them to fight, as there was no other recourse,⁵⁴ even though it meant defeat.

I took the occasion to impress upon him that, in my opinion, the attitude of the Government of the United States, in relation to Japan, as in relation to all other countries, was that it desired peaceful and friendly relations with all governments and with Japan; but that the people and the government had reached the firm conclusion that fundamental and vital issues were now at stake; that the United States had determined upon its course which it would follow with single purpose to the end; that the United States was not bluffing; that what the situation required, in my opinion, were not generalizations but express and specific acts, backed by promises made by people who would live up to their word.

I agreed with him that there was probably a big responsibility resting on Japan and the United States, in connection with possibly bringing the world war to an end; but that I felt sure personally that both the people and the government of the United States would not tolerate any effort which involved processes of appeasement. I stated it to be my own opinion that if Japan were to withdraw from the axis now, it might be “the break” which would be the “beginning of the end”; that it was obvious that that break must come sometime and that it would be fortunate for the world if it could come now.

I also stated that I thought it was a rare opportunity for Japan to establish itself in the world along the right side of law, order and decency in international relations and contribute to the restoration of peace and the establishment of a decent world in which to live. This opportunity, I stated, might not come to them again. I ventured the opinion that within the next four or five months, in all probability, events of a military character would determine that either one side or the other would be “over the hill” and that the opportunity now existing would then be foreclosed to Japan as a contributing factor to permanent world order and possibly world peace.

Kurusu said that he felt that there was a great deal in my point of view; in fact he said that he agreed with it. He made it clear, however, that he was without any commission or portfolio. I rejoined that I was in the same position; that I was speaking entirely without the knowledge of the President or the Secretary of State and was speaking only my own views.

In reply to my inquiry as to Matsuoka, he stated that Matsuoka had been using the military clique politically and that he had been “riding hard”, and perhaps too hard and that the steed had gotten out of control; that he was now going to Russia and Berlin, with the expectation of bringing something back. He also said that Stalin⁵⁵ was “sitting tight” abiding his time and watching his opponents trying to outbid each other to secure his support.

Kurusu seemed to know practically nothing of what was going on in connection with discussions between the Secretary, the President and his government.

I told him that I would be interested in knowing what he found at home when he arrived there. He asked me why? In reply I told him that I had been approached by a responsible group who wished to retain me on behalf of big business in Japan for the purpose of trying to bring about peace in the Orient; that they had made representations to me that were startling.⁵⁶ The representations so made were to the effect that the situation in Japan had deteriorated so rapidly that the financial, economic, industrial and social structure in Japan, as well as the security of property and personal rights, were being threatened by anarchy which nothing could stop except peace; and that was the motive which prompted their approach to me.

This group had stated to me that they were in a position to assure the President and the Secretary of State that Japan would agree to the following:

(a) To settle the war with China on any fair basis that the United States should determine.

(b) To restate its position on the new order in Asia on terms which the United States would accept.

(c) To withdraw from the axis.

That these proposals were based upon only one condition, i. e., that the situation should be so handled that the face of the government of Japan, which would do this, could be saved so that it would not be destroyed by popular reaction at home.

This group had assured me that they were strong enough and had representation enough in the Cabinet, in the Navy and in the Army to make good on these specific agreements.

I had declined the employment with the statement that, in my opinion, the only way for this matter to be handled, was for the properly accredited diplomatic representatives of Japan to take the matter up directly with the President and Secretary of State, and that if they could make good on these representations I thought that they would possibly contribute greatly to the possibility of peace, certainly in the Pacific, and possibly in the world.

Kurusu seemed to be impressed with this statement; he did not seem to be altogether surprised. He agreed with me that the only proper way was to go thru the regular diplomatic channels.

He said in conclusion that he was going back to Japan and make some inquiries and investigations on his own and that if he came back, which he might do, on a special mission, I would then know that he came with authority and something definite.

Comments on European Situation

With reference to Germany, the Ambassador said that the Germans were very confident of ultimate victory and were making preparations for every possible contingency, with characteristic German thoroughness. Hitler he said was “far and away” the overtowering personality and strong man of Germany. The German people he said were behind Hitler because they were convinced that defeat now would mean enslavement under a treaty far worse than that of Versailles.⁵⁷

Italy he said had become a joke thru Europe as well as in Germany. One of the favorite jokes, he stated, was the question—“What is the secret weapon of the Italian government?” Answer: “The German Army”.

On the Balkan situation his view was that it was completely under Hitler control. This was because each of the little countries was realistically confronted with the fact that England could not make effective any promises of help in time to prevent their immediate destruction or absorption.

With reference to the invasion of England, he said that certain high military officials in Germany had stated to him that Germany could undoubtedly land an expeditionary force on the British Isles, but that the serious and most difficult problem was to keep them there and to maintain their lines of communication.

Barring some surprising and extraordinary success by the Germans over the British, thru an invasion, it was his opinion that it would be a long and bitter war; and that Germany could not be starved out in this war, as contrasted to the last.

He seemed to agree with me that in the long run, barring some accident, the industrial facilities and wealth of the United States, in support of England would win the war.

Joseph E. Davies

53. Copy transmitted by Mr. Davies in his covering letter dated March 18 to the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck); Mr. Davies at that time was senior partner of the law firm Davies, Richberg, Beebe, Busick & Richardson, of Washington.
54. Marginal notation by Dr. Hornbeck: “This is nonsense.”
55. Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
56. Penciled notation by Dr. Hornbeck: “I think that Joe [Davies] has been a bit indiscreet in telling K[urusu] this—But that’s his, Joe’s, affair.”
57. For peace treaty of June 28, 1919, see Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii, p. 55.